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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
This report presents the results of a study performed in support of the Space Station
Freedom Advanced Development Program, under the sponsorship of the Space Station
Engineering (Code MT), Office of Space Flight. The study consisted of the collection,
compilation, and analysis of lessons learned, crew time req "uirements,._d other factors
influencing the application of advanced automation and robotics, with emphasis on potential
improvements in productivity. The lessons learned data collected were based primarily on
Skylab, Spacelab, and other Space Shuttle experiences, consisting principally of interviews
with current and former crew members and other NASA personnel with relevant ex_rience.
The objectives of this report are to present a summary of this data and its analysis, and to
present conclusions regarding promising areas for the application of advanced automation
and robotics technology to the Space Station Freedom and the potential benefits in terms of
increased productivity. In this study, primary emphasis was placed on advanced automation
technology because of its fairly extensive utilization within private industry including the
aerospace sector. In contrast, other than the Remote Manipulator System (RMS), there has
been relatively limited experience with advanced robotics technology applicable to the Space
Station. This report should be used as a guide and is not intended to be used as a substitute
for official Astronaut Office crew positions on specific issues.
APPROACH
Documents were reviewed covering the areas of lessons learned from on-orbit
operations, experience with advanced automauo_n and robotics, producfi_ty concepts, and
Space Station Freedom operations roquirements. Interviews were initially conducted with 23
current/former astronauts and payload specialists, including 6 Skylab crew members, as well
as several ground support personnel with relevant experience. Following the assessment of
the data collected, a second round of more specific questions was developed and distributed
concerning potential applications of advanced automation and robotics and the resulting
Impact on productivity. The questionnaire was distributed to 32 current/former astronauts
and payload specialists including all but one of the 23 interviewed plUs I0 additional
astronauts selected by Mike Lounge. Of the 32 receiving questionnaires, a total of 27
responded. Because inadequate data exist to support detailed quantitative estimations of the
impact of advanced automation and robotics on Space Station p_uctivity, qu-alitau%e and
preliminary order of magnitude quantitative estimates were made based on the limited data
currently available. The responses of astronauts, payload specialists, and ground support
personnel were used to develop a summary of their views concerning the desirability of
implementing advanced automation and robotics and the potential for increasing productivity.
LESSONS LEARNED AND INTERVIEW RESULTS
The Space Station Freedom Program starts from a base of experiences gained in earlier
pro.grams. Of particular relevance arc the lessons learned from Skylab, the first U. S. space
stauon, which forms a reservoir of experience in long duration space operations. Since the
basic mission of Space Station Freedom is scientific and technological research, the Spacelab
missions are also of particular interest, along with other Space Shuttle and earlier NASA
missions. Other sources of knowledge about long-term operations in hostile environments
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include the Soviet Salyut and Mir space stations, the U. S. nuclear submarine fleet, and
Antarctic research stations.
Extensive published materials are available describing the experience gained from
Skylab. Skylab demonstrated the ability of crew members to function effectively over
extended periods on-orbit, and showed that most tasks are not significantly impeded in zero-
gravity. Furthermore, crew members were able to perform major and complex repair and
servicing tasks. Lessons learned include the need to plan for maintenance and repair, to
improve the human interface to on-board computers and instruments, and to automate
routine, time consuming tasks wherever practical. Lessons learned documentation from the
Space Shuttle and Spacelab programs does not exist as such. Because these are ongoing
programs, lessons learned are implemented where feasible as the program progresses.
However, available documentation does provide pertinent background information.
Recommendations from the current/former astronauts and payload specialists
interviewed included automation of checklist items not requiring extensive human judgment
such as the flight data files including malfunction procedures, calibration of certain
instruments, and recording/downlinking of data. Some asu'onauts also suggested additional
f'dtering with some degree of automated resolution of alarms, automated trend analysis of
performance data, automated fault detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR), and automated
housekeeping and inventory management assists. Another area of significant interest was
improvement of human-computer interfaces including graphical interfaces employing pull-
down menus, windows, icons, and trackball pointer. While support existed for speech
recognition and speech synthesis, some astronauts foresaw potential problems with these
technologies for certain applications. General support was expressed for some proposed
uses of robotic technologies. Strong support was expressed for on-board training including
computer-aided training. Most of the interviewed astronauts expressed support for
automation of payload/scientific activities, although preservation of the crew's capability to
optimize and control scientific activities was emphasized. Ground support personnel were
also interviewed and generally expressed support for increasing the automation level and
improving the user interfaces of the control centeT and planning and scheduling activities.
The astronaut interviews were followed up with a questionnaire which addressed these
same areas via a list of specific questions concerning crew member views on the potential
impact of advanced automation and robotics on productivity. The questionnaire was
designed to help ensure that each interviewee was asked the same questions in the same
fashion. In answering the questionnaire, respondents were asked to assume that workable,
reliable implementations of the technologies can be developed with thorough testing and
shakedown of all such systems and that manual backup and human intervention modes
would exist. According to this survey, astronauts/payload specialists are philosophically in
favor of using advanced automation to increase Space Station productivity, with 81 percent
of thoseresponding ratingitas desirable,19 percentviewing itindifferentlyand none rating
itas undesirable. EVA robotics were rated as desirableby 73 percent and somewhat
undesirableby 12 percent with the remainder indifferent.In general,the astronauts/payload
specialistsviewed advanced automation and EVA robotics as desirable in improving
productivityon the Space Station.While 46 percentof therespondentsviewed IVA robotics
as desirablein some form, the others were eitherindifferent(31 percent) towards IVA
roboticsor viewed itas somewhat undesirable(23 i_rcent).Itisinterestingtonote thatnone
of therespondentsviewed any of thesethreegeneralcategoriesas highlyundesirable.These
resultsappear in the figurebelow. The Skylab astronauts,with more experience in long
vii
iduration missions, were more strongly positive in their overall assessments than were the
others.
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Results of the safety relat_questions appear in the figure below. _ was rated as
•having potential to contribute some increase to significant improvemehts in Safety by 93
percent of the respondents. Automated exception reporting and alarm filtering Was ratedby
84 .percent as having potential for some increase to significant improvements while an EVA
retriever was rated by 69 percent to potentially increase safety. Only one respondent felt
there might be any decrease in safety potential and that concern was related to the automated
exceptionreportingand alarmfiltering.
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OPERATIONS/PRODUCTIVITY PROJECTIONS
Although there are significant difficulties in defining productivity in terms that are easily
measured, several studies have addressed productivity issues in different ways for the Space
Station, including The Human Role in Space (qT-tURIS) studies and the Space Station _
Human Productivity Study (SSI-IPS). These studies were to support achieving the goal of a
9 hour workday, 5 days per week. The THURIS methodology includes a set of generic
activities and cost models which estimates the amounts and dollar value of crew hours saved
in performing specific activities; its application to evaluating candidates for automation would
require detailed definition of specific tasks in terms of generic activities and frequencies. A
viii
m
=_
II
mr
J
lw
It
!
IP
!
g
|
m
E
W
I :
!
m
iI
=
=|
__-_.
m _--
i:
mE22_.
m
B
!
!
B
am.
!
i
R
m
i m
B
E
_l
W
iB
) =--
! i
m
I
J
| i
i m
! _
w
• qp
:q
B
: H
i--
recent estimate of the value of on-orbit crew time is roughly $35,000/hr. SSHPS developed
management plans related to productivity issues. Twelve of these plans address issues which
involve candidates for use of automation or robotics. All but three of the 12 are currently
being investigated - task performance assessment, habitable volume leak point detection, and
on-orbit system certification.
Based on examination of workdays for Skylab, Spacclab, and other isolated and
confined environments, it appears that an eight-hour workday works well, while generally a
12-h0ur shift cannot be maintained_ more than a few weeks (without degradation in
productivity). Over a long period it seems that a nine or ten hour shift with one day off per
week might be better in achieving more productive time on tasks. How much flexibility in
workday duration that should be left to the worker is unclear.
Current Space Station workday planning templates have two shifts with a 12.5 hour
duty cycle for each of two teams (I 1.5 hours off) including two handovcr periods between
shifts. After allowing for exercise, hand-over time and on-duty meals, 8.5 hours is allotted
for operations (system and user), of which 7 hours are planned activities, designating an
average of 0.5 hour each to replanning, operations training, and planning reserve. With an
eight person crew, the daily totals are 17 man-hr. (2 x 8.5) for system operations and 51
man-hr. (6 x 8.5) for user operations. This planning template does not include time for
housekeeping and the intensive sampling and measuring activities of the Extended Duration
Crew Operations (EDCO).
Spacelab mission support experience indicates the desirability of shortening the workday
for ground activities to $ hours, and increasing the use of scheduling programs and the
flexibility of timelines to reduce required manpower levels. For Space Station Freedom
support, there are differing viewpoints over the allocation of payload activity timeline
planning between ground and station, with ground personnel indicating a preference for
scheduling on the ground, and flight crew comments indicating a desire not to overload the
crew and to allow flexibility in daffy schedules. There is agreement on the need to automate
ground scheduling activity where feasible.
APPLICATION OF ADVANCED AUTOMATION TECHNOLOGY
In this report the term advanced automation refers primarily to knowledge-based
systems (including expert systems), advanced human-computer interfaces, and systems
mimicking human cognitive abilities. The emphasis is on systems not currently used on
spacecraft but which are sufficiently mature for use in the Space Station Freedom Program by
the Assembly Complete stage or shortly thereafter.
Great progress has been made in the application of knowledge-based systems to
practical problems. In the last five years these systems have become fairly common in
business, industry, and government applications, and results have shown impressive
operational _d financial benefits. NASA has significant on-going efforts in knowledge-
based systems, including a number of prototypes on Space Station Freedom testbeds.
Examples of NASA systems which have shown demonstrable operational and economic
payoffs include the Integrated Communications Officer Expert System Project ('IESP), and
the BOOSTER expert system, both in use in the Mission Control Center at Johnson Space
Center. IESP has been estimated to pay for itself in two years of operation, and BOOSTER
has been said= to have paid for itself by promptly locating a main engine pump problem in
ix
lSTS-26. Another fielded knowledge-based system in NASA is the Resource Allocation and
Planning Helper (RALPH), an intelligent assistant for allocating/scheduling the antenna and
computea" resources of the Deep Space Network, saving 3.5 man-years per annum. JPL's
Spacecraft Health Automated Reasoning Prototype (SHARP) expert system received wide
attention during the encounter with Neptune by Voyager 2. SHARP demonstrated its value
when it diagnosed a fault in a ground-based unit of the Deep Space Network after it noticed a
drop in transmission quality from Voyager 2's 30 watt transmitter. Knowledge-based
systems are also used by NASA contractors to support Space Shuttle payload bay
reconfiguration, and the verification and validation of on-board softgrar_. -_
Advanced automation prototypes under development for the Space Station Freedom
Advanced Development Program include applications for r_ost rn_i__h_ _d gr0uhd
systems. These applications include advanced human-computer interfaces, intelligent on-
board and ground-based training systems, monitoring and control systems, fault diagnosis,
isolation, and recovery systems, and systems for planning and scheduling. Advanced
automation could also perform other time consuming tasks such as mventof'y man_age__nt
and control of camera alignment/pointing and lighting. Preliminary projections show_tfiat __
significant operations cost savings may be realized in both flight operati0ns_d in _und
support through the use of these advanced automation application_ .....
APPLICATIONOF ROBOTICS TECHNOLOGY
Current applications of robotics technology work well in structured or somewhat
uncertain environments populated by well known objects; extensive research is underway
oriented towards more autonomous operations in less structured settings. __NASA's robot
technology program is based on two parallel paths: development, space qualification, and
operational integration of telcoperated manipulators; and research on increased autonomy for
manipulators. Development of a practical supervised telerobot requires adding to its Con_-I
structure a machine vision subsystem and a task planning subsyste_ _ _ ._:_ __
The Space Station_robotic systems include the Flight Telerobo_c Servicer 0:TS), the
Canadian Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator (SPDM), the mobility base, a redesignd
Remote Manipulator System (RMS), the Japanese Experiment Module (JEM) RMS, and the
Astronaut Positioning System (APS). These will be used to perform tasks including
assembly assistance, maintenance, servicing, and inspection. This is consistent with the
strong support for EVA robotics this study found among the astronauts, and the_tr view that
the automation of inspection tasks offered significant potential for incre_ing l_'0ductivity.
Quantification of'_tential productivity g_ns c_ only be currently extra_lated using
projected planned astronaut activity guidelines; however, studies have indicated that
substitution of IVA teleoperated roboticsintoEVA time lines show significant _uctions in
crew time requirements. The reduction in EVA time gained by using robotics, at least in the
fh'st years of the Space Station, will be offset by the increased IVA time that will be required
to support robotic operations. Using roootics will provide the direct advantage of reducing
the requirement for the limited EVA time available, but will increase the demand for IVA.
Advanced Development tasks in shTa'e_dco/itroYwiil=;ncreas_ _e d'ficiencyofrobofie
operations and will permit some fully automated tasks which are supervised by IVA
astronauts. In later years, some robotic applications will be capable of ground remote
supervised control. Inspection tasks and worksite preparation activities are likely candidates.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The conclusions of this study may be summarized as follows:
• The astronaut community generally has expressed strong support for the use of
advanced automation and EVA robotics on the Space Station. In terms of potential
productivity improvements, their collective view was that the applications with the
greatest potential were automated inventory management, record keeping, and FDIR,
improved human-computer interfaces, and automated construction and inspection
with EVA telerobotics. Astronauts with the long duration flight experience of Skylab
were somewhat more strongly positive in their views towards automation than
astronauts and payload specialists whose only flight experience has been Space
Shuttle missions. Current astronauts, on the other hand, with recent exposure to the
degree of automation employed0nthe Space Shuttle may be less likely to consider
automation a panacea (Low, 1990).
• There is a high potential for significant increases in productivity on Space Station
Freedom through the application of advanced automation technology during the
development and evolution of the Space Station. Areas which appear to offer the
greatest potential include automation of payload operations, inventory management,
and system monitoring and control (including FDIR).
• There is also high potential for significant increases in productivity in ground-based
Space Station operations through the use of advanced automation, resulting in lower
Life-cycle costs over the life of the Space Station. Areas which appear to offer the
greatest potential include Space Station Control Center functions, Operations
Planning and Integration activities, training, and software maintenance.
• EVA robotics has the potential to increase on-orbit productivity. The most cost
effective and technologically simple way to significantly add to astronaut productivity
(as well as decrease astronaut EVA time) throughout external assembly, maintenance,
_d inspection operations during the early life of the Space Station may be to transfer
control of the robotic elements to the ground for selected tasks. Ground control of
robotic tasks with data latency requires an integrated approach to task and spatial
planning, sensor data fusion, and robot control. Collision avoidance using this
integrated approach has been demonstrated for a robotic inspection task with time
delay representative of that experienced from the ground to low earth orbit. The
Advanced Development Program is continuing its efforts to develop and demonstrate
thistechnology given itspotentialtoreduce WA timeforrobotictasks.
A significant increase in the level of definition of Space Station activities and crew
tasks is needed which includes their durations and frequencies over the life of the
Space Station operations to provide a firm quantitative estimate of the expected
benefits of advanced automation and robotics in terms of actual crew hours saved and
thus available to support payload operations. Such data is also required in order to
judge the adequacy of available crew time as a resource to support payload
operations.
xi
aThe study results support the conclusion that there are a number of areas of application
of advanced automation and robotics which combine expected availability of the technology,
potential for significant impact on station productivity, and support by the user community.
In general, the Fiscal Year 1990 Tasks of the Advanced Development Program appear to be
consistent with these criteria.
Based on the conclusions above, the following are recommendations for the
development of advanced automation and robotics technology for the Space Station Freedom
Program:
• Development of advanced automation _d robodc_nology applications should be
actively pursued. General areas of emphasis should include knowledge-based
systems for flight systems and for ground operations, improved human-system
interfaces, and EVA telerobotics. =......
• Specific applications cannot be recommended solely on the basis of quantitative
estimates of productivity benefits at present; general guidelines should be to develop
systems which combine near-term technical feasibility, high potentiai for saving crew
time on-orbit or reducing staffing on the gro_d, and which have the early acceptance
and support of users.
• Adequate provision should be made in system design to accommodate future
introduction of advanced automation and robotics applications.
• Additionaleffortshould_ _vOted/o developingdatatoprovidethebasisformore
precise quantitative estimates of the impact of specific systems on productivity and
life-cycle cost. This effort should include the collection of workload and activity
durationdatafixanSpace StationFreedom once thestationispermanentlymanned.
• Related to the point above,a systems enginec_g study approach to trade issues
involving allocation of functions to a person, machine, or some combination thereof
needs to be performed as a next step. Such a top'down approach should consider
crew activities in two categories: (1) operations - where the routine events handled on
a daily basis might be reduced from3 hours/crew membef-diiy to 2 hours, and (2)
mission activities - involving crew experiments and new crew jobs which provides
greater potential for realizing productivity gains. Factors such as reliabl _qityty,Safety,
etc., could then be factored in to give strong indications of high payoff applications.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES
The Space Station Freedom Advanced Development Program has been established by
the Nati0n _ Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to demonstrate near-term pay-
offs from the application of advanced technology on the baseline Space Station, and to enable
the evolution of the Space Station over its projected thirty year life, in keeping with the needs
of users and long term national goals. Under the sponsorship of the Space Station
Engineering (Code MT), Office of Space Hight, the MITRE Corporation has conducted a
study to assess the potential need for and benefits of advanced automation and robotics
technology on the Space Station Freadom. The purpose of this report is to present the results
of that study in support of Advanced Development Program planning and implementation.
The study consisted of the collection, compilation, and analysis of lessons learned, crew
time requirements, and other factors affecting the need for advanced automation and robotics
on .Space Station Freedom, with emphasis on the potential for improvements in productivity
aria resulting enhanced mission capabilities and reduced life-cycle costs through the use of
this technology. The lessons learned data collected were based primarily on Skylab,
Spacelab, and other Space Shuttle experiences, consisting principally of interviews with
current and former crew members, interviews with appropriate NASA personnel at
Headquarters, Johnson Space Center, and/vlarshall Space Flight Center, and various reports
and publications. The objectives of this report are to present a summary of this data and its
analysis, and to present conclusions regarding promising areas for the application of
advanced automation and robotics technology and the potential benefits in terms of increased
productivity, n this study, primary emphasis was placed on advanced automation technology
because of its fairly extensive utilization within private industry including the aerospace
section. In contrast, other than the Remote Manipulator System (RMS), there has been
relatively limited experience with advanced robotics technology applicable to the Space
Station.
The intended audience for this report includes the management and staff of the Space
Station Freedom Program at all levels, and particularly those involved in decisions
conce_g the development of advanced automation and robotics technology and its use on
the evolving Space Station. This report should be used as a guide and is not intended to be
used as a substitute for official Astronaut Office crew positions on specific issues (Low,
1990).
1.2 BACKGROUND
With a planned operational lifetime of thirty years, Space Station Freedom requires the
capability to grow and evolve over time. This requirement was formally recognized in
President Reagan's directive on space policy of January 5, 1988, which states that the Space
Station will allow evolution in keeping with the needs of station users and the long-term
goals of the United States. The Advanced Development Program was established under the
Space Station Freedom Program (SSFP), to help define, develop, and implement a program
to enable evolution of the station. The Advanced Development Program is managed by Code
1-1
MT, NASA Headquarters, and involves all NASA Centers and all four SSFP Work
Packages.
The objectives of the Advanced Development Program include the enhancement of
productivity on the baseline and evolutionary station, and reductions in operations and life-
cycle costs. Thus the rationale for investments in specific technologies and applications
should include an assessment of the potential for productivity increases and cost savings.
The initial Advanced Development Program has focused on advanced automation and
robotics, with emphasis on advanced automation and in particular, knowledge'based
systems. The study described in this report has attempted to identify significant areas of
application of advanced automation and robotics technology, and to assess the potential for
productivity increases and cost savings from these applications.
1.3 SCOPE
For this report, and the study it describes, the term "advanced automation" refers to
automation more advanced than what is currently implemented on the Space Shuttle. Thus
advanced automation was assumed to include expert and knowledge-based systems, together
with the associated human-computer interfaces. Emphasis was placed on technologies which
arc currently available or in an advanced state of development, reducing the need to consider
technical risk explicidy. The term "robotics" was assumed to encompass the associated
automation software and hardware, and emphasis was placed on teleoperated robotics for
both EVA and IVA related applications.
Sources for potential applications were pfimar_y existing reports and documents, as
well as interviews with current and former astronauts and other NASA personnel.
Applications on the Space Station Freedom Manned Base were emphasized, with some
consideration also given to ground-based mission support applications. Potential
applications on the Polar Orbiting Platform, and applications of knowledge-based systems to
the design, development, and engineering of the station were not explicitly c0nsid_i.
X1thoughthespeci cde.sol s tion con gn ationwerenota c ticalfactorinthe
assessments presented in this report, the study in general is based on the configuration as
def'med in June 1989. It is recognized that there is the potential for significant modifications
due to the Configuration/Budget Review currently underway as this report is being written.
Modifications leading to a simpler baseline design may result in an increased need for
automation and robotics enhancements during station evolution, as well as an increased need
for identification of "hooks and scars" on the baseline Space Station necessary to
accommodate future growth and upgrade.
1.4 0VERVIEW0F THE STUDY APPROACH
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The overall Objective of the study, assessing the need for advanced automation and ill !
robotics in the evolution of Space Station Freedom,_required the accomplishment of two
supporting objectives. The first of these consisted of the compilation and anaIysis of relevant
lessons learned from Space Station analogs to identify potential applications of advanced _[ !
technology. The second was the identification of projected crew time allocations and ground
personnel requirements for the operation of the station. This information was combined to
form an assessment of the potential impact of the technology on stati0-Hp/oducdvity.
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The approach taken to accomplish these objectives was to identify, collect, review, and
analyze relevant information. The data consisted of reports and documentation, and
interviews with persons having knowledge of space operations. The documentation coUected
included lessons learned from Skylab, Spacelab, Space Shuttle, the Soviet space program,
and terrestrial analogs to working in space; crew time allocations and productivity analyses
for Space Station Freedom; and descriptions of advanced automation and robotics technology
together with experience from its application and the resulting productivity and cost impacts.
Interviews were conducted with current and former astronauts and payload specialists
representing experience with Skylab, Spacelab, Space Shuttle, Apollo, and Gemini, as well
as with astronauts in training. Following these interviews, a list of specific questions was
developed and distributed, and the responses tabulated. Other NASA personnel with
knowledge of Space Station productivity and crew time analysis, or with ground-based
mission operations, were also interviewed.
The analysis of the data collected was oriented towards identification of applications
with high potential, followed by assessment of potential benefits. The assessment of
potential benefits was based primarily on high-level workday time allocations, experiences
with similar technology, and judgment; it was impractical in most applications to forecast
specific productivity increases in quantitative terms. This was the result of a lack of fm'n
projections of crew activities and amounts of time required for each activity in sufficient detail
for analysis, together with the difficulty of predicting quantitative impacts of a particular
application of advanced technology to a specific activity. Thus the conclusions presented
empha:size the judgments of operational personnel (e.g. astronauts) rather than quantification
of proauctivity. More detailed descriptions of the approach taken in collecting data, including
the interview process, and the steps taken to analyze the data, are contained in Section 2 of
this report.
1.5 ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. The approach taken in the study is
described in detail in Section 2, including a description of the interview process and a
discussion of how the collected data were used. Section 3 summarizes the results of the data
collection process regarding the need for advanced automation and robotics based on
previous experience. This section includes material from reports and interviews, and covers
Skylab missions (3.1), Spacelab and other Space Shuttle missions (3.2), and experience
from miscellaneous areas outside the U.S. space program which are analogs to the Space
Station, including the Soviet space program and the U.S. nuclear submarine program (3.3).
Section 4 discusses productivity projections and time allocations for Space Station Freedom.
Included are summaries of basic concepts of productivity, and existing and ongoing work
within the Space Station Freedom Program regarding productivity analysis and crew and
mission support time allocations. Sections 5, Application of Advanced Automation
Technology, and 6, Application of Robotics Technology, present overviews of the
technology, describe experience with the technology, list potential areas of application, and
assess the potential for improving productivity and effectiveness and reducing life-cycle costs
on Space Station Freedom. Finally, Section 7 presents conclusions and recommendations
arising from the study.
The appendices include an listing of the Space Station Freedom Advanced Development
Program projects (Appendix A), a list of personnel interviewed during this study (Appendix
B), the astronaut/payload specialist survey questionnaire and responses (Appendix C),
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Ubackground on productivity concepts (Appendix D), an overview of advanced automation
technology (Appendix E), an overview of robotics te.chnology (Appendix F), a list of NASA
A&R contacts (Appendix G), principal authors of Dis report (Appendix H), references
(Appendix I), a bibliography (Appendix J), and a glossary (Appendix K).
m
B
i
I
"l
m _
M
w
m ij+
I
!
I
1-4
|
|+
m
U
m
m
E
z
m!
i
l
!ira
lil
H
gg
!m
g]
m
Em
SECTION 2
STUDY APPROACH
Accomplishing the study objectives required the identification of potential applications of
advanced automation and robotics technology on Space Station Freedom, identification of
time allocations for projected activities of the crew on-orbit and mission control on the
ground, and assessment of the potential for improvements in productivity from the use of
advanced technology in the identified applications. Specific study activities fell into two
categories: collection of data in the form of documentation and interviews, and assessment of
the data to identify the potential benefits from application of advanced automation and
robotics. The general approach taken in the study is described in Section 2.1 below,
followed in Section 2.2 by a more detailed discussion of how the interviews were conducted
and data collected and compiled.
2.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE APPROACH
The overall approach is illustrated in Figure 2-1. Initial activities, conducted in parallel,
were the collection and review of documentation and the interviewing of current and former
astronauts and other NASA personnel. Documentation reviewed covered the following
areas;
Experience from Skylab, Spacelab, other NASA missions, the Soviet space program,
and other analogs to the working environment in space such as the U.S. nuclear
submarine program
• Experience with advanced automation and robotics technology, both within NASA and
more generally
• Concepts of productivity for humans living and working in space, including attempts to
quantify the impacts of technology on productivity
• Space Station Freedom operations, crew activities and time allocations.
Interviews were initially conducted with 23 astronauts and payload specialists, including 6
Skylab crew members, as well as other individuals with experience relevant to the objectives
of the study. Following the assessment of the data collected, both from interviews and
documents, a second round of more specific questions was developed concerning potential
applications of advanced technology on Space Station Freedom and the resulting impact on
productivity. The conduct of these interviews !s_scdbed more fully below.
The results of the initial round of interviews, together with the review of existing
documems, supported the development of a list of potential applications of advanced
automation and robotics, along with some guidelines pertaining to their development and use.
The potential contribution of these candidate applications to the enhancement of productivity
on Space Station Freedom was assessed based on the data collected regarding crew activities
and time allocations, and ground support staffing. This assessment combined the judgments
of astronauts and other operational personnel, the experience to date with advanced
technology and its impact on productivity, and the judgment of MITRE staff regarding the
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Figure 2-I Study Approach
extent to which candidate application areas met criteria related to the potential for productivity
enhancement. It was the assessment of the MITRE study team that the existing data
regarding station operations, crew activities, and the effects of advanced technology are
inadequate to support a detailed quantitative analysis resulting in an explicit numerical
estimate of the impact of the technology on hours of crew time required and overall life cycle
costs. However, certain conclusions can be drawn regarding the implementation of advanced
technoiogy applications for Space Station Freedom which are meaningful in terms of
providing firm guidelines for automation and robotics thrusts.
The conclusions from the assessment of candidate application areas were compared with
the projects supported by the Advanced Development Program during Fiscal Year (FY) 1989
and projected for FY1990. The Advanced Development Program tasks for FYg0 are shown
in Appendix A. The results were expressed in the form of recommendations concerning
applications with the greatest potential for productivity benefits.
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2.2 DATA COLLECTION AND THE INTERVIEW PROCESS
The gathering of information for the study included collection and review of documents
and reports, initial interviews with current and former astronauts and other NASA and
contractor personnel, and collection of responses to a specific set of questions developed
following the initial interviews and document review. Document collection was
straightforward; a list of the documents reviewed is included as Appendix I. This section
describes the approach taken in the interviews, with emphasis on the interviews with current
and former astronauts. A list of persons interviewed is given in Appendix B.
The interviewswere conducted in an informal manner. A shortlistof generalquestions
was prepared, but these were primarily intended to stimulate discussion and were not
discussed uniformly inallof the interviews.The objectivewas toobtain the interviewcc's
vicws regarding previous experience indicatinga need for automation and robotics,and
desirablepotentialapplicationareason Space StationFreedom. The directiontaken by each
interviewvarieddepending upon the comments and opinionsexpressed.
An attempt was made to have at least two persons from the study team present at each
interview to allow the comparison of notes and impressions and to reduce listener bias in the
interpretation of responses. Some of the interviews were taped, but in most cases notes were
taken by hand.
Assurances were given to each contact that confidentiality would be maintained, and that
any sensitive statements made would not be traceable to an individual. These assurances
were given at the time of setting up an interview, and were reiterated during each interview.
In most cases the interviews were conducted at the individual's office. Trips were made
to Marshall Space Flight Center and to Johnson Space Center to interview several contacts.
Interviews were also conducted at NASA Headquarters, the Space Station Program Office at
Reston, MITRE's NASA Headquarters Site, and other locations.
Using the results of the initial interviews, a list of more focused questions concerning the
potential for productivity enhancement from use of automation and robotics was developed
and presented to the current and former astronauts and payloa d specialists previously
interviewed together with 10 additional personnel from the Astronaut Office at Johnson
Space Center. A total of 26 responses were received. The responses were collected and
merged into a tabular summary. This data formed part of the basis for assessing various
applications of advanced automation and robotics technology.
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SECTION 3
LESSONS LEARNED AND INTERVIEW RESULTS
3.1 SKYLAB EXPERIENCE
As the name implies, the primary purpose of Skylab was to serve as a laboratory for
scientificobservationin orbitat 235 nauticalmiles. The areas of investigationincluded
astronomy, earth resources,physiology, materialsprocessing, and behavioral science;
Skylab also served as a platform to testboth the technologicaland human capabilitiesto
support long durationspace flightand toperform usefulwork in zero gravity. The Skylab
spacecraftwas planned to have an eightmonth operationallifeto support threeseparately
launched three man crews; itactuallyremained in orbitfor justover six years,with its
systems functionalfor most of thattime. The crew missions were of increasingdurationat
28, 59 and 84 days respectively.The Skylab complex consistedof the OrbitalWorkshop,
thcApollo Telescope Mount (ATM), theMultipleDocking Adapter,theAirlock Module, and
theInsu'ument Unit;theentirecomplex was placedin orbitby a Samm V rocket. The crews
traveledtoand from the Skylab inApollo Command ServiceModules nearlyidenticaltothe
spacecraftused in the lunar missions,launched by modified Saturn IB rockets. Dcspitc
seriousproblems during launch, includinglossof one of the solarpower wings and thc
micromcteoritcshieldduring Skylab launch,the failureof another solarpower wing tofully
deploy, and other equipment failuresduring itsorbitallife,Skylab met the bulk of its
scientificobjectives,and allowed NASA togain significantadditionalknowledge regarding
hum_ capabilitiesinspace. Descriptionsof the Skylab program appearinBelew (1977) and
Holder and Siuru (1975).
The relevanceof theSkylab experiencetothe Space Stationprogram isobvious. Skylab
was, in effect,the fin'stU.S. space station,and isNASA's only directexperience with long
duration manned space flight. In addition,its mission was predominantly scientific.
However, limitationsto the analogy between Skylab and the Space Stationdo exist.First
among theseisthe factthatSkylab was based upon Apollo (1960s) technology making the
levelof automation availableforSkylab very limited.
3.1.1 Skylab Document Review
A v_ety of documents, (seethe Bibliography),were used as sources forthisanalysis.
In general,thesedocuments do not focus upon automation and robotics(A&.R) due to the
relativeimmaturity of the technology at the time Skylab was being planned and built.
However theydo shed lighton variousconsiderationsrelatedtoA&R plans.
3.1.1.1 Human Capabilities
According to Skylab veteranOwen K. Garriott(1974),one major role of the human
crew member isthe flexibilityhc (or she) brings to the system, including the abilityto
respond tounforeseen events. Examples of major unforeseenrepairsin Skylab included the
freeingof the solarpanel assembly and deployment of the shade during Skyiab 2 and the
replacement of the rategyroscopes during Skylab 3. Examples of unforeseen scientific
activitiesincluded observations of the comet Kohoutek and instances of the scientist-
astronautvarying experimental protocolsbased on resultsor to takeadvantage of scientific
opportunities.
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The general consensus of reports from the Skylab program was that humans have the
capability to perform essentially any task on-orbit that they can do on the ground, if equipped
with the right tools. In particular, the moving of large masses was easy as long the astronaut
could see around them to steer (JSC, 1974 and Bond, 1974). The primary limitations on
human performance were found to be in the need to brace oneself to obtain leverage in the
absence of gravity (JSC, 1974) and decreased accuracy in psychomotor tasks requiring
accurate positioning (Connors, 1975). Extra-vehicular activity (EVA) posed additional
difficulties in the lack of depth perception due to lighting characteristics and fatigue stemming
from the requirement to maintain fixed positions and the effort to work against the stiffness
of the pressurized suit. In addition, long term isolation ultimately has an effect on
performance (JSC, 1974), a fact which is confh-med by Soviet space experience (Bluth,
1986) and experiences from the U.S. nuclear submarine program (Boeing, 1983).
Individual task completion times for Skylab initially exceeded preflight baselines but
improved with practice (Connors, 1975 and Kubis & McLaughlin, 1974). Neutral buoyancy
training provides a good means of estimating task completion times (McDonnell Douglas,
1984). Nonetheless, planners tend to overload schedules (Connors, 1975), from a desire to
get as much done as is possible and because the actual in-flight contingencies are not always
foreseen.
3.1.1.2 General Design Guidance
One of the lessons learned was the need _or additionaI-s_'stem flcxib_ty (NASA HQ-
PO, 1974), including the need for more flexible redundancy/failure management and the
ability to change caution and warning limits as the environment changes and preset limits are
found to be no longer appropriate (JSC, 1974). On the other hand, the crew (and the
ground) must be provided with current information regarding system configuration including
all settable parameters. Problems developed on Skylab when certain switch settings were
modified by ground personnel without the knowledge of the crew.
The Skylab crew interface was significantly more complex than that in previous manned
space missions (Bond, 1974) such as the Apollo missions. Crew interface with Skylab
systems and experiments was effected primarily through panels of switches and indicators
located at various places in the vehicle; a hexadecimal keypad was provided for data_entry,
and a teleprinter for uplink of textual information (e.g. instructions) from the ground. In
addition, a large number of experiments appeared in the manifest., with many of them having
complex interfaces (MSFC, 1974). In some cases the experimental apparatus did not allow
the crew sufficient control to obtain optimal results, and in others the required crew
interaction was needlessly time-consuming. A standard, user-friendly system interface is
needed, which provides the crew (and the ground) with current information regarding system
status,and which makes necessaryinteractionsas easy as ispossible.
A significantamount of on-0rbit maintenance (a totalof more than 250 separate
unscheduled actions)was requiredduringthe threemanned missions;particularlynoteworthy
wcrc the previouslymentioned freeingof thejammed solarpanel and deployment of a solar
shield on Skylab 2 and the erection of a replacement solar shield and rate-gyroscope
replacement on Skylab 3. The Skylab design anticipated only limited maintenance
requirements; in particularlack of foot restraintsin some externalareas complicated early
repairwork (JSC, 1974). Periodicreplacement of ATM film cartridgesrequiredan EVA.
Based on the Skylab experience,the NASA Centers feltthatNASA should design for on-
orbitmaintenance OSC, 1974) and place items expected to requireservicein pressurized
areastoavoid therequirement forEVA (Schultzctal.,1974). Access should bc provided to
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all parts of the vehicle (NASA HQ-PO, 1974, and JSC, 1974), and all systems should be
considered as possible maintenance targets. An effort should be made to systematically
capture design knowledge to aid the support of diagnosis and maintenance functions (NASA
HQ-PO, 1974).
Additionally, the impact of experiments on operations must be considered. This impact
includes inventory requirements, servicing requirements, and limitations on maneuvering. In
particular, routine servicing of the ATM required an EVA.
3.1.1.3 Housekeeping
Experience with the habitability systems also pointed up specific areas, such as the
routine cleaning of filters and the cleaning of walls, in which housekeeping functions could
be more efficient. While most of these areas are not readily automated, one area of
significant interest was inventory management. Skylab inventory management posed
problems in tracking a large quantity of stores which could not easily be replaced. An
additional difficulty was that small items tended to float away and become lost. Thus,
inventory management, storage, and the handling of small items were particular problems.
Since loose items tend to follow air flow in zero gravity, the flight crews learned to look for
lost objects on air return screens, and a number of suggestions have been made to use airflow
devices for the handling and control of small objects.
3.1.1.4 Automation and Robotics Needs
As was stated previously, automation and robotics were not considered major areas of
interest in the immediate post-Skylab era, and the available documentation gives little
coverage to these issues. However, additional automation was recommended (JSC, 1974)
for those experiments in which the crew involvement does not include any evaluative or
decision making functions, but is limited to following checklists. This principle could also
extend to following checklists in some systems functions (NASA HQ-OSF, 1976).
Additional automated assists for recording and reporting were felt to have value (JSC, 1974).
3.1.2 Skylab Astronaut Interviews
The consensus among the Skylab crew members interviewed generally favored
automation, although there were some variances on specific items. Although Skylab used
Apollo-era technology, Skylab was the first real use of system automation in space flight in
the sense that the crew did not have to continuously monitor the systems. Table 3-1
summarizes the applications of automation and robotics technology suggested by both Skylab
and Shuttle crew members. The following sections will provide additional explanation of the
opinions/comments expressed by the interviewees.
3.1.2.1 Workload and Schedules
Skylab astronaut opinions about the workload varied, possibly reflecting the fact that the
later missions placed greater demands upon the crew. Several commented that the fast pace
characteristic of the relatively short Spaeelab missions would be difficult to maintain for
extended periods. The predominant view was that one "off' day is necessary per week, with
crew activities on that day being optional. Also, sufficient time should be built into schedules
for contingencies, and the crew should have the flexibility to reschedule tasks which are not
time or resource critical. Several astronauts felt that an on-boat_l, computerized re-scheduling
capability would be useful.
3-3
Suggested Areas for
Table 3-1
Advanced Automation and Robotics
m
W
Monitoringand control
Screeningofalarms
Trend analysis/incipientfailuredetection
Automated external "IV cameras and lighting
ElectromcFlightDam F'de
Intelli_entdatareduction
Rescuablecaunon and warninglimits
Automatedchecklists/procedures
Automatedinventorymanagement
Autonomous subsystemsoperation
Confi_,uration Control documentation
Faultdiagnosisisolationand recovery(FDIR)
"What if' capability and explanation facilities
Fire detection location and suppression
Automated sating to prevent cascading failures
Reconfi_uration
Medical/health advisor
EVA suit maintenance advisor
Switch in backup element & notify crew
Advisory Systems
Payloads
High definition television(HDTV') Automatedcalibration/alignment
Electronicloggingof observations,photographs,etc.Sample analysis
Automatedbiomedicalanalyses Feeding,cleaningoflabanimals
_ Biolo[ical/Materiais sample analysis Calibration and alignment
Scheduling
Schedule development (ground)
Edit capability
Rescheduling(on-board)
Intelligentcomputeraidedtraining
Videotapes
On-board training
Heads-up displays
ExternalORU replacement
Remote inspectionoftheexterior
Housekeepingrobots
Improved collisionavoidance
Robotics
Hazardousmaterialshandling
EVA retriever
Wall scrubber
Filter cleaners
Human-computer interface
"Mac" styleinterface
Speech recognition
Auto recording/downlinkof notes
Use of graphics
Speech synthesis
Electronicmail
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3.1.2.2 Human Computer Interface
_¢ human computer interface on Skylab was regarded as difficult to use. Particularly
onerous was the requirement to enter long sequences of numbers at the keypad, which in
some cases were calculated on the ground and read to the asu'onauts over the communications
link. The te!epdnter on the Skylab was useful, but a wider printout with graphics would
have been better. There was much use of paper records and documentation on Skylab; this
could be computerized. One Skylab veteran recommended that a user interface similar to that
on the Apple Macintosh be used.
3'1.2.3 Scientific Activities
As was stated in the lessons learned documents, astronauts commented that some
experiments required a crew member to execute a lengthy checklist without having any
opportunity to exercise judgment or control the course of the experiment. This was
particularly common in instrument calibration or alignment. In some cases, ff the checklist
was interrupted or an error was made, the crew would have to start the procedure again from
the beginning. Where feasible they suggested that such checklists and repetitive activities
(e.g. instrument alignment and calibration), should be automated where human judgment is
not required, or at least "set-points" should be provided to allow recovery from intermediate
steps.
In Skylab the astronauts were required to read recorded data (e.g. experimental results)
to the ground over the communications link, usually once a day. Instructions were
sometimes received from the ground in the same manner, although the teleprinter was usually
used. Recording experimental results (and logging of samples and photographs) and
transmission tO the ground was another activity suggested for automation. Automated
measurementofair required during exercise and measurement of human waste as well as
biological and mat_alS s_ple analysis were also mentioned.
_: = ,
Some• crew members wanted to have flexibility in scheduling, at least around major
tasks. Another suggestion was that time-critical actions be considered for automation, to
assure that these actions bereliably performed at the proper time and to minimize the impact
on other work and relieve the associated crew member stress.
3.1.2.4 Monitoring and Control
System monitoring is a tedious task which should generally be considered for
automation. Several crew members reported excessive numbers of false alarms, which
required them to _terrupt work to deal with the alarm. This was particularly disruptive if it
caused the interruption of work which was difficult to restart. To alleviate this problem, they
recommended that caution and warning limits should be resettable, and suggested that
development of systems to filter out spurious alarms might be considered. A number of
astronauts suggested automated fault diagnosis, isolation and recovery (FDIR) systems.
Also suggested were automatic recording of configuration/status, incipient failure detection,
and automation of at least some of the malfunction procedures (MALs), e.g. those where the
decision making is reasonably routine. At least one astronaut pointed out that contingency
planning is a particularly difficult task, i.e. many of the failures which have occurred were
not the expected ones and thus not the ones which were simulated.
3-5
3.1.2.5 Other Areas for Automation and Robotics
Otherareas for which the astronauts suggested automatic assistance were housekeeping
and inventory management. These areas were considered by most of the interviewed crew
members as excessively time-consuming and unproductive, at least in the sense that they do
not directly contribute to the crew's scientific work. In particular, the transfer of food from
the logistics module to storage lockers, vacuuming of filters and screens, and the daily
recording of consumption of food and other supplies were mentioned as burdensome.
Several astronauts supported an automated inventory management system, for instance using
a bar-code reader to record the use of supplies or placement of tools. While routine cleaning
was not generally regarded as burdensome in Skylab (it required 20 man-days over the life of
the program, or approximately 4 man days per month of occupation), some of_e astronauts
felt that an automated aid for cleaning behind the racks in the Space Station might be
valuable. One astronaut suggested use of on-board training systems (e.g. intelligent,
computer aided training or ICAT). Others recommended automated communications or ftre
detection/suppression/prevention.
Suggested robotics applications included external on-orbit replacement units (ORU)
replacement, hazardous materials handling, various outside operations, remote inspections of
exterior surfaces, and EVA set up (pu_ng portable work platforms in place prior to astronaut
EVA). Associated automation re.commended included television camera/lighting control and
pointing provisions supporting proximity operations. Strong encouragement was also voiced
for an automated crew mounted retrieval system which would automatically return a disabled
astronaut to the Space Station.
In general, tedious and repetitive activities and time critical tasks were viewed as
candidates for automation. In automated systems, the crew must be able to ascertain that the
automation is behaving properly, and the automation design should allow for graceful
degradation and manual intervention/backup. Wherever possible, systems should be
modularized to facilitate manual intervention/operation (as well as to support verification and
validation). When procedures are automated, it should be recognized that some of the
prepared procedures may be incorrect and in need of modification. Provisions should be
made for easy modification of procedures and checklists within configuration management
guidelines.
Emphasis was placed on the need for a strong infrastructure to support automation and
robotics; this infrastructure would include the Data Management System (DMS), availability
of sufficient internal and downlink bandwidth, and other supporting technologies as high
definition television. Other advice given included designing automation features that support
checkout and verification, having the software developers working closely with the end users
from the beginning, ensuring the user-interfaces are really user-friendly, providing degraded
and manual modes in the automated systems that are simple to use, developing systems with
maintenance, repair, and modification in mind, building distributed systems, allowing for
software compatibility, and considering security aspects. Some stressed that the Space
Station Freedom Program should think in terms of more advanced technology.
3.1.2.6 Suggested Items to Remain Manual
Skylab astronauts interviewed suggested some items or activities which they felt should
remain manual. These included hatch operations (at least have manual override mode),
pressure equalization valves, EVA controls, and manned docking and maneuvers. They also
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generally felt that waste management should remain manual primarily for aesthetic or health
reasons or because they did not see how it could be automated.
3.2 SPACE SHUTTLE EXPERIENCES
Thirty-two Space Shuttle missions have been launched as of December 1, 1989. These
have included three Spacelab missions as well as a host of other scientific experiments.
Interviewees included astronauts and payload specialists who had flown Spacelab missions,
astronauts who had flown other STS missions, and astronauts who have been assigned to
upcoming flights but have not yet flown. Some of the astronauts interviewed were currently
working on projects directly supporting the Space Station.
3.2.1 Shuttle Documentation
No documents comparable to the Skylab "lessons learned" documents have been
produced for the Spacelab or STS programs. A number of documents relatingto Spacclab
and ground supportoperations(MOD, 1985) were reviewed.
3.2.2 Astronaut and Payload Specialist Interviews
The views expressed by the astronautsinterviewed varied widely. Some astronauts
believedthatallareasshould be subjectto automation and thatNASA should aggressively
push the state-of-the-artinA&.R. At leastone feltthatNASA isspending too much efforton
research and not enough on building the station. More control from the ground was
mentioned as an alternativetoon-board automation. However, opinions converged inareas
regarding many specificA&R applications.General candidatesfor automation included
monitoring of system state,repetitiveactions,and time-criticalactionsnot requiringhuman
judgment. General recommendations included the provision of usable manual
backups/overridesand intermediatelevelsof automated control. Many astronautsfeltthat
"man-in-the-loop"operationwas essential,atleastinitially,with slow evolutiontoward more
automation to preserve timeline continuity, safety, and operability. Some mentioned that if it
makes sensetoautomatesomethingon earth,thenitshouldprobablybe automatedinspace.
However, a Skylabastronaut(Pogue,1989)cautionedthatwhilethisisa good generalrule,
some thingsare actuallyeasiertoautomate inspace (due tothe microgravity)and should not
be overlooked. Severalastronautsemphasized thatautomated systems should be designed so
thattheygivetheuserclearinsightintovitalsystemoperations.Warnings were issuedabout
the tendency of physicalsystems tobehave differentlyin thespace environment thanon the
ground and thatthismust be takenintoaccount.
3.2.2.1 Improved Human Computer Interface
General dissatisfaction exists with the system interfaces on the Space Shuttle. These
interfaces were described as "unfriendly" and antiquated. The displays tend to be cluttered
and consist primarily of columns of numbers. Several astronauts felt that too many
keystrokes were required to call up the desired information or to take the desired action; one
astronaut estimated that during a typical Space Shuttle mission, the flight crew makes 27,000
keystrokes. In addition, several astronauts felt that too many discrete controls (over 1000
lights, gauges, and switches) are present, particularly on the flight deck.
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It was felt there are too many different computer interfaces on Space Shuttle (especially
during Spacelab missions). These can include the Space Shuttle Data Management System
(DMS), the Spacelab computer system, and computers for individual experiments.
In general, the astronauts wanted interfaces which make use of the best technologies
available on the ground (e.g. pull down menus and the windows-icons-mouse-pointer style
interfaces popular on current computer workstations, replacing the mouse with a trackball for
zero gravity use). Another desire is better use of color and graphics. Speech recognition
interfaces were not regarded as desirable for critical applications, but almost everyone who
expressed an opinion could see possible uses of this technology for hands-busy control, e.g.
for certain space suit or glove box controls. If used however, a backup means of control was
strongly desired. Several astronauts felt that speech synthesis could be useful in certain
applications for relaying information as long as the visual cues (e.g. warning lights and
messages) were also retained,
3.2.2.2 Monitoring and Control
Generally, the astronauts supported the automation of monitoring tasks. However,
there were mixed feelings about the need for additional automated screening/interpretation
of alarms. Some thought that the shuttle caution and warning system of various levels
designated by color and tone was adequate; others felt that there were excessive false
alarms. One veteran suggested a "smart system" for critical warnings would be helpful.
Several interviewees emphasized that the automated systems must not hide useful
information from the crew and that somehow these systems take into account the problems
of sensor reliability and accuracy. Several endorsed subsystems autonomy and trends
analysis. A desired feature is "what if?'.' capability where the crew member cart query the
system as to what would happen ff a certain actions were taken before committing to such
actions. Resettable limits for caution and warning were thought to be necessary.
3.2.2.3 Fault Diagnosis, Isolation and Recovery (FDIR)
The astronauts strongly supported FDIR activities including automated load shedding
and safing of systems though there were mixed views on automatic reconfiguration,
especially in safety-critical systems. Most of those who supported automatic
reconfiguration also emphasized that the systems must inform the crew and ground control
of any configuration changes. Some were concerned about implementing automated
control of safety critical systems while others felt that at least portions of even safety critical
systems could be automated. Others wondered how automated systems would be able to
handle multiple independent failures when current written malfunction procedures cover
single faults. Concern was also expressed by some over the fact that failures that occur in
space are often not those foreseen during mission planning, though prototype knowledge-
based systems exist which employ causal modelling to handle such contingencies. It was
also emphasized by several that an automated FDIR system should explain its reasoning.
One as_onaut suggested the use of simulation (SIM) results to help build FDIR expert
systems. Another veteran astronaut suggested that even the use of advisory expert systems
to recall fault procedures would be helpful.
Several astronauts expressed the viewpoint that the current paper Flight Data File
(FDF) is unwieldy; the version currently carried on-board can weigh over 100 pounds.
There was a genera/feeling that it could be at least partially automated (i.e. put into
electronic form). One astronaut felt that flight crews might still want a paper copy on-
board.
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3.2.2.4 _Automation of Payloads
There have been a number of experimental apparatus failures, particularly on
experiments located on the middeck, although crew intervention has allowed the successful
accomplishment of scientific objectives in most cases. Some payloads do not give the flight
crew enough control to allow successful intervention in case of problems. Ground personnel
have no access to the standalone computers on the middeck, and there have been situations in
whieh_Automation did not work correctly. There was a general consensus that payloads
should be designed for flight crew intervention.
Many astronauts supported further automation of the scientific payloads, where
appropriate, as long as sufficient capability was retained for crew members to
interv_c/ovcrride the automation. The appropriate level of automation varies based on the
nature of _e research; automation was viewed as impractical for some aspects of life sciences
experiments while it was considered that manufacturing processes should be completely
automated. Even in life science experiments, it was suggested that the animal waste
management and cleaning process somehow be automated. Additionally, it was suggested
that an expert system or other automated system with confidentiality protection provisions
include a data base for medical diagnosis, history, medical records, and clinic operations
including exercise and body input/output parameters. Several suggested that experiment set
up, operations monitoring, and observations recording should all be automated where
feasible. Another strongly suggested that an historical database for flight science experiments
be established because so many principal investigators proposing experiments seem to be
completely unaware of similar experiments previously flown. Successful automation of a
scientific activity on the ground appears to be a geg,eral prerequisite to automating it on the
Space Station. Some crew rnemb_ felt that teleselenee has not been particularly successful
to date (at least, for materials processing) due to communications delay and lack of visual
fidelity (color and depth perception), and that more work needs to be done in this area.
Concern was also expressed about the need for a strong data management system (DMS) and
sufficient downlink capability to support on-board science.
3.2.2.$ Telerobotics
The only experience with robotics in the Space Shuttle era is the Remote Manipulator
System (RMS). There were indications that there have been problems with this system, but
the only details available had to do with an excessive rate of false alarms in the RIVIS collision
avoidance software, controUability (e.g. dynamic harmonics) and comments on the need for
an improved user interface.
Several of the astronauts interviewed had opinions on planned Space Station robotic
systems. General support existed for an EVA Retriever (which is not in the Space Station
baseline) based upon safety considerations. This device was felt to be potentially useful in
retrieving items lost during EVA, which has several safety advantages, in addition to
possibly preventing the loss of needed equipment; the EVA retriever raight even be able to
rescue _ astronaut who had become disabled or separated from the Space Station during
EVA. Potential limitations of the device were identified as range, time to deployment, and
the means to locate a 10st item. In the ease of an unconscious or disabled astronaut, there
might be difficulties in effeeting a rescue. Alternative concepts for astronaut rescue such as
self rescue devices were also of interest. The Flight Telerobotie Servicer, on the other hand,
was felt by many to have, at present, a poorly defined mission. However, there were
suggestions that pan of its mission could be for external inspections, thus reducing EVA
time.
llH
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3.2.2.6 On-board Training
NASA currently puts a great deal of effort into detailed mission training, greatly
increasing the astronauts' ability to perform complex tasks under difficult situations. Every
effortismade totailorthe form and sequence of thetrainingtothe missionrequirements;thus
the lasttwo SIMs performed before a mission arc launch abort and landing,to maximize
retentionof thesesafetycriticalitems. Video tapesof in-flightmaintenance procedures have
been carriedon the Space Shuttle,but the practicewas discontinuedbecause no one used
them. Of course, these missions have been relativelyshortcompared to proposed Space
Stationmissions.
The interviewed astronautsexpressed nearlyunanimous support foron-board training.
Because of the long durationof a crew's"mission" on the Space Station(initially45, later
90, and ultimately180 days),insufficientime willbe availabletofullytrainthe crew on the
ground in allprocedures necessary for the mission. In addition,over a six month period,
much priortrainingwilllikelybe forgotten.Thus, on-board trainingisstronglysupported
among the astronauts,although them are variousinterpretationsof what might be involve.
Refresher trainingisprobably needed on seldom performed taskssuch as repairprocedures,
pilotingof an emergency escape vehicle,and docking. On-board trainingmight also serveas
a firstexposure to the operating procedures of second segment payi0_ A particular
concern was refreshertrainingto renew Space Shuttlepilotingskillsaftera six month stay
on-orbit.The desiredforms of trainingrange from the relativelyconventionaltechnologies,
such as videotapes of repair procedures, to the relativelycomplex, such as on=b0ard
simulations,intelligentcomputer-aided training(ICAT) and use of "heads-up" displays to
review materialwhile making an EVA repair.One astronautsuggested the use of an actual
system, such as the Remote Manipulator System, for practice/training,with precautionsto
ensure thatthe practiceisperformed in an areawith no physicalhazards. Another suggestion
was toemphasize the captureof knowledge about procedures and systems behavior gained
during trainingand then incorporatethisknowledge inexpertsystems for use in monitoring
and controlas well as FDIR.
3.2.2.7 Scheduling
The Space Shuttle:aslxonautsgenerallysupi)ortcdflexibiHtyin _c form of on-board
capabilityto reschcdule noncriticalactivities.Crew timelines-wcre_generallyfeltto bc
realistic,when thereare no contingencies;but NASA has tended to schedule very tightlyin
the Space Shuttle and Spacelab with long workdays with littletime allowed for
contingencies. Such tighttimelinesin alllikelihood,willnot be workable in the Space
Stationenvironment. STS planning has recentlybeen improved to _hedule main/critical
activitiesand provide a "todo list"for the rest.The astronautsgenerallyprefen'edtohave
major and time criticalitems scheduled by the ground, with othertaskson the "to do list".
There was widespread support for attainingon-board scheduling flexibility,which atleast
one payload specialisthoughtwould be extremely beneficialwhen on the_crge Of scientific
breakthrough. Although not brought up specificallyby the astronauts,frc_rna productivity
perspectiveitseems thatan on-board dynamic reschcduling capabilitywould bc highly
desirablein the event of contingencies which effectnew system configurations(such as
power or thermal)inorder toprovidea fullerlevelof operationuntila new baselineschedule
can be generated. The mission/payload specialistswith Spacelab experience generaUy felt
thatthe Spacelab work pace could not bc maintainedover an extended 45-180 day mission.
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3.2.2.8 Other
Opinions varied as to whether or not control of inventory was a major problem. Some
astronauts felt that simple record keeping and discipline were sufficient for this problem,
though the Skylab experience does not support this view. Others felt that a computerized
inventory management system would be a useful aid in locating items quickly ff the method
of record keeping was not burdensome; the concept of something like a barcode reader for
logging items was widely accepted.
Opinions varied as to how much autonomy the Space Station should have from the
ground. The astronauts generally have less strong opinions as to how much automation
should be involved in functions which are to be performed on the ground. A strong DMS
was seen as necessary to support on-board automation; on the other hand, ground-based
control would either require much expanded downlink bandwidth or would limit the ability to
transfer payload data.
Other candidate areas for automation and robotics included EVA suit maintenance, check
out, trend monitoring, and tracking of time-limited items as well as other unspecified EVA
support activities. Also, various advisory systems, housekeeping systems (including a
genuicidal wiping robotic device for module wails), robotics for handling toxic samples, and
ensuring enough bandwidth to accommodate future high definition television (H.DTV)
capability for the future were recommended. Principles emphasized included using
automation and robotics to make the crew member's job easier (not replace the crew
member), using such advanced technologies to make an immediate improvement in Space
Shuttl e missions (including Spacelab), and implementing the relatively simple applications
early instead of just working on the harder problems with only promises for the future.
3.2.2.9 Suggested Areas to Remain Manual
Some astronauts felt that safety-critical system reconfigurations such as pressure
equalization valves and hatches should remain manual. Others felt that certain scientific
areas such as life science and materials processing are not particularly susceptible to
automation. Other specific areas where automation was not favored or was regarded as
infeasible (at this time) included manned docking and reboost, RMS (especially in support of
EVA), and biological sample collection, although support for a better RMS collision
avoidance system and improved user interfaces was voiced.
3.2.3 Ground Support
Space Shuttle missions involve a large ,'army on the ground" to provide the necessary
support services. If the Space Station were to be operated the same way the cost of the
quantity of support required would be significantly larger, and the support schedules used for
Space Shuttle missions would be impossible to maintain.
3.2.3.1 Scheduling
For the Space Shuttle, the planning and scheduling activities focus around the crew
activity plan (CAP). This consists of the mission timelines detailing the actions to be taken at
specific times, often planned down to the second. This plan is both time and event oriented
and is generated on a computerized system which records scheduling decisions while the
actualscheduling and constraintchecking are done manually. The EZCAP system,in which
major items are scheduled and the remainder put on a "to do" list,was well liked by the
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crews but will not be continued in Space Station. The current process is highly labor
intensive, with 5-10 people working one year to plan a typical shuttle mission.
Spacelab planning was the fast attempt at distributed planning, with payload planning
performed by the Spacelab Payload Operations Control Center (POCC) at MSFC and then
integrated into the STS plan at JSC. The current software (used for Spacc,abscheduling) is
written in FORTRAN and is difficult to modify. More easily modified software for
scheduling payload operations is desirable. Advanced scheduling methodologies making use
of additional knowledge-based system techniques are being developed and arc recommended.
With multiple POCCs for Space Station, planning efforts will be further distributed, with
integration performed at the Payload Operations Integration Center (POIC) to be built at
MSFC.
The planning process needs to be further automated' beginning with automated
constraint checking, and ultimately with the software doing time placement in the timeline.
However, automated scheduling on board is regarded as a waste of crew time; plans arc to
give the crew the capability to edit schedules (move a single item in time) and ultimately the
capability to move several items around over a period of several hours.
3.2.3'2 Space Station Control Center
In many respectsthe Mission Control Center ('MCC) has not changed sincethe Apollo
era.The FlightDirector has overallcontrolof a Space Shuttlemission. Seventeen console
operatorsin the FlightControl Room (FCR or "frontroom") aleresponsiblefor performing
specificmission functions,coordinating problem solving, and communicating needed
informationto the FlightDirector. "Back room" teams inthe Multipurpose Support Rooms
(MPSRs) resolveprobl.cmsin an .interdisciplinarymanner insupportof the frontroom. The
MCC ismanned m srn_tsarouna the clock during a Space Shuttlemission, typically6-7
days flight time plus 2 days for prclaunch support. The controllers interviewed
recommended continued effortsto improve the user interface(theuse of color,graphical,
task-orienteddisplaysisthe faststepin thisdirection),allow the software torecognize out-
of-bounds conditions,and provide analysisof possiblecauses of anomalies. One problem
with automation in MCC isthe unreliabilityof sensors;a guidelineexiststhatno actionbe
taken unless there isindependent confn'mation of the problem, and any automation must
allow for thisfactor.Automation might improve the performance and consistency of less
experienced people inthe controlrooms, and in particular,reduce the trainingtirncrexlUired
forcontrolroom personnel.
The existing Mission Control system _tes back to the Apollo era. "I_.c consoles are not
user friendly, with the displays consisting of columns of numbci'L- IVllssion Operati_ _
Directorate(MOD) and theMission Support Directorate0V[SD) personnelhavc_cn working
to implement more modern technology, including graphics workstations for clearer
information. Another efforthas been to bring expert system technology to MCC. The
Integrated Communication Officer Expert System Project (IESP), mechanical, and
BOOSTER expertsystems (known collectivelyas Real-Time Data Systems) arepartof this
effortand have achieved considerablesuccess and acceptance among the flightcontrollers.
Some positions(e.g.BOOSTER) arc not manned during allmission phases, however. The
Real TirncData Systems (RTDS) demonstrate how automation can improve the workload of
the MCC personnel;theseare discussedin Section5 of thedocument. This isaccomplished
through betterdata displays,betteranalysisof the data,and use of artificialintelligencefor
monitoring,control,and FDIR applications.
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The organization and operation of the Space Station Control Center (SSCC) is expected
to be similar to that of the Space Shuttle at least in early phases. Differences will exist in
console and support positions, of course; and the SSCC will need to be continuously manned
365 days a year. FLight controllers have reported this to be stressful, exhausting work, and
maintaining extended operations for the analogous Space Station Control C_nter on a year
round basis is recognized as a problem.
3.2.3.3 Flight Data File
The Flight Data File (FDF) is the _ documentation associated with a Space Shuttle
Mission. It includes checklists and procedures for every activity/contingency which is
expected for the mission. It is used as a reference by both flight and control center crews.
For recent Space Shuttle missions, the paper copies of the FDF have wcigbed over 100
pounds, NASA has undertaken a project to investigate the feasibility of replacing the paper
FDF with an electronic version. This concept has generally been supported by astronauts
and ground personnel, but a mechanism must be provided for an individual to annotate "his"
copy of the FDF with explanatory notes relative to individual duties; and a need is perceived
for the astronauts to be able to maintain personal notebooks.
In Space Station Freedom the size of the FDF is apt to increase significantly, and
problems with FDF configuration control will also be accentuated due to the length and
complexity of the missions. Thus the technology and procedures for maintaining the FDF
will be a crucial issue.
3.2.3.4 Training
Mission relatedtrainingisan extensiveeffo_within NASA. A varietyof specialized
facilitiesarc used for trainingin such mission facets as use of the RMS, weightless
procedures forEVA, as wellas fortraininginthe operationofindividualspacecraftsystems.
Two of the most complex flightcrew trainingfacilitiesare the high-fidelityShuttleMission
Simulator (SMS) and the Spacelab Simulator (SLS); these can be linked to MCC for
integratedtrainingof both flightand ground crews. NASA has implemented a Computer-
Aided InstructionalTrainer(CArl')as a low-end system to _ the gap between textbooksand
the more complex and expensive trainers.One problem is that the amount of training
required,12 weeks for a typicalone-week Space Shuttlemission,makes the availabilityof
the expensive high-fidelitytrainersa seriousconstraint,and one which isapt tobe even more
limitingin the Space Stationenvironment. Advanced computer-aided trainingtechniques
may be usefulinprovidingrelativelylow-cost,high-qualityinstructionforthe flightcrews.
3.3 OTHER RELEVANT EXPERIENCES
Two additionalmajor Space Stationanalogs were reviewed -the Sovietspace program
(inparticularthe Soviet Mir and Salyut space stations)and the U.S. nuclear submarine
program. Both representsources of experience with long durationmanned presence in a
hostileenvironment. However, such analogs can be deceptiveunlessthe ddiffercncesin the
overallenvironment between the Space Stationand the analog are well understood. Also,
sincethe purpose of thisdocument isan analysisof thepotentialbenefitsof automation and
roboticsinthe Space Station,theprimary interestin theanalogs focuseson theseareasrather
than on psychosocial factors. Other examples consistof long-term operations in hostile
environments, such as Antarcticresearchstations,but thesearcnot significantlyautomated.
However, they do reveal some of the problems relatedto equipment maintenance and
modification thatcould occur on Space StationFreedom. The Antarcticteams performed
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extensive modification of equipment to the point that subsequent teams were unable to repair
and maintain the equipment due to the lack of existing configuration knowledge.
3.3.1 The Soviet Space Stations
The Soviet Union has had an extensive manned presence on-orbit starting with Salyza 1,
in April 1971 and continuing through the current Mir space station (core launched in 1986).
The Soviets use slightly different technology, but the goals and expressed operational
philosophy of their effort are reasonably similar to those of the U.S. program. Many of the
experiments manifested on their space stations are similar to those supported by the U.S.
space program (Bluth and Helppie, 1986). In interpreting the experiences of the Soviet space
program, one must remember theunderlyingdifferencesbetween the availabletechnologies,
the selectionand trainingof the cosmonauts, and the underlying organizationsand societies
and theirU.S. counterparts.
Because of the Soviet Union's relatively primitive computer industry, thc level of
computerization and complex automation in the Salyut and Mir systems is low by U.S.
standards. However, they have automated some functions, and have expressed the intention
to increasethe levelof automation in the future.Itisworthy ?f note thatthe Soviets have
successfullyautomated some things,such as the docking of unmanned resupply vehicles
with theirspace stations(although Sovietcosmonaut Vaientin Lcbedcv (1988) did express
some dissatisfactionat being "out of the loop"),thatwould be difficulto sellin the U.S.
program. The Sovietsdo appear to have had theirshareof equipment faiI_s and concerns
about failuresattributableinparttopoorlydesigned controls/procedures.These include the
unintentionaldefrostingof a refrigeratordue topoorly designed controls,and the unfounded
concern thatwaste water had been recirculatedintothefreshwater supply (Lcbedcv, 1988).
The Sovietsplace a heavieremphasis on on,it repairthan istraditionalfor the U.S.
space program. I.,ebedev's(1988) book emphasizes the extent to which on orbitrepairis
criticaland containsnumerous instancesofdescriptionsof repairsto equipment on theScdyut
7 space station. The Soviet program regards manned presence as an enhancement to system
reliability (Bluth and Helppie, 1986).
3.3.2 The U.S. Nuclear Submarine::Pr0gram
Nuclear submarines can be thought of as an analog for the Space Station in that they
exist for long durations in a hostile environment. However, the nature of the submarine
mission is markedly different (military instead of scientific), as is the size and composition of
the crew.
The nuclearsubmarine fl_t has relativelylittlecomputerization/automation,a situation
which has been am'ibuted,atleastin part,to the influenceof Admiral Rickover (I-Icmond,
1989) and ismade possibleby the sizeof the crew (II0-130). The emphasis ison manual
control of criticalfunctions,such as the reactor,with exhaustive trainingin operations
(Boeing, 1983). Nonetheless, system failuressuch as reactorscrams do occur somewhat
frequently(Boeing 1983 and Hemond, 1989). The Navy isgraduallyincreasingthe levelof
automation in the nuclear submarine fleet, and it has been estimated that smaller faster craR
carrying smaller crews would be possible ff higher levels of automation were accepted
(Hemond, 1989).
Another _:_rcomp_son is'th_c_np_asis On rep_. The Space Stationcan be
viewed as closerto a large naval vessel,which operates a continuous program of routine
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IVA Robotics
maintenance and has the capability to perform many emergency repairs while at sea (although
major repairs may require a tender or port call), than to an aircraft, which is only maintained
in the hangar (Slonin, 1989). In the submarine service the emphasis is on repair without
surfacing, facilitated by exhaustive training, spares availability, and extensive record keeping
of both the historyof systems and of the source and pedigree of spares. Unlike the Space
Station,however, submarines can surfacein an emergency for serviceby a sub tender or
return to port. Major repairs arc always reserved for port call.
3.4 QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
A questionnaire was distributed to 32 current and former astronauts and payload
specialists; the 32 included all but one of the 23 interviewed earlier, plus 10 additional
individualsfrom the AstronautOffice.These includedsixastronautswith Skylab experience
and seven with Spacclab experience (although these categoriesoverlapped somewhat).
Responses wcrc received from 27 of the surveyed group,a response rateof 84 percent. The
questionnaire consisted of three sections:one which asked the respondents to rate the
potentialof specificA&R applicationsforimproving crew productivity,a second focused on
thepotentialimpact of specificA&R applicationson safety,and a thirdwhich focused on the
respondents' general opinions regarding the main A&R areas. The questionnaire and
accompanying instructionsas well as the detailedsurvey resultsarc shown in Appendix C;
the resultswere analyzed primarilyby tabulation.Not allrespondentsaddressed every item
in thequestionnaire.
In answering the questionnaire,respondents were asked to assume thatworkable,
reliableimplementations of the technologiescan bc developed with thorough testingand
shakedown of allsuch systems and thatmanual backup and human interventionmodes
would exist.According tothissurvey,astronauts/payloadspecialistsarc philosophicallyin
favor of using advanced automation to increase Space Station productivity, with 81 percent
of those responding ratingitas desirable,19 percentviewing itindifferentlyand none rating
itas undesirable. EVA robotics were rated as desirableby 73 percent and somewhat '
undesirableby 12 percentwith thercmaintlerindifferent.In general,the astronauts/payload
specialistsviewed advanced automation and EVA robotics as desirable in improving
productivity on the Space Station. While 46 percent of the respondents viewed IVA robotics
as desirable in some form, the others were either indifferent (31 percent) towards IVA
robotics or viewed it as somewhat undesirable (23 percent). It is interesting to note that none
of the respondents viewed any of these tlnv.c general categories as highly undesirable. These
results appear in Figure 3-1.
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Figure 3-1 Astronaut Views Regarding Automation and Robotics
Results of the safety related questions appear in Figure 3.2. FDIR was rated as having
potential to contribute some increase to significant improvements in safety by 93 percent of
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wthe respondents. Automated exception reporting and alarm filtering was rated by 84 percent
as having potential for some increase to significant improvements while an EVA retriever
was rated by 69 percent to increase safety. Only one respondent felt there might be any
decrease in safety potentia] and that concern was related to the automated exception reporting
and alarm filtering.
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Figure 3-2 Astronaut Ratings of Safety Imp_ts of A&R Applications
Questionnaire results involving productivity impacts of specific applications of
automation and robotics appear in Figure 3-3. Several specific applications st_ out as
heavily favored with greater than 90 percent of the respondents indicating the potential
for some increase to significant improvement in productivity: automated record keeping
and documentation (100 percent), automated inventory management, automated
FDIR, improved human-computer interfaces, and robotic construction. On two
of these, inventory management and improved human-computer inte arracks, a majority of all
the respondents indicated significant improvement potential for productivity.
Between 80 and 90 percent of all respondents indicated that potential for some
increase to significant improvement in productivity exists for robotic inspection,
automated exception reporting/alarm filtering, external camera/light pointing
automation, advanced human-machine interfaces in general, robotic external
repairs, systems automated trends analyses, checklist automation, robotics in
general, automated systems monitoring and controlling, and EVA retriever
robotics.
: 1
From 50 to 79 per/:ent of the respondents came the expectation of productivity
improvement from applications involving payload automation (79 percent), on-board
training systems (72 percent), payload automated data anay7ys_(71 percent),
Principal Investigator in-a-box type experiment expert systems (65 per_nt), internal
cameras/lighting pointing automation (58 percent), cameras/lighting pointing
automation in general (58 percent), speech recognition (56 percent), speech
synthesis (54 percent), automated scheduling/rescheduling capability (52 percent),
and IVA rack robot (50 percent). Only one application, automated housekeeping
robots (46 percent), received less than a majority of responses indicating belief of the
application leading to an increase in productivity. Even in this case, most of the respondents
indicated negligible impact while only 8 percent foresaw some decrease in productivity or
significant problems related to automated housekeeping robots.
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Twenty-six specific questions about A&R applications evoking 611 responses resulted
in 465 indications (76 percent) of belief that these specific applications would lead to at least
some in(:_'case in productivity while only 42 (7 l_rcent) indicated some decrease or significant
problems concerning productivity regarding specific applications. The 104 remaining
responses (17 percent) indicated negligible impact on productivity.
APPLICATION
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Inventor7 management
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Trend analysis
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Figure 3-3 Astronaut Estimates of Productivity Impact of A&R Applications
In general, the results of the questionnaire are consistent with those of the interviews,
although a few specific items differed somewhat from the predictions which would have been
mad_ based on the interviews. The main noticeable differences were in the ratings of the
EVA retriever, while rated favorably, was not rated as highly in the questionnaires as was
expected based on the interviews, and automated inventory management, which was rated
higher in the questionnaires than was expected based on the interviews. However, the
interviews did indicated that many of the astronauts favored an automated crew retrieval
approach using a "spiderman" package or other back mounted system to return a disabled
crew member to the Space Station. Other differences between the opinions expressed on the
interviews and the results of the questionnaire may be attributed to interviewee doubts about
the maturity or reliability of automated systems, which the questionnaire instructed the
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respondents to ignore or perhaps to the fact that a brief description of each application to be
rated was included on the questionnaire (see Appendix C).
The questionnaires confn'm the observation that Skylab astronauts, and to a lesser extent
Spacelab veterans, are somewhat more favorable toward automation and robotics than other
astronauts. This difference may stem from the fact that Skylab, and to a lesser extent
Spacelab, represent long duration missions and that some of the advantages of automation are
likely to be most apparent in the context of a long-term mission. Also, scientific efforts
dominate both the Skylab and Spacelab progra_ as opposed to satellite deployments.
Another possible factor is that the relatively low level of automation in Skylab has given the
Skylab astronauts relatively little experience with the problems of automation, although two
of the Skylab astronauts have also flown Space Shuttle missions, While the respondents
were more supportive of automation and robotics in general (Figure 3-1) than of most of the
individually specified A&R applications, the individual's general perception of automation
may be influenced by the applications perceived as most promising (or perhaps, in a few
cases, the least promising) by the individual.
A number of the respondents included written comments. Seven respondents noted that
the stated assumption that the A&R technologies would be made to work reliably is a cruciaI
concern; this is consistent with concerns expressed during the interviews about the ability to
design correct and reliable systems. Two respondents emphasized the point that they favored
automated fault detection and isolation but not automated re.covery/reconfiguradon schemes.
Lastly, several astronauts emphasized that NASA should take a more aggressive role to"
include A&R technology applications in the Space Station program.
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SECTION 4
OPERATIONS/PRODUCTIVITY PROJECTIONS
FREEDOM
FOR SPACE STATION
During the early 1980s, NASA conducted a Space Station Human Productivity Study
(SSI-[PS) which proved valuable for issue identification and early program planning for
Space Station Freedom. For SSHPS, productivity was defined as "the use of man to attain
udli_ objectives in the space station system" with the objective of a nine-hour workday
(exciuding weekends) composed of an average of six hours for payload activities and an
average of less than three hours of operational maintenance. A routine EVA was envisioned
as an eight-hour task with six hours of useful operations (Cramer, 1983; Cramer, 1985a;
Cramer, 1985b ). This approach has influenced the subsequent investigations of habitability
issues and the development of habitability requirements which may aid in maintaining
sustained human productivity during long duration spaceflight. Also, the current thinking on
the framework for the crew workday (Lewis, 1989) reflects a workday similar to that
articulated during SSHPS.
Blu_ (!984)has noted that productivity concepts are in a state of continual evolution
and that the term involves far more than the familiar cost to profit ratio, being a complex of
perceived ideas (by the various program participants) on the subject. Measuring productivity
has been found to be difficult because of both the quantitative and qualitative factors that
con_bute to human performance. Human performance is a mixture of processes -
perceptual, mediational (cognitive), communication, and motor (Berliner et al., 1964).
Motor processes are easily quantifiable, but in increasingly automated tasks, the other three
processes (particularly mediational ones) become dominant in human performance. Thus,
although tools for measuring components of human productivity in space are limited,
spacecraft simulators (Atkin, 1987), THURIS (McDonnell Douglas, 1984; McDonnell
Douglas, 1987), and recent optimization methods (Stuart, 1986) offer an initial means to
assist in the refinement of investigations of candidate tasks for future automation and
robotics.
Appendix D provides a more detailed background on the difficulties involved in defining
and measuring productivity.
In recent years, researchers have attempted to develop quantitative indices of human
performance in order to predict the optimal workloads for human operators, thus controlling
productivity. Workload measurement techniques have been inclined to be specific to a small
subset of tasks.
4.1 CANDIDATE TASKS FOR AUTOMATION AND ROBOTICS
As Nickerson has emphasized (1987), criteria should be formulated regarding what
aspects of a space station's operation should be automated. "The rule that anything that can
be automated (effectively, safely) should be automated is not necessarily a good rule." That
is, there may be some functions that can be done suitably by either humans or machines that
should be done by humans. One must consider not only the technical feasibility but
problems of morale, perception of control, and the necessary maintenance of key skills.
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mMuch has been written about the philosophy of which functions can be done better by
humans and which can be done better by machines. The physiological limits and
environmental re_luircments delimit the capabilities of the human, but human performance
continues toprovide unique abilitiesthatwillbe unmatched forthe near future.The major
unique human abilities(Nickerson,1987; Atkin,1987) includethefollowing:
1. Integrate information - from many sources and in many conventions and forms
(particularly the rapid processing of diverse visual data).
2. Make judgmems thatarcrelevant,reliableand important-largedecisioncapacitythat
infusescommon senseas wellas technicalknowledge.
3. Respond effectivelyand rapidlytounanticipatedevents-excellentadaptivecontrol
system,improving with practiceand transferringlearnedresponsestonew tasks.
4. Follow impreciseinstructionsand work toward high-levelpurposes.
5. Manual dexterity - the hum-hand.
6. Employ appropriate strength and dexterity - manipulation of large payloads in micro-
gravity..... =_ =- + ..... +
The fin'st four abilities in the list derive from the phenomenal cognitive capacity of the human
while the last two items reflect on the special human porformance resulting from the
coordination of physiological systems.
Examining the lessonslearned from re,cent missions and regarding the conversations
with a cross-sectionof flightcrew members (seeSection3.0),it_v_+n6_ thatphilosophical
approaches, similarto the above analyticallydeduced list,were suggested as operational
guldelinesfor automation and robotics.That is,the top fourabilitiesappear to be imbued
into the opinions of many types of astronauts,shaped by flightexperiences of varying
durations.Ingeneral,the common suggestionswere as follows:
I° Automate the monotonous and repetitioustasks - particularlythose with high
frecluencyof occurrence such as system monitoring and routine experiment or
payload measurements.
2. Automate thecomplex _d timecriticaltasks.
3. Automate the hazardous/unsafe tasks.
+
4. Design automated components and systems with allowances forhuman intervention
and manual overrideinmind -remember the human adaptabilityto theunexpected.
5. Automation is:f0_-=_sating$c human inperforming his)hertasks,so notifycrew of
anomalies and options for correctiveactionand allocateto the crew judgment and
decisionfunctions-particularlyforactionsthatare potentiallyhazardous to crew or
6. Introduce increasing levels of automation for systems incrementally - build trust in
the machine by crew members.
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Although different interviewees had their own value judgments (based on their specialized
experiences and background) about what was most important to automate, there were
frequent comments related to both the need to use the automation already available on the
ground for spacecraft and the caution that one should not expect to be able to automate in
space what is not already automated on the ground. However, it should be noted that micro-
gravity sometimes make automation feasible or easier than on the ground. This includes the
assembly of high mass structures (Pogue, 1989).
In attempting to gain further insight into the candidate tasks for automation and robotics
for the SSFP, the human productivity management issues uncovered by the SSI-tPS
(Lockheed, 1985b) as well as their current status were studied. Sixty-seven management
plans, encompassing 113 identified issue areas, were developed. The majority of the plans
dealt with habitability issues. Twelve plans appeared to be candidates for the significant use
of automation and robotics to facilitate resolution. Most of these are either being studied by
work package contractors or in work with some degree of implementation envisioned,
although dependent on funding scenarios. All but three of these plans are actively being
investigated or planned for consideration in the near future:
1. Task performance assessment - portable multi-test batteries had been suggested to
measure how the human performance changes with long duration missions, and thus
provide a quantification of biofunetional capabilities that could be used for the
development of criteria and standards for task performance. Soviet Salyut and Mir
experience indicated discrete drop-offs in crew performance at predictable points in
the missions. These are at three months, five months, and toward the end of a year.
2. Habitable volume leak point detection - automated equipment would assist the crew
in locating cabin leaks above minimal acceptability. This task was also noted as a
candidate b_, some interviewees. Leak detection methodology of contaminants, such
as ammoma, to the external environment is under investigation (Jolly and
Deffenbaugh, 1989).
. On-orbit system.certification requirements - some believe many crew hours could be
consumed in recertifying and calibrating equipment during a 30-yr. station life. This
is not being addressed at this time apparently because of the early development status
of the program. Some activity is underway for the initial certification of the station.
The caveat must be added that although the other nine candidates - equipment and food
storage, data tile storage requirements, trash-waste stowage and storage, water allocation for
crew support, waste and trash collection methods, inventory management system
development, on-orbit training, develop expert scheduling system requirements, autonomy
technique selection/time phasing - are at least being examined in terms of inserting
appropriate hooks and scars into the program, future budget constraints may prevent the full
development and implementation of some items.
Although THURIS and other preliminary tools for estimation of the quantitative aspects of
productivity neglect the unique and total .aspects of human performance, cursory attempts to
cost an astronaut-hour have been made (McDonnell Douglas, 1984 and Friedtand et al.,
1988). For example TI-IURIS used approximately $32,500/hr. while a more recent estimate
is on the order of $35,000/hr for non-EVA time (Friedland et al., 1988). Using this later
figure, saving only one crew hour per week for a highly repetitive task through automation or
4-3
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roboticstheoreticallyrepresentsa savingsor reallocationof $910,000 fora six-month period
(26 hr.@ $35,000/hr.)which could be applied toan additionalexperiment. Other potential
cost impacts include greaterflexibilityin taskmanifestingand reduced ground operations
COSTS.
4.2 CREW WORKDAY
4.2.1 Previous Workdays in Space
In Skylab, the firstspace station,a dailyroutine was establishedfor allthree flights,
which was in, most ways, comparable to the ground-based everyday activitywith a
Houston-based time reference(JSC, 1974; Johnston and Dietlein,1977a). This meant the
crew worked and sleptduring the conventionalhours. Eight hours were allocatedfor sleep
on each flight.Exercise was scheduled for I/2hr.each day on Skylab 2 (28 days),I hr.on
Skylab 3 (59 days),and 1 I/2 hr.on Skylab 4 (84 days). Some scientistshave concluded
from theiranalysesthateven though thethreeSkylab flightsvariedinduration and thatthe
crews had pronounced variabilityin preflighttrainingschedules and initialreactionto the
spacecraftenvironment, in-flightaskperformance was relauv_qdyequivalentamong the three
crews (Johnston and Dietlein,1977b). However, productive work did vary with mission
day and flight.For example, the Skylab 3 crew began experiment operationswith over 31
man-hr./day (3 men) and increasedto 36 man-hr./day near the end of the flightwhile the
Skylab 4 crew s_at 28 man-hr./day(3 men) to over 33 man-hr./dayin thelaterphase. It
should be noted that'post-sleep"activitiesrelatedto experiments and repairswere included
as "productive" time. The increaseswere attributedtoreductionin time for"overhead" tasks
(foodpreparation,eating,housekeeping, etc.)achieved as experienceWas gained in livingin
microgravity(Johnston and Dietlein,1977c). Some members of the Skylab 4 crew recalled
thatina 14 hr.space workday, only about 6.5 hr.were really"productive"work (i.e.getting
data or making something). Another recollection was that the Skylab 3 crew had
considerably more time in ground-based simulators than the Skylab 4 crew and thatthis
differencecontributedtothe slightlylower productivityinSkylab 4 when the initialactivity
plan was designed for Skylab 3 terminalproductionrates.
The beginning of the Space Shuttle era, with the First flight in 1981, heralded a new style
in manned space operations. A reusable spacecraft had been built and with it a unique
capability of carrying a manned laboratory into space, Spacelab, which permitted not only
astronauts, but scientists and engineers to conduct experiments in the mierogravity
environment on a regular basis. The Spacelab missions on-board the Shuttle have been of no
more than ten days duration, but the workdays have been intense, with timeline planning to
thelevelof a minute. Experiment operationshave been scheduledaround theclock,with two
shiftsof 12-hour duty periods(Garriottet al.,1984). Apparently some _ws necd_ed15 hr.
to complete the tasks planned for 12 hr. Some of theSe-c_v_ members favor a 12 hr.
workday for Space StationFreedom but with more of a skeletonof a tirneline,llavingicss
granularitythan that presently employed for STS. Some investigatorshave noted a
differenceinthe perspectivesof crews from the currentshortdurationSTS flightsversusthe
long durationSkylab flights,particularlywith respecttohabitabili_needs C'c_ping trip"
vs.a long durationevent),includingwhat levelofproductivework can bc sustainedinflight
over a six-month period.
D4ring the Space Operations Center(SOC! phase A design studiescontractorstriedto
determine the requirements for a space stationwork schedule. In particular,Boeing
personnelexamined severalisolatedand confined environments (ICE),encompassing Arctic
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radar stations, Alaskan pipeline construction camps, nuclear submarines, and Antarctic
research stations (Miller, 1989). They reached the conclusion that beyond 30 days of
continuous 10-12 hr. shifts, one needed to provide one day off per week to prevent social
problems and "burnout". Also, a nine to ten-hour workday appeared to be optimal to
maintain productivity. Examining work shifts in factories with significant amounts of
overtime, the fLrst four hours were found to be about 90 percent productive, the next four
hours, 75 - 80 percent productive, and the last two to four hours, 50 percent productive.
Their analyses indicated that one could expect a 10-hr. workday to contain 75 percent
productive time (i.e., 7.5 hr.). The final report recommended for a SOC, an eight-hour
workday for six days per week for a crew of eight with one day off per week and two shifts
when requh-ed (Boeing, 1982).
Other investigators (Alluisi et al., 1963) of human performance during confinement have
indicated that for periods of two weeks, and perhaps longer, a properly selected crew could
be productive on a work schedule of four hours on and two hours off. For a month, and
maybe two to three months, a schedule of four hours on and four hours off would be better.
Perhaps if workers arc free to set their own schedules, productivity may be enhanced. In
a recent factory setting, when the workday was changed by request from five eight-hour days
to four 10-hour days with three days off each week, employment attrition decreased and
productivity remained the same (Lewis and Swaim, 1986). On theother hand, an ICE study
on seven-month Antarctic station winter-over revealed that among workers who could set
their own workday, disproportional amounts of time were spent at the beginning and ending
months of the confinement in attempting to achieve productive work. This was attributed to
increases in anxiety during these padods. Some participants indicated that a weekly schedule
of work and free time should be set by the Antarctic station management to even out the
workload during the winter-over period when there is no provision for leaving the area
(Evans et. al., 1988).
In 1983, NASA brought together a broad range of experts, who were familiar with ICEs
and work schedules in general, to discuss the optimal productive workday that should be
selected for the ICE of a space station. Out of these deliberations clcveloped the goal of 90
percent productivity for a nine-hour workday (five days per week) composed of an average
of six hours for payload activities and an average of below three hours for operational
maintenance. Thus, this became the framework for the present planning for Space Station
Freedom. However, the management issue of the optimal work schedule was listed in the
final report of SSHPS as one still requiring significant research, but this need has been
neglected in the current planning efforts.
Much researchremains to determine theoptimal work-restcycleforthe confinement of a
space station.In summary, what isknown isthatan eight-hourworkday seems to work well
on Earth ina normal environment aswell as a confinedenvironment,while generallya 12-hr.
shiftcannot be maintained formore than a few weeks (withoutdegradationin productivity),
and thatperhaps a nine or ten hour shiftmight be betterover a long period to achieve even
more productive time on tasks. How much flexibilityshould be leftto the worker for the
workday durationisunclear.
4.2.2 Space Station Workday Plans
The currentplanning for the crew workday aboard the Space StationFreedom depicts
crew availabilitytimes in terms of systems operations,user or payload operations,and
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overhead activities on a daily basis (Lewis, 1989). A crew size of eight is assumed with the
following schedule sequence of activities as a general goal for each:
Postsleep : - 1.5 hr. (includes morning meal)
Handover - 0.5
shift begins
OPERATIONS - 4.5 (or 4.0)
Exercise - 1.0
Lunch - 1.0
OPERATIONS - 4.0(or 4.5)
Exercise - 1.0
Handover - 0.5
Free time - 0,5
Preslccp
shift ends = 12 1/2 hr.
1.5 (includes evening meal)
Sleep g.O
24.0
Thus this workday, ii_c1uding two handover _dodsbctween the two shifts, results in a 12
1/2-hr. duty cycle for each team and a 11 1/2 hr off cycle. The schedule is fiexibid_d ihe
8.5 hr. allotted for operations (systems and user) is actually 7 hr. of pia_ned activities
because 1/2 hr. is designated to replanning, 1/2 hr. operations training (average; may not
occur each day), and 1/2 hr. planning reserve.
Therefore, the o_aortunities to enhance productivity W_i A_ appear to lie mainly within
the systems operauons and, of course, user operations in terms of improving the efficiency
of procedures. Perhaps a small increase could also be obtained in increasing the automation
of the handover, but that could negatively impact the obvious social component ncededt0
maintain continuityamong shiftteams. The time allocationforexerciseisdrivenby medical
requirementstomaintain thephysicalconditionof thecrew which inturnimpacts p_uctive
work. An expertsystem isbeing developed to facilitatethe applicationof correctprotocols
(tailoredto individualneeds) and to assistin motivating the crew to exercise. Ithas been
reported by the Soviets thatin long duration flight,itisdifficultfor crews to continue to
devote a sizableportionof each day toexercising.Examining theoperationshours,itshould
bc noted thatsome crew members perform more useroperationsthansystems operationsdue
totheirspecializedtraining.However, an overalldailycrew average (eightperson) can bc
determined asfollows:
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Systems operations - 17 man-hr. (2 x 8.5)
User operations
Overhead
51 man-hr.
32 man-hr.
Total I00 man-hr.
(6 x 8.5)
(exercise: 2 x 8 + on-duty
meals: 1 x 8 + handovers:
lxS_
This typical workday will vary significantly when EVA operations (two crew members
performing and one crew member monitoring for eight hr.), proximity operations (involves
part of one shift time for two crew members), and transfer operations (STS at the station;
involves entire shift) are occurring. Hence, these operations also become excellent
candidates to investigate for the application of A&R to improve total station productivity.
Two additional types of crew activities have not been included in the current workday
planning (Lewis, 1989). The Extended Duration Crew Operations (EDCO) program calls for
certifying crew members for periods of up to six months. EIXTO could involve significant
additions to exercise periods and additions to biomedical sample preparations and analyses
activities. This extra crew time could be considered as additional overhead or user
operations. The other major activity is the routine housekeeping, including the regular
cleaning of habitable areas and maintaining of an orderly environment. In general this is a
shared task among all crew members. Housekeeping time was a common concern among the
crew members interviewed. One estimate was offered that every six months, 20 man-days
(eight-hour shifts around the clock) will be consumed in a germicidal wipe of the station to
controlmicrobialgrowth. Certainlydements of housekeeping and theroutinesampling and
measuring of EDCO should be high priorityitems toconsiderforA&R use toimprove crew
productivity.
Although, as described above, Lewis (1989) gives the most current available
information regarding crew time allocations, these estimates taken by themselves are too
broad to be useful in performing a quantitative analysis of the potential impacts of
automation, because they basically divide the available time between payloads (75 percent)
and systems (25 percent). Reynolds (1985), presents somewhat more detailed estimates
gleaned from crew time studies done by MSFC, Rockwell, and McDonnell Douglas during
Phase B studies. However, these studies assumed a crew of six and are marred by other
inconsistencies and questionable assumptions. Also in some cases, recent design changes
will probably impact these estimates (e.g., the EVA estimate is probably too low in view of
the decision to use the current space suit design).
Nonetheless, for want of more recent detailed estimates, these data (primarily the MSFC
estimates) can be used in conjunction with 1989 crew workday estimates to yield the crew
activity projections in Table 4-1. The data in this table have been adapted from that supplied
by Reynolds to represent a crew of eight, and to allow for one hour per day for handover,
instead of 30 minutes, as is estimated by Lewis. That is, the activities hours are depicted in
forms of 8 1/2 hr. of operation plus 1 hr. of handover. These estimates are also reasonably
consistent with current plans showing 72 percent of the operations time devoted to payloads
or mission specialist activities related to payloads. In this table the estimates are given in the
form of equivalent astronaut-years for the sake of consistency with the data supplied for
ground support. For instance, a crew of 8 times 1 hr. each for activity planning each day
would result in 0.84 manyears for this task each year.
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Table 4-1
Crew Time by Function
ActivityHours/Day TotalHours/Day
Activity Planning
System Monitoring and Control
Flight Control
Flight Planning
Training
Inventory Management
Internal Maintenance and Servicing
ExternalMaintenance and Servicing
Proximate Operations
Payload Operations
Reboost
Annual Crew Member Years
8.00 .84
7.00 .74
1.04 .11
2.00 .21
2.00 .21
1.90 .20
6.20 .65
6.10 .64
5.44 .57
36.00 3.79
0.32 .03
Total Operations _ 8.0_
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4.3 GROUND SUPPORT AND MISSION OPERATIONS
4.3.1 Spacelab Mission Support
Ground support for Spacelab (SL) missions has provided NASA the opportunity to
develop the capability to support payload activities in a manned microgravity laboratory and
to coordinate in real-time the conduct of experiments by astronauts, scientists and engineers.
This opportunity, although for relatively short flights (7-10 days), can also provide
experience which is transferable to the sustained ground support necessary for payloads
operationson-board Space StationFreedom. Studying the experiencedocumented inthe SL-
I and SL-3 Payload ActivityPlanner'sreports(Weiler, 1984; Hardage and Jackson, 1985)
meaningful relevantobservationswere noted with respecttothe phased workday, workload,
and shift duration. :
During SL-1, payload rcplanning activities were performed on a continuous 24-hour per
day basis, divided into two 12-hr. cycles (six people per shift). The replanning teams
endured a high workload which significantly exceeded expectations and practiced
simulations. The primary causes were unusually large numbers of replanning and
operational change requests generated by launch delay teleprinter use (instead of text and
graphics system), temporary loss of Spacelab subsystems, experim_f_0_es, and an
extended mission length of one day. For some personnel, the 12-hr. shifts grew to 15-16-
hr. A recommendation was made to consider 8-hr. shifts or to intersperse 12-hr. shifts with
8-hr. shifts for relief. Concern was stated over the exhaustive effect of 12-hr. shifts with
increased chance of errors for long duration missions. It was als0 suggested that aI1 team
members should be at the payload operations center 7-10 days before launch to minimize
fatigue effects induced by shifted circadian rhythms (for those crossing a number of time
zones). Those fatigueeffectsappeared exacerbatedby high workloads and long workdays.
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For SL-3,thesame SL-I work schedules(12hr.)were implementedforthereplanning
teams.Even thoughtheworkloadwas aboutwhat was expected,fatigueproblemsoccurred
similartotheSL-I experiences,resultinginthecorrespondingsuggestionstoshortenthe
workday to g-hr.and have everyparticipanta thesitefivedays beforelaunch.Also,the
comments were made thatmore personnelshouldbe used to reduce the workload and,
therefore,thechance oferrors.One observation,"no singlepersonneeds towork on two
differentmissionsthatareseparatedby onlytwo months" (Hardageand Johnson,1985),
appearstoexpressthehecticworkingenvironmentthatoccursasdedicatedpersonneldo their
besttohelpmaximize thescienceyieldofa mission.
Interviews with ground support personnel, further indicated a need for infusion of
automation to alleviate past and continuing payload support problems. A suggestion was
made that the manpower levels required for SL timeline planning should be reduced through
the increased use of scheduling programs and that the timeline process needed to encompass
more flexibility. The timelines for the previous SL missions were regarded as being too
rigid. An integrated planning system was needed that would treat the whole system of
constraints of all on-board systems and the various science disciplines. Also there was the
suggestion that morn intelligent computer-aided training (ICAT) would help with the training
of ground support personnel.
Apparently cun'ent SL timeline planning is driven by on-board power level, data return
rate, and actual available crew time. For SL, a rough estimate of crew time utilization as
productive time is 70 percent. These three critical parameters will most likely be the main
drivers for Space Station Freedom. Therefore, the application of Knowledge-Based Systems
(KBS) to optimize the use of these factors would aid both Spacelab and Space Station
Freedom.
Mission control support for SL missions has been provided with the JSC Mission
Control Center (MCC) which dates from the 1960s. The number of flight console operators
has been reduced from the Apollo era to 17 "front room" operators plus "back room" teams,
but the consoles are not as user-friendly as they could be (see Section 3.2.3.2). Efforts are
in progress to reduce the reported stressful workdays (9-10 days of support for the average
STS missions) by implementing improved data displays and knowledge-based systems for
monitoring, control, and FDIR applications.
4.3.2 Space Station Freedom Support
The currentground supportplansforSpace StationFreedom consistof an increment
plan,executionplanand updateplanderivedconceptuallyfrom theSpace StationOperations
Task Force. The incrementplan willbe prepared 12 months priorto the mission and
includes90,dayplans. The executionplanisdevelopedsixmonths priorto themission,
while the update plan isdevelopedjustpriorto thatincrement(90 days)."Manpower
requirementsfortheseplansincludetwo teams (10-12personsper team) forincrement
planning,threeteams (10-12personsper team) forexecutionplanning.,and supportfor
weekly replanning(mostofthesame peoplenotedearlier).Also,therewillbe requirements
forfivetosixpersonson consolestowork problemson a hourlybasis(seventeams or 35-
42 persons).In addition,a typicalturnoverof softwaredevelopersisexpected. So the
numbers ofrequiredground supportpersonnelincreasequickly,resultinginan additional
requirement oreducemanpower throughautomationon groundand on-boardprocessing.
4-9
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Space Station Freedom will provide them with more flexibility, but the challenge still remains
to adapt the schedules to the individual productivity levels of the various station crew
members.
There are differing viewpoints over how much payload activity timeline planning should
be done on the ground and how much on-board the station. The ground personnel lean
towards doing most of the scheduling, including payload planning, on the ground due to
computer processing and storage limits on-board. The software on-board should be adequate
to enable the capability to deal with contingencies. At the same time, it is acknowledged that
man needs to be taken out of the loop to some extent on the ground as well to reduce error
and manpower requirements: Flight crew comments on the subject indicated a general desire
to not overload the crew. It was suggested that there should be three plans everyday - (1) a
policy plan of 7-10 days, (2) a plan for the day after tomorrow, and (3) today's plan. These
plans should be uplinked in time for the crew to comment before implementing. The on-
board dynamic rescheduling capability should assist the crew in inserting three types of tasks
into their daily schedules - (1) mandatory tasks, (2) high priority tasks, and (3) shopping List
tasks. The Soviet crew have expressed a desire to automate as many functions as possible.
Generally, the Mir is out of communication about half of an orbit for each orbit, so control
by ground support is difficult. One cosmonaut remarked that there are huge numbers of
people on the ground who get lazy during long duration flights (Bluth, 1989b). Thus there is
a common need expressed by all participants to automate ground scheduling activity where
feasible, with the disagreements apparently being over how much should be aboard a space
stadon.
Other dimensions to the ground support operations include the potential personnel
increases required to support an evolving and growing station over a 30-year interval For
example, in the case of power growing from 75 kw to 300 kw, an estimate has been made
that an initial 40 to 50 support personnel requirement will grow to 80 to 100 people. With
the infusion of existing KBS technology to augment monitoring and fault diagnosis activities,
the initial requirement could be reduced to 12 to 15 people, growing to 20 to 25 people for
the 300 kw state (Weeks, 1989). This represents a significant productivity enhancement with
the addition of KBS technology to operational support. A similar application could be made
for other distributed systems requiring ground support for Space Station Freedom.
In su_' current ground support estimates can be derived from Mission Operations
Directorate, JSC presentations (MOD, 1989; Webb and Shinkle 1989), and from material
supplied by MSFC (Weiler 1989) personnel. These are recent projections (generally
September 1989) and are presented in Table 4-2.
Mission control support for Space Station freedom will involve continuous daily support
as opposed to the 1 1/2 weeks of intense support required for a Shuttle mission. The Space
Station Control Center (SSCC) will require 5.8 teams with typically 60 positions (civil
service and contractor) to support continuous console operations at three shifts per day
(Webb and Shinlde, 1989). The number increases to seven certified teams to enable rotation
of workers to non-console duties, and to eight teams (i.e., ,180 positions) to provide for
turnover stock. This projection does not include non-console supporting activities in the
SSCC. Automation applications focused on the console functions and interfaces as well as
the _'aining of the flight controllers would increase SSCC productivity and reduce operating
costs via manpower requirements reduction.
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iTable 4.2
Manpower Requirements for Ground Support (Man-years)
W
= .
J
FY 1993 FY 1995 FY 1997
Operations Planning and Integration 72
Trajectory Design and Dynamics 46
Space Station Control Center 41
Space Station TrainingFacility 102
Payload Planning 55
Payload Operations Support 35
142 145
42 54
269 339
25 135
55 6O
35 42
Additional information regarding productivity for the Space St,ation Freedom may be
found in Appendix D.
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SECTION 5
APPLICATION OF ADVANCED AUTOMATION TECHNOLOGY
As used in this report, the term advanced automation refers primarily to computer and
electronic systems which exhibit intelligent behavior (usually referred to as expert or
knowledge-based systems) or otherwise enhance the flight (and ground) crew's capability to
operate the Space Station and perform payload activities. The emphasis is on systems which
are not currently used in spacecraft. Thus even simple expert systems are considered
"advanced automation" as ate other automation approaches not currently used in spacecraft,
while the avionics packages presently used in the Space Shuttle are not. An overview of
available advanced automation technology is given in Appendix E. The reader is also
referred to the Space Station Freedom Program Capabilities for the Development and
Application of Advanced Automation (Bayer, 1989) and to the Space Station Advanced
Automation Study Final Report (Friedland et al., 1988).
5.1 POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS FOR SPACE STATION FREEDOM
General categories of potential automation applications for Space Station Freedom may
be derived from the literature. Specific potential applications come from suggestions by the
astronauts and ground personnel, active and proposed projects at NASA and the contractor
community, and the literature. The general criteria for tasks where advanced automation has
potential are: repetitive or boring tasks, vigilance tasks, tasks involving cognitive processes
only,time criticaltasks,hazardous tasks,and tasksrequiringknowledge the astronauts/users
do not possess. Table 5-I shows intelligentsystem applicationsunder development forthe
Space Stationfunded by the Advanced Development Program. Additional funding for a
number of these effortsisprovided by the Officeof Aeronautics and Space Tcchnology's
(OAST) Systems Autonomy Program and by Space StationSupporting Development funds
withinthe work package.
5.1.1 Monitoring and Control Systems
A number of examples of knowledge-based monitoring and controlsystems existin
industry.NASA has alreadyshown the value of such systems inapplicationssuch as IESP.
The evolutionaryautomation ofmonitoring should continue,with theadditionof knowledge-
based systems for monitoring on the ground, and ultimatelyon-orbit.At the simplestlevel,
monitoring systems might merely perform an exception reportingfunction,thatis,notifya
human operatorwhen system behavior/statusisoutsideof some presetbounds. In instances
where the rulesfor evaluating expected system behavior axe complex, contextdependent,
and subject to change, the process requires more expertise;and advanced automation
technology may be needed. Another use of advanced automation technology would bc to
perform trend analysison the systems being monitored, to both detectand avoid incipient
failuresand to betterunde_tand system behavior. Effortsapplicable to Space Station
Freedom include the Communications and Tracking (C&T) Central Processor Resource
Manager expert system, the Thermal Expert System (TEXSYS) for the Thermal Control
System (TCS), the Data Management System (DMS) Network Monitor, the Operations
Management System (OMS) event evaluator,the Power Management and Distribution
(PMAD) System Fault Recovery and Management Expert System (FRAMES) and Load
PriorityListManagement System (LPLMS), and thepayload Instrument Scheduler/Control
System.
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Table 5-1
Advanced Automation Prototypes Funded by the Space Station Freedom
Advanced Development Program
Monitoring Planning Automation
& & Training SoRware &
control FD_ _ Swtems
EPS APEX
PMAD
PMAC I.¢RC Activity
C&T Central Processor
Resource Manager ES
Thermal _YS
MAESTRO
LeRC Activity _,eRC- Activity
Local Conu'oUer
Fault Manager
TEXSY$
ECLSS MSFC Activity MSFC Activity
Payloads PI-in-a-Box Pl-in-a-Box Pl-in-a-Box Pl-in-a-Box
Instrument Scheduler/ Payload-Assist
Control ES module deploys-ICAT
DMS Network Monitor Global FDIR Advanced DMS
Processorfs, Networks
7
OMS Event Evaluamr Global FDIR :-: _:Short Term
Activity Planner
PMS PMS Scheduler
SSE Design Knowledge Advanced Software
Capture Development Workstation
KBS Ada Tools
RMS Procedural Advanced Human-
Reasoning System System interface
5.1.2 Fault Diagnosis, Isolation and RecOvery •
Fault diagnosis, isolationand recovery systems hav e also bc_en demQns__tra_Led in
industry.The high payback of such systems inspace-appiic_Ri0nsh_becn_monstratcd by
BOOSTER inthe Mission Control Center. The automation of FDIR would provide several
the amountbenefits--includingrapidand reliablecorrectionof problems and lessening .............of
spentintrainingforsituationswhich theexpertsystem can handle. Systd_d perform these
functions would often be model-based ratherthan ad hoc, particularlyearlyin the Space
Station'soperational cycle, and would thus require an accurate understanding of how
systems operate. Some ad hoc knowledge could bc gained through simulations(SIMs), the
restwould nccd tobc acquired through experience with thelivesystems. Effortsapplicable
to Space StationFreedom include the ElectricalPower System (EPS) Automated Power
Expert (APEX), FRAMES, TEXSYS, the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) Procedural
Reasoning System, and an OMS FDIR prototype similar to Mission Control's IESP,
BOOSTER, and mechanical expertsystems.
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5.1.3 Planning and Scheduling Systems
The value of planning and scheduling systems can be seen in the use of the AALPS,
GATES, and RALPH applications. Activity planning/scheduling, both on-board and
ground, can be facilitatedusing intelligentsystems. Such systems generallycomprise two
functions--activityplanning, which is the process of developing the sequences of
actions/eventsnecessary to complete some task,and scheduling,which isthe process of
assigning times to activities/actionsbased upon plans and resource constraints.Activity
planning lendsitselfdirectlyto solutionsusing knowledge-based techniques;and scheduling
systems may use knowledge-based or expert systems techniques,although a varietyof
algorithmic and heuristicapproaches are commonly used. NASA flightplanning and
schedulingactivitiesate done on the ground, with littleuse of advanced automation. While
the astronautsexpressed a preference for flexibilityin short-term scheduling, on-board
planning/scheduling aidsmay bc essentialbecause of the complexity of payloads,and the
tightnessof resource constraints.Relevant projectsincludethe PMAD LPLMS and Loads
Enable Scheduler t'I..ES),and Payloads Management System (PMS) scheduler.
5.1.4 Human Computer Interface
General improvements in the human computer interface,such as theuse of colorgraphic
displays,pull down menus-icons-trackballinterfaces,and design to group data/functions
logically,would be of value. In addition,the Space Stationprogram can benefitfrom use of
expert system technology to minimize the amount of input required from astronautsby
intelligentselectionof defaults.Speech recognitiontechnology may bc usefulinnon-life-
criticalfunctionswhere hands frecoporationisdesirable,such as inuse of the glove-box and
where a small setof discretefunctionexists.Automated verbalannunciationof some caution
and warning informationmay bc usefulinthe augmentation of visualcues. The automated
audio recording of logs/observations,with directdownlink in audio form and transcription
on the ground, might save considerabletime; atsome futuretime automated transcription
might bc possible.Applicable development effortswithinthe Space Stationprogram include
evaluation of complex interfacetechnologies at ISC and MSFC and evaluation of the
evolutionrexluiremcntsforcupola workstationsatARC.
5.1.5 Training
Training of novices in an areaof expertiseisa classicalapplicationof expertsystems.
Additional possibilitiesinclude an on-board trainingcapabilityusing multiple media and
providing the capabilityto allow for refreshertrainingin seldom performed tasksand f'trst
time trainingin low probabilitytasks,such as certainrepairtasks.Expert systems can also
bc used to expand the capabilitiesof training/simulationat reasonable cost both on the
ground and on-orbit.Training resultscan bc captured for possibleinclusionin diagnostic
expert systems. Relevant projectsinclude the Payload AssistModule/Deploys Intelligent
Computer Aided Training (PAM/D ICAT) system,Software Support Environment (SSE) and
Technical and Management Information System (TMIS) projects addressing design
knowledge capture,and the "PrincipalInvestigator(PI)in a box" scientist'sassistant.In
additionto servingtrainingfunctions,thislastapplicationisintendedtogivereal-dineadvice
toastronautson theconduct ofexperiments.
5.2 PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS FROM ADVANCED AUTOMATION
,......: = :++:i
The factthatadvanced automation +_hnologies arefindingapplicationsinbusinessand
industry demonstrates thatthese technologiescan be cost-effectiveand can significantly
improve operations.Unfortunatelyrelativelylittlespecificcost/payoffinformationisreadily
available. While system users express confidence thatproductivityimprovements exist,
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these are often impossible to quantify accurately; and, when cost/savings data exists, it is
often incomplete, withheld for competitive reaons, or lacks sufficient background
information to be of use in formulating projections. Generally, the productivity related
benefits from use of advanced technology fall into several categories--less manpower
required, shorter training periods, more consistent performance, better performance, and less
stress on humans. Table 5-2 is a summary of the potential benefits of various areas of
automation based on the literature and astronaut comments.
Table 5-2 ....... :
Areas of Productivity improvement from Advanced Automation
System Type
Monitoring & Control
Workforce* Speed Accuracy TminingTime Consistency
++ ++ + + ++
FDIR + ++ + ++ ++
Planning& Scheduling
(includingdynamicreplan,
ning/reschcduling)
÷+ ++ + + ++
Human Computer Interface +
Training +
II
mQI
+ moderate improvement
++ significant improvement
qP
!
i
g
m
III
++ ++ ++ ++ ¢-_
'E
il
+ ++ ++
* Note: Workforce savings may be in number of people or indeca'ease in required work.
Manpower savings are an obvious form of _tential savings. Anything which can be
adequately done by a machine does not need to be done by a human; this will generally result
in a net savings if it is possible to either augment the human operator or find him/her other
productive work. The most significant savings in _power costs are usually seen in
monitoring and control and planning and scheduling systems. Based on the limited data
available, successfully implemented ground-based automation systems aimed primarily at
manpower reduction in narrow domains may have a In'st year payback in excess of 50
percent (the approximate rate of return on the investment on IESP). Paybaek for planning
and scheduling systems may well be higher because less testing and backup is required. On-
board systems will require more extensive verification and validation, but will probably have
higher payback because of the extremely high value of an on-orbit astronaut-hour (see
Section 4.2).
Speed and consistency _ also potential b_efl_ of automation. Both faster response
times and consistent responses are generally possible through automation of such time
consuming and repetitive and boring activities such as monitoring. In addition, humans do
not perform repetitive and boring tasks very reliably, providing another potential advantage
for automation; the use of user friendly interfaces can also significantly improve speed and
accuracy on such tasks. XCON, NICBES, GATES, and IESP (see Appendix E) provide
examples of the how automation can be used to improve response times and reliability. Since
FDIR systems do not often deal repeatedly with identical contingencies, consistency is not
generally as much of an issue as is correctness. While projections of benefits based on
faster, more accurate performance are speculative, in such applications as fault diagnosis
speed may prove exceedingly valuable, as in the case of NASA's experience with
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BOOSTER. Another benefit from automated FDIR "is that the resolution of faults is less apt
to be held up while expe_ arc located.
For space applicationsthereisalsoa dichotomy inthetreatmentof on-board and ground
manpower. On board manpower forSpace StationFreedom isvery expensive (estimatedby
some to b¢ $35,000 per astronaut-hour)although the bulk of thisfigureobviously stems
from fixedcostsand overhead. The costsof ground supporttime arc a more modest $50 per
man hour,although fixedcostsand overhead arc includedhere,too.
Ground support activitiescost savings are on relativelyfirm basis,both because
automation can resultin actualdirectsavingsof manpower, and because realcostsavings
have already been demonstrated in analogous projects. Itshould bc noted thatIESP
demonstrated a 25 percent savingsin systems monitoring costs,although because thiswas a
firsteffort,these realizedsavings are probably somewhat conservative;thus a high end
savingsof 50 percentisalsoconsideredformonitoring and controlsystems. Automation of
planning and schedulingactivitieshas demonstrated high payoffswhen replacingcompletely
manual systems with interactivegraphics;in replacing lower levelsof automation, as is
generallythe case withinNASA, a lower range of savingscan be expected (e.g.10 percent
to25 percent).The payoff from FDIR systems isimpossibletopredictatthispoint,except
thatithas been demonstrated thatsuch systems can more than pay forthemselves. The cost
savingspossiblefrom advanced trainingsystems,largelystem from two sources,the use of
lower costtechnologiesfrom some aspectsof trainingand theshorteningof requiredtraining
times. The former isnot quantifiableatthistime,but the latterisapt to be on the order of
(10-25)percent (basedon IESP). IESP and otherMission Control Center applicationshave
greatlyreduced the time requiredtomodify and extend applicationsoftware.This initself,
leads to greatlyincreased productivity. The savings due to the use of improved human
computer interface are not easy to quantify (in part because it is difficult to separate the effects
of interfaces from other changes, although once again they were demonstrated during IESP),
but these interfaces are generally relatively low in cost and provide immediate benefits in
user satisfaction ff in no other area. Another area of savings which cannot be readily
quantified is savings due to preservation of institutional memory through design knowledge
capture in support of advanced automation
Potentialcostsavingsfrom thesetypesof automation inground supportapplicationsare
summarized in Table 5-3,based on the ground supportrequirements given inTable 4-2. A
range of savings percentages isgiven,with a dollarsavings estimatesfor each end of the
range. The savingsestimatesforareaswhich are alreadyrelativelyautomated arc naturally
lower than thoseforareaswhich make littleuse ofautomation.
Saving on-board astronauttime presentsa high potentialpayback; but,sincethe crew
sizeand many of the costscontributingto theon-board hourlyratearc fixed,the time saved
must be divertedintootherproductive usesfor thispayback tobe realized. In general,any
time saved willbe devoted tomore payload (e.g.scientificwork). While other factorssuch
asciectricpower availabilityand totalavailableresupplymass affecttheabilitytoadd payload
activities,experiencewith the Skylab and Space Shuttleisthatexperimentswith low resource
requirements can utilizeany astronaut time freed by automation. Furthermore, the
development of scientific"facilities"on the Space Stationwill open significantresearch
opportunitiesindependent of the requirementsto carry heavy, study-specificapparatusinto
orbit,although needs forre,supply willstillexist.Also,in many cases thenaturalalternative
to spending crew time inmonitoring and controlof systems istoperform those functionson
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the ground rather than to automate them, so that for such activities as monitoring and control
the opportunities to save astronaut time through automation may be somewhaf_xr_ted. _"7
Table 5-3 . :_, :
Potential Cost Savings from Ground Support Advanced Automation
Activity
Operations Planning and Integration
Trajectory Design and _cs
Space Station Control Center
Space Station Training Facility
Payload Planning
Payload Operations Support
Potential Savings
(% reduction in task time) : = =7
25-50
10-25
25-50
10225
10-25
25-50
Based on the crew time estimates and available productivity studies in Section 4, Tables
5-3 and 5-4 gives rough estimates of potential savings in crew time achievable through
advanced automation. These estimates are only approximate because both the underlying
crew workload data and the percentage of savings are only ball-park figures; and for each
area a range is given for the potential _entage savings and dollar estimates based on the
high and low ends of the range. However, the reader should remember that these savings do
not necessarily translate directly into dollar savings, but could represent time which might
more appropriately be devoted to additional payload activities.
Table 5-4
Potential Savings from On-board Automation
Activity
ActivityPlanning
System Monitoring and Control
Flight Control
Flight Planning
Training
Inventory Management
Internal Maintenance and Servicing
External Maintenance and Servicing
Proximate Operations
Payload Operations
Reboost
Percent Savings
(% reduction in task time)
5-10
5-10
10-20
5-25
10-25
10-25
5-10
2.5-5
5-10
5-10
5-10
Further background on advanced automation technology and fielded applications may be
found in Appendix E. __
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SECTION 6
APPLICATION OF ROBOTICS TECHNOLOGY
In principle, applications of the robotics technologies present a significant potential in
improving the productivity of the Space Station Freedom operations. The technology could
be targeted to handle routine tasks, perform inspection, and carry out maintenance and
servicing activities in both IVA and EVA applications. The question that now arises is the
degree that such potenti_ can be realized at various stages of Space Station development.
The answer to this question depends on a variety of factors, including:
• Stares and availability of the technology as a function of time
• Requirements for assembly, housekeeping, servicing and maintenance activities
• Accommodations of designs allowing exploitation of robotics potentials.
In the remainder of this section it is assumed that such accommodation has been made
and that the robotics technology will be used operationally as soon as it is available and can
be safely applied. An overview of robotics technology is given in Appendix F.
6.1 POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS IN SPACE STATION FREEDOM
Section 3.4 of this report presented the results of the survey taken of the astronauts to
capture their insights on the need for, and relative merits of, investing in advanced
automation and robotics to increase productivity. As discussed earlier, the astronaut
responses relevant to the potential of robotics to improve their productivity can be summed
up as follows:
• In the near term, astronauts felt there is greater potential for the utility of EVA
robotics than IVA robotics.
• In the near term, automated robotic inspection tasks are perceived by the astronauts as
having the greatest productivity potential of the EVA functions.
As a result of the survey, the following discussion is separated into EVA and IVA
.sections, with the majority of the analysis being presented for the potential productivity
maprovements of EVA robotic activities
6.1.1 EVA Potential Applications
NASA is currently developing a Space Station robotic system which has four principal
elements: the Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS), the Canadian teleoperated robotic arm
(MRMS), the mobility base (the Transporter) and the Shuttle RMS. These will be used
separately and in conjunction to implement a variety of EVA tasks. The choice of tasks is not
finn at this time but it includes three basic classes of activities: assembly assistance,
maintenance and servicing, and inspection. These classes of operations are essentially those
suggested and evaluated by the astronauts in this survey, and thus it is useful to discuss the
potential productivity improvements for each of these functional groups.
G
G
m.
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bAll of the system elements are telerobotic, i.e., their motions are controlled directly by
an operator located either in a station module, or in a Space Shuttle or at an EVA station on
the MRMS. They achieve the accuracies required for their vari_functions by the ability of
the astronaut to use direct or video observation to guide them. In this sense these operations
will be extensions of the type of operations already carried out in various Shuttle missions by
the EVA astronauts working in conjunction with the RMS. -o+_ _ _ ....
However, in the following discussions of advanced uses of these systems it is important
to realize that all of the arm elements (the RMS, the MRMS, and the FTS) at_e also-
programmable, i.e., all of their joints can be pro_ed to accomplish the mbvement of
their end points to a given location within useful accuracies (on the order of a couple of
inches for the MRMS and the RMS, and roughly a hundredth of an inch for the much smaller
FTS.) These progranm_ble accuracies, coupled _th the NASA/NBS Standard Reference
Model (NASREM) hierarchical control architecture of the FTS, provide the basls for early
adaptation of planned automated procedures which enhance the potential for the adaptation of
automated procedures. The following sections discuss the possible applications of robots
based on the survey and literature.
6.1.1.1 Assembly Assistant Tasks
While the details are still under consideration, it appears that all of the robotic systems
(the MRMS, the Transporter, the RMS and the FTS) will be used during assembly for
various functions including:. _ _ .... _
*Tmnspon of material from the Shuttle bay to the work site
- Truss packages
- Work jigs
- Living and lab modules
• Positioning elements at the work site
- Thermal _diato_m
- Attached payload assemblies
- Support and positioning of the astronauts at the work site.
In the current plan the control of the robotic elements for these tasks will be
accomplished by the astronauts from teleoperation workstations in the Space Shutde and/or
the Space Station and possibly from a remote ground statioti. _::_ .... -- ............. _ :
One Way ofdramatlcaIIyin_asing thceffec_v-e'productivity Of_ as_nauts for these
operations would be to provide ground control of various elements of the robot systems for
simple tasks which can be accomplished while the astronauts arc engaged in IVA activities
and/or are in the EVA preparation cycle. The candidate ground taskswould be: I) transport
materials, 2) prepare the work site during the EVA pre-breathe period, and 3) inspect
worksite for anomalies or to ensure all support equipment is in-place.
_e major task of_e'large _ _S_S) in this activity is to transport and
position objects. The smaller FTS will primarily be used to hold objects in place during
assembly, position attachment tools, and perform simple assembly operatio.ns in well-
def'med, jigged environments (GSFC, 1989a). Although primarily teleoperated, the required
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automation control technology is well understood and falls into the class of "pick and place"
robots. The astronauts and the literature surfaced three major cautions in applying this
factory based automation technology to a ground controlled space operations environment.
• Signal delay times: The ground operators will not have the direct vision of the arms
and their workspacv which characterized the Space Shuttle/RMS operations, and
which is the basis of the teach pendant method of creating the automated routines of
factory robots. Therefore, all the ground operator's information from sensors and
video feedback will reach them with varying delay times of up to three seconds.
Additionally, there exists the possibility of communication outages which must be
allowed for.
+ • Size and complexity of the total workspace: Factory automation is based on robot
: operations from a freed base in a structured workspace. The complexity of the Space
•: Station robot operations, especially during assembly tasks, will require frequent
updates to both the location of the robot's base and the structure of its workspace (i.e.
reach envelopes and obstacles). To the extent possible, work envelopes should be
pre-defined (everything has a place) and well structured (keep the work envelope
uncluttered and simple).
• .implementing safety: Safety zones around factory robots will have to be implemented
m space by a complex integration of the hardware, the software and the operational
rules so that there is essentially no chance that either normal or failure mode actions
could damage the Space Station or endanger an astronaut. The latter goal can be
achieved, with some loss of capability and flexibility, by restricting all ground
controlled robot activities to non-EVA periods. In the case of the FTS it appears
:: feasible that a combination of a _afe zone and safmg devices/software will reduce the
hazards sufficiendy to allow astronaut acti_W in proximity to the FTS.
Rapid, graphical display of all planned movements relative to the surrounding Space
Station e!ements for ve_cation must be provided prior to implementation. Because of the
control limitations of adopting state-of-the-art teleoperation and automation techniques,
significantly smarter software and the integration of more reliable sensors capable of sensing
and prohibiting dangerous motions as well as providing the ground controller with the
information required to plan and proof safe trajectories and object manipulations, will be
required.
6.1.I.2 Maintenance and Servicing Tasks
The currentnear-term concept formaintaining the Space Stationand servicingthe on-
board experiments isbased primarilyon the exchange of system elements packaged to be
easily attached and detached by eitheran EVA astronautor by a robot. These orbital
replacement units (ORUs) generallyrequirethe placement of a "release"tool (usuallya
powered drivercoupled with a holdingand forceequilibratordevicesimilartothe MMS tool
used by the astronautson theSolarMax repairmission)inmultiplelocations.
Maintenance and servicingtasks differfrom the assembly tasks in two important
dimensions. Firstthe maintenance function willbe required for the lifetimeof the Space
Station and second the range of masses to be manipulated willbe small compared to the
habitation/laboratorymodules handled duringassembly.
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The productivity for these tasks Could _ incased _ the s_way _ for the assembly
assist tasks - teleoperation from stations or ground control of the robot operations. The
majority of the maintenance tasks will be removal and replacement of standard ORUs (which
are system elements packaged specifically for on-orbit replacement by crew members and/or
robotics). The planned robotic friendliness of the ORUs, their relatively srnaIl mass and their
fLxed, known work-site environment, all tend to make the use of teleoperation from station or
ground controlreasonableoptionsto _e astronaut: ..... :
The FTS or SPDM willprobably be the system used forthe majorityof themaintenance
and servicingtasks.Current plans callfor the FTS to be carried to the work siteby the
Transporter and the MRMS, and to functioneitherattachedto the MRMS or from a truss
mounted work site.The efficiencyof theORU_p_ffi-cement taskWillbe enhanced by the
integrationof automated sensorfed controlsoftwarecapableof stabilizingand controllingthe
FTS's contactoperations(insertion/grasp). :...........
6.1.1.3 Inspection Tasks
As noted earlier in section 6.3, the survey indicated that the opinion of the majority of
the astronautswas thatautomated inspectiontasksofferedone of the bestopportunitiesfor
increasing theirproductivityover the lifeof the Space Station. This conclusion is in
agreement with the resultsof an early Space Station study of Automation and Robotics
(McDonnell Douglas, 1986) which reportedthatin some cases,inspectiontasksrequire90
percentof thecrew tasktime versus 10 percentforactuallyperforming a repair.
Inspecnon_s, at a __, _eability _ p0smon an instrument probe or package
so that any surface area or component of the Space Station can be examined through its
sensor feedback. Advanced inspection tasks may also require that the package have the
ability to physically interact with the suspect part, e.g. insert an inspection probe. The
MRMS, the FTS, or the MRMS and FTS operating together, could be used for either of
these inspection tasks types, depending on the degree of precision and system stability
required to perform the inspection. Inspection of solar array panels, truss members/joints and
payloads are the tasks most likely to be candidates for EVA reduction by using robotic
inspection. -
Again, ground operation of selected obstacie-fre_ surface inspection tasks, especially
those routinely and periodically scheduled, could be the most cost effective first approach to
essentially increasing astronaut productivity for this class of activity.
6.1,2 IVA _ent_i-Applications .....
As discussedin section6.3,the astronautsin thesurvey indicatedthat,intheiropinion,
the potentialforrobotsto increasetheirIVA productivity(e.g.,lab tending)was significantly
less than could be accomplished through EVA robotics. In addition there w_ Some
expressions of concern about working in proximity to an operating robot (such as an
astronauttendingone labexperiment while a robotisservicinganotherexperiment).
There arc however some potentialIVA robot usesthatcould probably be of considerable
assistanceinrelievingthe astronautof time consuming, repetitivefunctionswithout involving
the potentialof inadvertentcontactwith a crew member (McDonnell Douglas, May 1989).
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Rack and/or rail mounted manipulators capable of routine film change out, material transfer
including toxic or otherwise hazardous materials handling, inspection, or automated
housekeeping tasks such as vacuuming, germicidal wiping), or cleaning the interior of life
science experiments should be examined as the IVA workload is more fully defined. It
should be noted that the Space Station laboratory module interior can be considered more
"friendly" to automated robots than the EVA world since the work cell environment can be
made more amenable to layout like a factory robot with work cells segregated from astronaut
activity areas.
6.2 PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS FROM ADVANCED ROBOTICS
Given the limited astronaut experience base for quantifying astronaut productivity, and
the present state of the planning for the design and operation of the various elements of the
robot systems, only very general statements can be made about increasing astronaut
productivity at this time. This study has suggested the technical potential of augmenting on-
board robot control with ground remote control as one way to increase astronaut productivity.
A reasonable approach to project potential astronaut productivity gains by substituting
ground control functions for selected on-board astronaut activities would be to build on the
methodologies and task timelines developed in three previous studies which examined the
effect on total astronaut activity time of incorporating the FTS into timelines which were
originally planned as EVA activity ordy (see Appendix F for more detail).
The fhst two s_mdies, (Smith et al., 1987 and D_Ws, 1989) developed methodologies
which could be applied to on-orbit operations or to ground control augmentation. The studies
indicated that even the substitution of an IVA teleoperated FTS into ali-EVA timelines
showed significant reductions in astronaut activity requirements. However, the reduction in
EVA time gained by using robotics, at least in the fwst years of the Space Station, will be
offset by the increased IVA time that will be required to support robotic operations.
Advanced Development tasks in shared control will increase the efficiency of robotic
operations and will permit some fully automated tasks which are supervised by IVA
astronauts. In later years, some robotic applications wiU be capable of ground remote
supervised control. Inspection tasks and worksite preparation activities are likely candidates.
Ground control of robotic tasks with data latency requires an integrated approach to task and
spatial planning, sensor data fusion, and robot control. Collision avoidance using this
integrated approach has been demonstrated for a robotic inspection task with time delay
representative of that experienced from the ground to low earth orbit. The Advanced
Development Program is continuing its efforts to develop and demonstrate this technology
given its potential to reduce IVA time for robotic tasks.
The third study (GSFC, 1989) examined the same subject with similar results and
recommended four specific assembly tasks be considered for robotic augmentation:
• Resource pallet installation
• Thermal Control System (TCS) panel instaUation
• ORU installation
• Inspection operations using FTS on the MRMS
While these tasks were all studied as assembly elements, the third and fourth are
representative of maintenance and inspection tasks respectively.
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gIn each of the above studies, the savings in astronaut total time was achieved by
transferring some EVA tasks to an IVA controlled FTS. (Smith et al., 1987) further noted
that "A strong benefit of autonomous operat_ni_s ttic p0tenti_I to/edd¢c Statlon iVA for
supervisory tasks and thus improve FTS value and productivity. However, these benefits
must be examined in the light of their technical complexity against performing the functions
telerobotically from the ground."
that:
The astronaut cautionary comments support these conclusions and add the observation
The advanced technologies required fo¢ safe ground control of the robot elements can
lead directly to those required for augmenting the efficiency of the on-board robot
control by the astronauts.
Both the (Smith et al.,1987) "note"'and the above"observation" are important. In
view of the stateof development of robotic technologies,itisclear thatfullreduction in
selectedEVA activitiesusing autonomous robotsisnot feasiblein the near term. Therefore,
the next best alternativeto augmenting an already aggressiveon-orbitwork schedule,isto
alleviatesome of the simple but potentiallytime consuming EVA taskswith ground remote
control. This solution would also help reduce some of the on-orbit IVA telc0peration
workload. This alternativeiscurrentlyonly viable,consideringtime delay limitations,as long
as the taskremains simple with no requirementforhigh-rateclosedloop force/torquefeedback
tothe ground operator.The payoff,interms of workload manifesting/flexibility,appears great
enough to warrant initialdevelopment, testand ground applicationof technologies such as
scene simulation,off-linespatialplanning,sharedcontroland predictivesimulated con_oi to
offsettime delay. These technologies,ifproven firston the _ w_ _ more easily
rctrofitteclintothe Space Stationrobotic environment as theFTS evolves.
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SECTION 7
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section states the conclusions of this study with respect to the potential for
increasing productivity during the evolution of Space Station Freedom through the
application of advanced automation and robotics technology. Based on these conclusions,
recommendations are made concerning the technologies and application areas addressed by
the Advanced Development Program.
7.1 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions of this study may be summarized as follows:
• The astronaut community generally has expressed strong support for the use of
advanced automation and EVA robotics on the station. In terms of potential
productivity improvements, their collective view was that the applications with the
greatest potential are automated inventory management, record keeping, FDIR,
improved human.computer interfaces, and automated inspection with EVA
telerobotics. Astronauts with the long duration flight experience of Skylab were
somewhat more strongly positive in their views towards automation than astronauts
and payload specialists whose only flight experience has been Space Shuttle
missions. Current astronauts, on the other hand, with recent exposure to the de_.e
of automation employed on the Space Shuttle may be less likely to consider
automation a panacea (Low, 1990).
There is a high potential for significant increases in productivity on Space Station
Freedom through the application bf advanced automation technology during the
development and evolution of the station. Areas which appear to offer the greatest
potential include automation of payload operations, inventory management, and
system monitoring and control, including FDIR.
There is also high potential for significant increases in productivity in ground-based
station operations through the use of advanced automation, resulting in lower life-
cycle costs over the life of the station. Areas which appear to offer the greatest
potential include Space Station Control Center functions, and Operations Planning
and Integration activities.
EVA robotics has the potential to increase on-orbit productivity. The most cost-
effective and technologically simplest way to significantly add to astronaut
productivity during external assembly, maintenance, and inspection operations may
be to transfer some control of the robot elements to the ground for selected tasks.
A significant increase in the level of definition of Space Station activities and crew
tasks is needed which includes the duration and frequency of those tasks over the life
of the Space Station operations. This data will provide a firm quantitative estimate of
the expected benefits of advanced technology in terms of crew hours saved and thus
available to support payload operations. Such data is also required in order to judge
the adequacy of available crew time as a resource to support payload operations.
7-1
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7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the conclusions above, the following are recommendations for the
development of advanced automation and robotics technology for the Space Station Freedom
Program:
• Development of advanced automation and/-0bttiCS _c]ino]0_sliouid_e actively
pursued. General areas of emphasis should include knowledge-based systems for
flight systems and ground operations, improved human-system interfaces, and EVA
telerobotics ....
• Specific applications cannot be recommended solely on the basis of quantitative
estimates of productivity benefits at present; general guidelines should be tO develop
systems which combine near-term technical feasibility, high potential for saving crew
time on-orbit or reducing staffing on the ground, and acceptance and support by
users, : ......
• Adequate provision should be made in system design to accommodate furore
introduction of advanced automation and robotics technology. _:_ .......... :==
. : ......... = ............. _=
• Additional effort should be devoted to developing.data to provide the basis for more
recise quantitative estimates of the impact of specific systems on productivity and
re-cycle cost. This effort should include the collection of workload and activity
duration data from Space StationFreedom once thestationispermanendy manned.
Related to the point above, a systems engineering study approac h _ _C issues
involving allocation of functions to a person, machine, or Sbhie:_nafion thereof
needs to be performed as a next step. Such a top-down approach should consider
crew activities in two categories: (1) operations - where the routine events handed on
a daily basis might be reduced from 3 h_reW me-m-her da3/-t-0_h0_, and (2)
mission activities - involving crew experiments and new crew jobs which provides
greater potential for realizing productivity gains. Factors such as reliability, safety,
etc., could then be factored in to give strong indications of high payoff applications.
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APPENDIX A
SPACE STATION FREEDOM ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM
This Appendix contains a listing of the Fiscal Year 1990 tasks of NASA's Advanced
Development Program as Table A-1. The Advanced Development Program is managed by
Space Station Engineering, Office of Space Flight, NASA Headquarters, and involves each
of the Space Station F'medom Program Work Packages and all of the N.ASA Centers.
Table A-1
Advanced Development Program - FY90 Tasks
Project Title Center Task Manager
Flight Systems Automation
Power Management & Control Automation
ECLSS Automation
PI-in-a-box
Thermal Control System Automation
On-orbit Crew Training Prototype
Power Management & Distribution Automation
Ground Operations Automation
Real-Time Data Systems
InteLligent Computer-Aided Training
Instrument Scheduler Expert System
Transition Flight Control Room
Space Station Information Systems
DMS Advanced Automation
OMS Fault Detection, Isolation, & Reconfiguration
OMS Advanced Scheduling System
TMIS Design Knowledge Capture
KBS Scheduler Re-host
Advanced Payload Simulator
Optical Protocols for Advanced Spacecraft Networks
Advanced Automation Tools & Architectures
Computer Integrated Documentation
LcRC
MSFC
ARC
JSC
JSC
MSFC
JSC
JSC
GSFC
JSC
JSC
JSC
JSC
ARC
JPL
SSC
JPL
ARC
ARC
Jim Dolce, Jim Kish
Brandon Dewberry
Peter Friedland
J. Dominick, K. Healey
Barbara Pearson
Bryan Walls
Troy Heindcll
B. Savely,B. Loftin
Larry Hull,Karen Moc
A1 Brewer
W. Mallary, K. Douglas
Mike Kearney
Rick Eckelkamp
PeterFriedland
Rich Doyle, EricBiefeld
Wendy HoUiday
Larry Bergman
Ellen Ochoa
Guy Boy, Peter Friedland
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Table A-1
Advanced Development
(continued)
Program - FY90 Tasks
I
Advanced Automation Software, Hardware,
Advanced Software Development Workstation
ART/Aria Tool Prototype
CLIPS & CLIPS/Ada Extensions
KATE/Ada Tool Prototype
KBS Integration Environment
Fault Tolerant Software Architectures
MAESTRO Advanced Scheduling Tool
Digital Optical Computer Evaluation
Space-qualified Multiprocessor
Advanced Human-System Interface
Telerobotic Systems
Telerobofic System Technology
Architecture for Telerobotic Systems
Automated Construction Testbed
Collision Avoidance Sensor Skin
Telerobotics Ground Remote Operations
Crew/Equipment Retrieval Robot Design Study
Human Factors
JSC
JSC
JSC
KSC
ARC
ARC
MSFC
MSFC
ARC
ARC
Emie Fridge, Bob Savely
Chris Culbert
Chris Culbert
Barbara Brown
Henry Lure
Ann Patterson-Hine
Bryan Wails
Charlie Jones
Allan Femquist
Mike McGreevy
_L
_L
LaRC
GSFC
_L
JSC
Sarnad Hyati
Brian W'flcox
AI Meintel
John Vranish
Bert Hansen
Kathy Healey
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APPENDIX B
PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED
This Appendix containsa listingof thepersons interviewedduringthecourse of the study.
Astronauts/Payload Specialists Missions Flown -_
John-David Bartoc
Gerald P. Cart
N. Jan Davis
Bonnie Dunbar
Owen K. Garriott
Edward G. Gibson
Grog Harbaugh
Henry W. Hartsfield
David C. Hilmers
Jeffrey A. Hoffman
Joseph P. Kerwin
Byron K. Lichtcnberg
John M. Lounge
Jack R. Lousma
Story F. Musgrave
Claude Nicollier
Robert F. Ovcrmeyer
Robert A. Parker
William R. Pogue
Jerry L. Ross
Rhea M. Seddon
Robert Springer
John W. Young
STS 51-F (Spacelab 2)
Skylab 4
assigned to STS 47 (Spacelab J)
STS 61-A, STS 32
Skylab 3, STS 9 (Spacelab 1)
Skylab 4
assigned to STS 39
STS 4, STS 61-D, STS 61-A
STS 5 l-J, STS 26, STS 36
STS 51-D
Skylab 2
STS 9 (Spacelab 1)
NRL
CAMUS
Teledyne Brown
Grumman
Lockheed
Payload Systems
Inc./CAMUS
STS 51-I, STS 26
Skylab 3, STS 3
STS 6, STS 51-F (Spacelab 2),
STS 33
assigned to STS 46
STS 5, STS 5 I-B (Spacelab 3)
STS 9 (Spacelab 1)
Skylab 4
STS 61-B, STS 27
STS 5 I-D
STS 29
Gemini m, Gemini IX, Apollo 10,
Apollo 16, STS 1, STS 9 (Spacelab 1)
privateconsultant
McDonnell Douglas
CAMUS
Mission Ooerations. Johnson
A1 W. Baker
Stephen G. Bales
Theodore W. Eggleston
James R. Gauthier
William P. Graver
Eugene F. Kranz
Charles R. Lewis
John F, Muratorc
John W. O2qeill
Gerald E. Shinkle
Soace Center
B-1
mOther NASA Personnel
B. J. Blurb
Jon D. Erickson
Stephen B. Hall
Charles M. Lewis
Keith H. Miller
Jack W. Stokes
Je_'y D. Weiler
Others
Brand N. Griffin
David G. Hammcn
Gordon L. Johns
Richard L. Olson
Arthur N. Rasmussen
SSFP (Levell'I),Program System Engineering
and Integration .........
JSC, Systems Development and Simulation
MSFC, Program Development Systems Integration
(F__litor,Human Role in Space)
MSFC, Man/Systems Integration
SSFP (1.,cvelIf),Program System Engineering
and Integrafi_ _ _
MSFC, Space Systems Chief Engineers
MSFC, Mission Integration
Boeing A_spa_untsville
MITRE, Space Systems Division
NflTRE, Space Systems Division
Boeing Aerospace/Huntsville
MITRE, Space Systems Division
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SURVEY
APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRE AND RESPONSES
INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO SURVEY PARTICIPANTS
The attached questionnaire is being sent to current astronauts and former astronauts
form the Space Shuttle and Skylab programs. Its purpose is to obtain your views
regarding the prospective impacts of advanced automation and robotics technologies on
crew workload and productivity in the evolution of Space Station Freedom. For purposes
of this effort, advanced automation can be defined as automation more advanced than what
is currently implemented on the Space Shuttle. Advanced automation includes, but is not
limited to, expert and knowledge-based systems. It is important for us to understand the
probably usefulness of advanced automation and robotics technologies so that the
appropriate hooks and scars my be implemented and the appropriate development efforts
planned. Your responses will be most valuable in determining where development efforts
should be emphasized.
The questions on the attached sheet ask for your estimate of the probably impact of
a number of proposed advanced automation and robotics technologies and projects upon
Space Station Freedom crew productivity. You will be asked to rate each of these items on
a scale ranging from "Significant improvement" to "Significant problems". Since these
questions relate to the evolutionary period of Space Station Freedom, please assume, in
answering them, that workable, reliable implementations of the technologies can be
developed, that thorough testing and shakedown of all such systems will be performed on
the ground prior to their incorporation into the station, and that manual backup modes will
exist, along with design for human intervention. Thus you are asked to estimate the likely
impact of a successful application on crew productivi_, not the likelihood of a particular
application being successfully implemented. Several questions ask for your assessment
regarding a genera] area for automation along with several specific applications or
proposals within that area; please answer each separately. Other questions deal with the
impact of specific types of systems on safety and your general views on automation and
robotics issues.
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10.
Questions About Automati6fi and Robotics Applications on
Space Station Freedom
Productivity: In your opinion, what is the potential effect on productivity on-board
Space Station Freedom for each of the applications of advanced automation and
robotics listed below? Please refer to attached pages for further explanation of
questions.
Significant Some Negligible Some
Improvement Increase Impact Decaease
Automated assists for checklist completion
Automated record-keeping and
documentation
Automated inventory management
Automated monitoring and c0n_i __
a.Exception reporting and alarm f'dtedng
b.Trend analysis (e.g. recommend
preventive maintenance)
Automated fault detection, isolation, and
recovery (FDIR)
On-board trainingsystems
Automated on-board scheduling/
rescheduling
Automated lighting, camera alignment
and pointing
a.Intemal
b.Extemal
Improved human/machine interface
a.Human computer interface
b.Speech recognition systems for
non-safety critical controls
c.Speech synthesis for crew alerts
Payload specific automation
a.Automated analysis
blab module IVA rack robot
(e.g. for sample change out)
c."PI in a box" advisory systems
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11. Roboticdtelerobodc systems
a.Autonomous inspection systems
b.Autonomous repair robot
c.Automated housekeeping robots
(e.g. wall scrubber)
d.Consu'uction assists
e.EVA retriever
Significant Some Negligible Some Significant
Improvement Increase Impact Decrease Problems
m
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II. Safety: In your opinion, what is the potential effect on safety on-board Space Station Freedom for each
of the applications of advanced automation and robotics listed below?
Significant Some Negligible Some Significant
Improvement Increase Impact Decrease Problems
I. Automated fault diagnosis, isolation and
recovery
2. Automatedexception reportingandalarm
faltering
3. EVA retrieve_
m. PhilosophyforA&R on station:What isyouropiniongenerallyregardingthedesirabilityofusing
advanced technology during station evolution to enhance productivity?
Highly Somewhat Indiffenmt Somewhat Highly
Desirable Desirable Undesirable Undesirable
1. Advanced automation
(e.g. expert systems)
2. EVA robotics
3. IVA robotics(enclosed)
OtherComments:
i
N
C-3
WDESCRIPTION OF POTENTIAL A&R APPLICATIONS
Automated assists for checklist activities: Certain checklists are performed more or less
by rote; these can be automated. Expert systems and other forms of automation could minimize
crew input for following checklists and procedures in areas where human judgment is not
required. These systems might perform calibration and alignment, for example. Another example
would be an electronic version of flight data fries.
Automated-record_keeping and documentation: These systems might include automatic
assists to the logging and downlinking of observations and events. For example, the crew could
dictate logs rather than make paper or keyboard entries, with the automated downloading of
appropriate information.
Automated inventory management: These systems would involve computerized systems
for recording the quantities and locations of various inventory items. For example, a barcode
reader might be used to record items removed from and replaced in storage to facilitate the
tracking of the quantities and the locations of available items.
Monitoring and control: Automtlc monitoring of-s_fem_m:smight p_ally replace or
supplement ground-based monitoring. Intelligent data reduction systems could alleviate data
downlinking requirements. Automated exception reporting and alarm filtering would use expert
systems to screen false alarms (e.g. those due to sensor failure) and report valid alarms to the
crew or ground. Automated trend analysis systems would use performance data trends to predict
failures and recommend preventive maintenance.
Automated fault detection, isolation and recovery (FDIR): These systems would
identifysystem faultsand failures,identifytheprobably causes,and make reconfiguration/repair
recommendations. They could alsopotentiallybe used to support automatic reconfigurationof
systems (e.g.automatic safmg and load shedding).
On-board training systems: These systems might include trainersto perform refresher
trainingon seldom used or criticalskills,such as Space Shuttlepiloting,CERV operation,and
maintenance and repairprocedures. Such trainingmight incorporatevideo cassettesOr disks,
multi-media (video,audio and text)displays,computerized simulations,and intelligentcomputer-
aided instruction.
Automated on-board scheduling/rescheduling: Such a system would allow crew to
generate short-termschedulesand replanaround contingencies,as well as possiblyto finetune
baselineschedules.
Automatic lighting, camera alignment and pointing: These systems might include
remote camera pointing,automatic trackingof camera targets,and settingup in-vehiclelighting
forphotography/video.
Improved human machine interface: This category might include improved human-
computer interface technologies such as the pull down menus-windows-icons-trackball
technologies,speech recognition for non-safety-criticaloperations,and speech synthesis to
augment visualindicators.Backup means of communication/control would bc provided in the
case of speech technologies.
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Payload automation: Possible approaches would be incorporation fo expert systems for
experiment monitoring and control, fault diagnosis and recovery (FDIR), data analysis, and
systems to advise on experimental procedure (e.g. "PI in a box"). Other specific areas could
include automated analysis of samples where feasible, and a rack-mounted robot for sample
change out and other repetitive tasks.
Robotic/telerobotic systems: These might include robotic/telerobotic systems to scan the
external station with television (or HDTV) camera allowing crew members to survey for damage
without EVA. More sophisticated systems might be able to identify some types of damage
automatically. Other suggestions have been housekeeping robots (e.g. robot wall scrubbers),
external ORU replacement, and automated construction assists.
EVA retriever: This device would allow crew to retrieve objects (or disable astronauts) outside
of the station, without necessarily requiring another astronaut to suit up for EVA.
QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES
This Appendix contains the specific questions asked in the survey of astronauts and
payload specialists, together with counts of the frequency of each response to the questions.
The tabulations arc presented in Table C-l, by question, for the following groups:
Respondents (previously interviewed) with Skylab experience (6)
Respondents (previously interviewed) with Spaeelab experience,but not included in the
Skytab group (4)
!
Other Responses from Previously Interviewed Astronauts/Payload Specialists (9)
Responses from individuals from the Astronaut Office, JSC (not previously
interviewed) - flight experience not known (8).
There were a total of 27 responses received. Many of the respondents did not answer every
question, and thus the responses for an individual question do not necessarily total 27.
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Table 0-1
Total Responses - 27
Productivity: In your view, what is the potential effect on productivity on-board Space
Station Freedom for each of the applications of advanced automation and robotics listed
below? Please refer to attached pages for further explanation of questions.
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Significant Some
Improvement Increase
Automated assists for checklist completion
Previo*usly
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
To_ 15
Negligible Some Significant
Impact Decrease Problems
1
1
2 0
Automated record-keeping = and documentation
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
Total
Automated inventory management
11
I
2
k]
6
016 0 0
Skylab
Previously Spacelab
Interviewed Other
STS Crew
Not Previously Astronaut
Interviewed Office
Total 16 10 0 O
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Table C-1
Total Responses - 27
Significant Some
Improvement Increase
Automated monitoring and control
Negligible
Impact
Some
Decrease
Significant
Problems
r
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
Total 0 ,
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a. Exception reporting and alarm
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
To,-,
4" 1
1 3
2 5
1 5
,8 14
I
2
3 0
b. Trend analysis (e.g., recommend preventive maintenance)
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Skylab
Spacelab
O_her
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
3
4
5
Interviewed
Total 5 12 0 0
Automated fault detection, isolation, and recovery (FDIR)
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
Total
4
2
1
4
11
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2
6
4
14
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Table C-1
Total Responses - 27
Significant Some Negligible Some Significant
Improvement Increase Impact Decrease Problems
On-board training systems
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
2
2
2
Total 9 9 7 o
Automated on-board seheduling/rescheduling
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
S.kylab
Spacelab
Other
• STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
2
2
Interviewed
Total 4
1
2 I
3 4
4 2
i
10 7
Automated lighting, camera alignment and pointing
S£ylab 2
Previously Spacelab 1
Interviewed Other 1 4
STS Crew
Not Previously Astronaut 1 2
Interviewed Office
Total
1
1
3
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5
1
1
1
2 1
a. Internal
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Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
Total
3 2
2
4 2
3 3
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Table C-1
Total Responses - 27
Significant Some Negligible Some Significant
Improvement Increase Impact Decrease Problems
b. External
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
Total 12
9. Improved human/machine interface
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
i
Astronaut
Office
Total
2
_
2
3
2
7 0 0
a. Human computer Interface
i
Previously
Interviewed
,, i i
!Not Previously
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
4
2
4
4
Interviewed
Total 14
2
1
3
3
9
1
0 1
b. Speech recognition systems for non-safety critical controls
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
i
5
4
4
2
I0
l
1 2
2 1
3 4
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Total Responses - 27
Significant Some Negligible Some Significant
Improvement Increase Impact Decrease Problems
Previously
Interviewed
c. Speech synthesis for crew alerts
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Not Previously
. Interviewed
Astronaut
Office
I
1
1
2
1
5
3
Total 3 l I I 0 I I
1
1 0. Payload-specific automation
" r
Sk_,lab
Previously Spacelab
Interviewed Other
STS Crew
Not Previously Astronaut
Interviewed Office
Total 2
4
a. Automated analysis
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
I nterviewe d
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
Total
2
1
2
1
5
11 6
b. Lab module IVA rack robot (e.g., for sample changeout)
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NOt Previously
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
Total
2
2
3
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2
1
4
C-10
Fg
w
IP
f
@
w
IR
Table C-1
Total Responses - 27
Significant Some Negligible Some Significant
Improvement Increase Impact Decrease Problems
c. "PI in a box" - type advisory systems
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
Total
2
1
6
2
11
I 1. Robotic/telerobotic systems
i,i m
Skylab
Previously Spacelab
Interviewed Other
STS ,Crew
Not Previously Astronaut
Interviewed Office
Total
3
1
4
1
a. Autonomous inspection systems
0
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
Total
3
3
4
12
3
5
11
u
B
b. External repair systems
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed "
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Cre w
Astronaut
Office
Total
2
1 2-
6
6
15 2
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Table C-1
Total Responses - 27
Significant Some Negligible Some Significant
Improvement Increase Impact Decrease Problems
Automated housekeeping robots (e.g., wall scrubber)C.
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Previously
Interviewed
Astronaut
Office
Not Previously
Interviewed
Total
l
6 6 !
2 1
2
3
5
12 1
d. Construction assists
Skylab
Previously Spacelab
Interviewed Other
STS Crew
Not Previously Astronaut
Interviewed Office
Total
e. EVA retriever
3
2
2
4
ll 13 1
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously i
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
Total 15
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Table C-1
Total Responses - 27
Safety: In your view, what is the potential effect on safety on-board Space Station
Freedom for each of the applications of advanced automation and roboUcs listed below?
Significant Some Negligible Some Significant
Improvemen t Increase Impact Decrease Problems
Automated fault diagnosis, isolation and recovery (FDIR)
i ii
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
Total
4
1
2
5
12
I
3
6
3
13 0
Automated exception reporting and alarm filtering
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
Skyiab
Spacelab
Other
S'IS Crew
Astronaut
Office
Total
4
1
1
6
I
4
5
15 0
EVA retriever
ii
i J
Previously
Interviewed
'Not Previously
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
2
l
4
4
Total 7 1 1 8 0 0
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Philosophy for A&R on station: What is your view generally regarding the desirability
of using advanced technology during station evolution to enhance productivity?
Highly Somewhat Indifferent Somewhat
Desirable Desirable Undesir-
able
Advanced automation (e.g., expert systems)
Highly
Undesir-
able
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
Skylab
Spacelab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
Total
4
2
4
2
12
2
2
4 I
3 2
9 5 0
EVA robotics
Previously
Interviewed
Not Previously
Interviewed
Sk_l ab
Spaceiab
Other
STS Crew
Astronaut
Office
Total
1 2
1
2 1
3
6 4
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, IVA robotics (enclosed)
iii ....
Sk},lab
Previously Spacelab
Interviewed Other
STS Crew
i i
Not Previously Astronaut
OfficeInterviewed
Total
3
2 1
2 5
2 2
9 8
2
1
1
2
6 0
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APPENDIX D
PRODUCTIVITY CONCEPTS BACKGROUND
D.1 PRODUCTIVITY DEFINITIONS
The current NASA space station program, unlike previous attempts (e.g., Manned
Orbiting Laboratory, 1964 - 1968; Integrated Manned Space Flight Program, 1969; Apollo
applications Program (Skylab); Space Operations Center, 1980 - 1982), incorporated a
human productivity drive early in the formative years. In November, 1983 a foundation was
formed by the Space Station Technology Committee for the later Space Station Human
Productivity Study (SSHPS) conducted by a cross section of major aerospace firms
concerned with the efficiency of crews in manned spacecraft. It was acknowledged from the
beginning of this effort that the definition of human productivity was difficult. For the
SSHPS, it was defined as "the use of man to attain utilitarian objectives in the space station
system" with the flight objective of a nine-hour workday (excluding weekends) composed of
an average of six hours for payload activities and an average of below three hours for
operational maintenance. Whenever a routine EVA occurred, an eight-hour task with six
hours of useful operations was also envisioned (Cramer, 1983, Cramer, 1985a, Cramer,
1985b). The SSFIPS goals were to define the design/operations requirements for the support
of the human productivity and identify problem areas needing definition through the
development of an inclusive list of management issues and accompanying management plans
(Lockheed, 1985). It was believed that this approach would facilitate the development of the
habitability requirements for Space Station Freedom which would ensure a sustained human
productivity above 90 percent of the initial performance throughout a long duration flight
(Cramer, 1983). The long tours for the Freedom Station were initially projected as 90-day
intervals and, later, changed to 180-day intervalsto accommodate resupply constraints.
Currently, many of the management issues previously identified by SSI-IPS are being
addressed in the Man Systems Working Group in the Space Station Freedom Program
(SSFP). Most of those related to the use of automation and robotics to improve human
productivity are being considered except for a few potential candidates (see Section 4.1.3).
Using the SSHPS approach to defining human productivity has proved to be useful for
issue identification and early program planning, but "productivity" needs to be considered
from additional perspectives. According to Nickerson (1987), one should consider not only
human productivity and machine productivity but system productivity which is determined by
several factors. One of the critical ones is the manner in which functions are allocated to
people and to machines. Often, as in-the case of manufacturing, the dominant opportunity
for improving productivity is not attained by mechanizing the task of making or assembling
of products, but in the organizing, scheduling, and managing of the total project. Also the
linkage of social or interpersonal factors (both at the work place and outside) and productivity
may be indirect, but nevertheless it is important In other words, there arc both quantitative
and qualitative factors that comprise any estimation of the productivity of a system, such as
Space Station Freedom. Thus, Freedom's productivity can be considered, on one hand, as
the industrial productivity derived from space manufacturing, and, on the other hand, as the
individual crew member's effectiveness and efficiency (or that of the entire crew
complement) in completing his/her assignments which yield new and worthy scientific and
engineering information. Thus, both types of productivity contribute to the system
productivity of the station which will b¢ heavily dependent upon complex human-machine
interactions.
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Bluth (1984) suggests that the concept of productivity is in a state of continual
evolution. She noted that post-World War II, the numerical definition obtained by the ratio
of cost to profit or, in other words, dividing the economic value by the labor cost, came
under examination. In particular, Deming began to also consider the surrounding
environment, worker conditions, organization, and other intangible constituents, such as
customer satisfaction. Numerical production rates had not always worked as predicted.
Bluth attempted to synthesize the conv_'ging opinions of those with practical experience in
undertaking productivity programs. She formulated the paradigm represented in Figure D-1
to illustrate the complex of perceived ideas on the subject. The key term "perspective"
underscores that value and cost, as viewed by persons related to the program and its products
(e.g. Space Station Freedom and the information obtained from payload operations), are
dependent on their own outlooks and, therefore, are important factors in decisions they make
on the actionsthey_ _e. _ i ....
Consequently, treating the term of "productivity" simplistically results in some
difficulties that mandate consideration of both the contributing quantitative and qualitative
factors. The human performance contribution to productivity has been found to be difficult
to measure in a generic task-oriented manner and to assess in determining the actual workload
experienced.
Human performance in systems, when considered as a major dependent variable in
productivity, can be regarded as having the following taxonomy (Berlincr et al., 1964) in
processesand activities; _..... :
I. Perceptualprocesses
2. Mediational processes
3. Co_unication processes
{Searchingforand receivinginformation
{Identifyingobjects,actions,events
{Information processes
{Problem solving and decision-making
4. Motor processes {Simpl_screW_
{ComPlex/Contlnuous
The first three of these processes perform a large function in automated systems, particularly
mediational processes. In recent years, there has been increasing emphasis on trying to
measure these processesas both spacecraftand aircrafthave undergone more automation.
Being able to quantify these indicesof human performance would enable researchersto
determine when the human operatorisoverloaded,moderately loaded,and underioaded for
a specifictask(i.e.,workload assessment).Generally,simulatorsfon-n-amajortest-bedfor
these type of studies.However as noted in a recentassessment by Vreuls and Obcrmayer
(1983),theexistinganalyticaltoolsappear inadequate ineitheraddressing allof "what" to
measure orprovidinginsightinto"how" tomeasure. Furtheritwas noted thatinattcmpts to
automate the measurements, frequentlycomprehensive recordingswere made of everything
reasonable and then cleaned up afterwards by discarding unwanted segments, using a
varietyof mathematical tools and attending to those measures thatshow experimental
differencesof interest.Vreuls and Obermayer summarized theirfindings with regards to
four dominant problems with performance measures inthe simulatorenvironment: hidden
and embedded nature of performance (unobservable internalprocesses produce Overt
actions); lack of general theory of performance; determining validity of perforrnance
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Figure D-1
Productivity: Contextual/Process Perspective
measures (individual variability in humans for rate of lcaming dictates that in order to obtain
a _ctabiiity of measures in a training program, there must be empirical measures); and
establishing criteria for performance (metrics in use describe exp_icnces, but the scale of
performance quality is op,_ationally unknown for many tasks).
A pc1"usal of the various current workload measurement techniques also shows that a
given _chnique may be sensitive to one type of mental loading and not to another. For
example, Wierwille et al. (198S) found in an evaluation of 16 mental workload estimation
techniques in a simulated flight task which stressed mediational activity, that only seven were
found to produce reliable changes as a function 0f!oading.
The operation of an intricate sys_m, such as the Space Station Freedom, will depend on
the functions performed by both people and machines, and by both in interaction with each
other. High productivity will demand that workloads be near the optimal level. Overload
Will increase the frequency of human error, reducing productivity. Underload will waste
valuable resources and will contribute to boredom, both synergistically reducing
productivity. Thus the correct estimation of workload is critical tO improving productivity in
space (Nickerson, 1987). However, Wierwille et al. (1983) noted that a significant
consequence of automation is the shifting of the physical nature of tasks (motor processes) to
those of more monitoring and performance evaluating. The latter type is considerably more
difficult to measure due to the major cognitive components. Investigations in this area are
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still exploratory and represent considerable challenges for human factors researchers
(Nickerson, 1987). In the specialized and limited communities, such as EVA, there is yet to
develop a consensus on the appropriate measurements to produce meaningful comparisons
between task or even experiments (Atkin, 1987).
Thus the problem of defining "productivity", which initially appears conceptually
simple, is difficult when one attempts to find the appropriate metrics that could be used to
measure human and machine performance in Space Station Freedom. As mentioned above,
quantitative performance indices are inclined to be specific to a small subset of tasks, and
then these still neglect the qualitative aspects influencing the performance of the tasks. Much
research remains to improve quantification and validity of measures for this term.
D.2 Measurable Components
Nevertheless, realizing that "productivity" has both qualitative and quantitative
components, and that the current state of knowledge does not permit the establishment of a
reliable set of metrics for the former, one can consider the relevant quantitative approaches
accomplished at this date.
Although in the case of the aircraft pilot, many simulator studies have been undertaken
to measure performance and what can affect it, very little has been quantified for the case of
the astronaut in the spacecraft simulator. That is, while spacecraft simulators have been an
excellent device for the highly successful training of space crews, these environs have not
incorporated the quantitative re.cording of performance measures and workload assessments.
There are some plans to implement a type of performance tracking during training for Space
Station Freedom scenarios. The underwater training facilities, at JSC, MSFC, and ARC
could be regarded as specialized simulators for EVA tasks, but there remains contention in
this small community, as noted earlier (Atkin, 1987), over the suitable metrics to use.
The Human Role in Space (THURIS) studies were initiated in late 1983 by Harry L.
Wolbers, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, under the direction of Stephen B. Hall
at MSFC. The original objective was to provide information and guidelines in a form that
would enable NASA program managers and decision-makers to establish the most cost-
effective design approach for future space programs through the optim_ application of
unique human skills and capabilities in space. The study was partially built upon the results
of the earlier MIT Automation, Robotics, and Machine Intelligence Systems (ARAMIS)
study which developed a listing of 330 generic functional elements that were derived from the
analysis of 69 space project tasks. ARAMIS options spanned the fuI1 _ge from fully
human to fully machine. The ARAMIS study searched for the optimum mix of humans and
machines for space project tasks, but detailed cost tradeoffs were not incorporated. Focusing
on the viability of the application of automation and robotics to space activities and their
related ground functions in the 1985-2000 time period, recommendations were developed for
more study of telepresence, more study of expert systems for support of spacecraft decision
functions, more specific study of payload handling and launch vehicle operaU_ons, and more
study and development of space qualified microprocessors for spacecraft applications (Smith,
1983). THURIS used this foundation, analyzed other space projects, and developed a
generic set of 37 activities from which it was believed systems, meeting future mission
requirements, could be synthesized by assigning the principal criteria of performance, cost,
and technological readiness metrics. The resulting mechanism was thought to provide a
logical rationale for selecting the optimal human-machine interface early in the design
process, and therefore, a cost-effective approach (McDonnell Douglas, 1984).
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Within the THUR/S study, cost prediction models were developed. Using the nine-
hour day, five-day work week as in SSI-IPS, a total space station facility human involvement
cost of $32,522 per hour (1984 dollars) was estimated. This was based on nine costing
elements, four driven by time of use and five driven by frequency of use. Thus in this
context, events taking a long time (relatively inexpensive support equipment used for tasks
under one hour) or frequently repeated (generally inexpensive until about 1000 activations)
become candidates for some degree of automation. In succeeding studies, the THURIS cost
model fidelity and refinements were performed along with the development of a technology
readiness database supportive of the application process (McDonnell Douglas, 1987). Nine
mission scenarios were analyzed to validate the THURIS process, including Space Station
Research Laboratory Modules.
Some who have examined or tried to utilize the THURIS methodology for space station
productivity studies (Bluth, 1989b) have found that there is a lack of generalization of the
activities, individual differences and experience in learning curves cannot be factored into the
cost estimates, and performance variations of the human due to fatigue (as in EVA) or
mission duration are not considered. Human steps in a task are variable and are not the same
as that for a machine. Also THURIS cost functions are for individual tasks and do not
dei_end on the completion times for the tasks, resulting in a less than complete analysis of all
the costs of a given space scenario (Stuart, 1986). However, THURIS does appear to assist
in ref'ming an automation decision when one has a rough idea of what the candidates for
automation are. Currently, the NASA HQ Office of Exploration is funding NASA ARC to
modify a THURIS PC software application for analyses relatedto automation for a Mars
base (Hall, 1989).
In 1985, a JPL study (Zimmerman et al., 1985) developed a method for human-machine
trade-off analysis that employed decision analysis techniques which included combinations of
cost, productivity, and safety. This approach formulated the trade-offs as an optimization
problem in which a value for "person-hours" spent in Space Station activities was developed
and "crew hours saved" were maximized by automating functions while staying under a cost
target. The framework was a well-defined station with a fixed crew size. The use of
decision analysis enabled the def'mition of a linear function subject to linear constraints.
Similarly another optimization approach was developed by Stuart (1986). His study
assumed a variable crew size of human and machines, and employed overall cost as the only
figure of merit. That is, human and machine productivity were directly embodied in the cost
equations with the objective of minimizing the total cost of a particular job, resulting in a
function that was basically nonlinear.
Tools for measuring components of human productivity in space are limited, but, as
briefly discussed, spacecraft simulators, THURIS, and recent optimization methods hold
some promise as initial means to assist in the refinement of investigations of candidate tasks
for future automation and robotics.
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APPENDIX E
OVERVIEW OF AVAILABLE ADVANCED AUTOMATION TECHNOLOGY
The primary areas of advanced automation techology are in artificial intelligence (AI) and
advanced computer interfaces. The main thrust of AI development for the Space Station is in
knowledge-based systems, although other areas of interest exist. Advanced computer
interfaces include speech recognition and synthesis, as well as more familiar technologies.
Artificial Intelligence
AI is a field of endeavor which seeks to use computers and electronic systems to emulate
human mental processes. This field actually comprises a group of loosely related
technologies whose primary commonality is that they support the emulation of a human
capability. In some areas commercially used applications exist, while in others the
technology is still restricted primarily to the laboratory. Many AI efforts, such as
knowledge-based systems, are based upon relatively formal human reasoning processes;
these efforts have been relatively successful in part because the reasoning methods are well
understood. Other efforts, aimed at emulating such poorly understood human capabilities as
cognition (e.g. machine vision systems), ate less advanced.
The purpose of this appendix is neither to present a tutorial on AI nor present a
taxonomy of intelligent systems applications; these may be found in Waterman (1986) and
Waltz (1986), for example. Expanded discussion of NASA applications and technology
development can be found in the Space Station Freedom Program Capabilities for the
Development and Application of Advanced Automation (Bayer, 1989) and in the Space
Station Advanced Automation Final Report (Friedland et al., 1988). Nonetheless, some
description of the different technological areas comprising AI may be useful. The bulk of all
AI applications fall into two categories, knowledge- based systems and cognitive systems.
Knowledge based systems are the most mature advanced automation technology. The
term is derived from the fact that a major component of these systems is a base of
symbolically encoded declarative and procedural knowledge; an inference engine manipulates
this knowledge to perform the desired function. The knowledge may take the form of rules
of thumb, heuristics, information describing various entities, etc.; it may further be based on
a formal model of its domain, or it may be ad hoc. There are various approaches available
for incorporation into knowledge based systems; these approaches are not mutually
exclusive, and many hybrid systems exist. Expert systems are sometimes considered to
differ from knowledge based systems in that they explicitly emulate human experts, but in
this document the terms are used as synonyms.
The advantages of knowledge-based systems includetheirabilityto handle problems
which do not lend the_elves _dil.y toconventionalcomputerizationtechniques,theirability
tohandle inexactdata,and theirabditytoexplainthe reasoning by which a conclusion was
reached. Automating the solutiontoa classof problems may resultinlower costoperation,
fasteror more consistentdecision-making,and exhaustiveexamination of possibilitiesthata
human might overlook; and the resultingknowledge-based systems may have the further
advantages of extending the availabilityof specializedexpertiseand facilitatingthe formal
E-I
codification of expert knowledge. However, the knowledge-based system will generally
have a relatively restricted domain compared to the human expert.
AI deals with the manipulation of symbols. In principle, many programming languages
support symbol manipulation. Some AI researchers and system developers use general
purpose procedural languages such as C and Pascal. However, two languages specific to AI
are commonly used, LISP and Prolog. LISP has the advantage of great flexibility and wide
applicability, but can present a significant programming challenge. Prolog is based upon a
predicate calculus formulation which applies to some problems directly. OPS is a LISP-
based production rule language which has been widely used among knowledge based system
developers. Expert system shells (tools for building expert systems incorporating packaged
inferenceengines,user interfaces,and development assists)such as KEE and ART are also
widely used.
Intelligentapplicationscan be fielded on almost any type of computer, but the
applications are typicallyresource intensiveand have been more successful on some
architecturesthan others. In the early 1980s, a number of manufacturers introduced
expensive dedicated AI workstations,which featuredfastprocessors optimized for LISP,
largerealmemories, efficientmemory utilization,and tagged memory to support run time
ty1_ checking. With the availabilityof inexpensive,powerful generalpu_se workstations,
the relianceon specializedAI workstationshas declined. Currently most applicationsare
developed on workstations such as the Sun/4 and MicroVAX II and even on the current
generationof personalcomputers.
Another area of research which iscurrentlyvery activeboth insideand outsideof the
aerospace community and which may findsignificantapplicationsin space systems for the
futureisartificialneural networks. These consistof largenumbers of computing nodes,
operatinginparalleland gencxallyarrangedinlayers,ina manner resembling theorganization
of the neurons in the human brain. Neural network systems are especiallyuseful for
cognition,an activityat which humans (and animals) excel but at which conventional
computer systems Have had only limitedsuccess. Neural networks may bc simulated in
software,but would most naturallybe implemented in hardware. Development of neural
network chips ison-going.
Advanced Computer Interfaces
$igni_cant advances in the human-computer interface_nave been made in recent years,
many associatedwith AI research.These includethe routineuse,on commercially available
desktop computers and workstations,of graphicalinterfaces,pull-down menus, windows,
and a "mouse" or other pointing/selectiontechnique. Other effortswhich have so farmet
with less widespread applicationare natural language processing, continuous speech
recognition,speech synthesisand machine visionand image processing. Natural language
interfaceshave been successfullyappliedto restrictedomains, such as controlof robotsor
queries to databases, but natural language interpreters arc still far from being able to handle
the full range of expressions encountered in a language such as English. Speech synthesis is
in widespread use commercially, but speech recognition systems at the present, generally
handle only relatively small vocabularies and are subject to a significant number of errors;
such systems are most apt to be used in an environment where only a small vocabulary is
necessary and the operator's hands are busy. Machine vision and image processing systems
have also achieved some successes in relatively restricted environments.
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EXPERIENCE AND EVALUATION
A wide variety of artificial inteUigence apphcations have been developed. While a great
many of these am experimental or prototype systems, there are many applications in daily
use. The bulk of these latter are expert systems, the most mature of the AI technologies.
Automated systems are generally introduced for two reasons--to lower the cost of operations,
either by using fewer people or by producing more with the same people and to improve the
quality/consistencyofperformance.
Experience
The most promising technology for the near term is knowledge-based systems. A wide
variety of prototype and fielded applications exist. Most fielded applications use a production
rule knowledge representation, often in combination with frame based or semantic net
representationschemes; applicationsbased on a predicatecalculusknowledge representation
are lesswidely used, because of the strictworld model of predicatecalculus. Existing
systems use both deep (model-based) and shallow (rule-based)knowledge; and depend on
both exact and non-exact (fuzzy or probabilistic)approaches. Typical applicationshave
included interpretation (monitoring and control), diagnosis (FDIR), prediction,
planning/schedulingand design. A number of intelligentcomputer aided trainingsystems
have alsobeen fielded.Distinctionsare oftenmade between knowledge-based and expert
systems, e.g.Bayer et al.(1989) describe the differenceas being thatthe expert systems
explicitlyemulate thebehavior of human expertsinsolvinga specificproblem. However, in
thisdocument, the term expertsystem willbe used broadly toinclude allknowledge-based
systems.
Artificialneural networks arc a promising research area which has applicationsto in
many patternmatching tasks.While deuralnetworks have been appliedto the solutionof
mathematical problems such as the travelingsalesman problem, theirprimary applications
willprobably be in such areasof cognitionas speech and machine vision.However, many
years of research may be necessarybeforethe firstpracticalapplicationsof thistechnology
arc available;and theproblems of theinterpretationf visionor speech innaturalsettingsare
not addressedby thistechnology (Wasscrman and Schartz,1987).
Fielded/Knowledge.Based Systems
=
Although the existenceof commercially availablehardware suggeststhe existencein the
fieldof applicationsusing such technologiesas speech re,cognitionand machine vision,most
of the availableliteratureon fieldedapplicationsdeals with expertsystems. Turban (1988)
estimatesthatbetween severalhundred and severalthousand such systems exist.The table
below gives a small sample of these applications,taken from Turban (1988), Schutzcr
(1987),Waterman (1986) and other sources. Additionally,Feigenbaum etal.(1988) do an
excellentjob in describingmany successfulexpertsystems. These have been implemented
by a varietyof organizations,includingmany for-profitcorporationsand many corporations
not usuallyinvolved indevelopment ofcomputer technology. In a few cases,expertsystems
have been marketed commercially,or embedded inconventionalsoftwareproductswhich are
marketed commercially. Pleasenote thatonly systems which had proceeded to atleastto the
fieldteststagehave been includedinthistable.
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SMOKEY
Phosphorous Burden Adviser
OISPATCIE_
COMPASS
Au*._ CableF.xpm (ACE)
SpiaPro
Stra_ene
RegressionExpen
Sterner
A C_o__c _
Sygem (ACF.S)
XCON
XSEL
OPGEN
Y_ _.x_
Sysuan/MvS (YES/Mrs)
_Icrr
DIPMErER ADVISER
Pnxess Diagno_ic Syaem (PDS)
CASHVALUE
CELL Design Aid
ISLS, ISIS II
Table E-1
Expert Systems In Businem/lndustry
Carnegie-Mellon/US Navy
FMC
Cmesie o_ce.C
Intellico_
AT&T
/nteUigenetie._Amo¢o
AT&T
BBN/US Navy
TRW
I)EC.JCan_gie Me,llon
DEC./Camegie Melloe
ltazerdme
IaM
Qumum Develolanent
Corporation
Schlumberger, Ltd.
Wemu_use
Heuros ltd.
Azthur Anderson & Co.
Westinghouse
Reoonanend coma_ve action for rd'tiftaued fires in real-time
Diagnoses flaws in a l_OSphoeas producing process
Schedulesdispaw_n8 of materialsinproduc_onprocess
Analyzes ele.aztr_ rel_r loss to identify failun_s and
mggea actions
Identifies and diagnote$ faulty telephone network sections
Advises tm_n on effective use of centrifuge
Advises on doeing e_etirne_ in meleculargenetics
_ism f_ end _ _ p_e
Trainer on ships' gum plants for Navy personnel
Adviseson featme placemem
Advises _ compmer ¢onfignrs_on
Provides sales assistance in hare'win w,le,nion/cc_guration
Comqgm'esprinted circuit boards
Aids in Computer system operation
Liti_tioe sappoa
o(data from well logging devices
Diagnceis based oa senr_s
Compu_ _gnm_ _
Decision making and _c _'_ly_s for automated factories
(planning, scheduling, and maintenance)
Successful::_owledge based system applications date from Dendral, a system for
deducing chemical structure from mass spectrometer and nuclear magnetic resonance data,
which was begun in 1964. Early applications included system for diagnosis of blood
infections (MYCIN), a system for solving differential equations (Macs_,ma), geological
exploration (Prospector successfully predicted a large mineral deposit location), a French
offshore drilling platform expert system (Drilling Advisor), and pulmonary function
evaluation (PUFF) In some cases, the systems have been implemented in functions which
are critical from the perspective of the sponsor, such as DEC's XCON computer
configuration expert system or American Express' Authorization Advisor. Expert systems
have been implemented in military applications, where the potential consequences of late or
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wrong decisions are high. Military application include expert systems for diagnosis of faults
and planning of maintenance for such complex hardware such as aircraft engines, planning of
air transport loads, and battlefield planning. Other government agencies employing
knowledge-based systems include the Internal Revenue Service, which is developing
systems to aid in response to taxpayer queries and processing cases.
NASA has developed a number of knowledge-based system prototypes, some of which
are shown in the table below. This table gives the names, sponsoring center, and a brief
description for a sample of knowledge-based systems; please note that both prototype and
operationalsystems have been included.Where available,the system hardware and software
are alsolisted.Three of thesehave bccn used in Mission Control operations collectively
calledthe Real-Time Data Systems CRTDS), one atthe integratedcommunications (INCO)
console, another to analyze mechanical problems, and the third,BOOSTER, to analyze
ropulsion system problems. These have been successful,and the Director of Mission
ration, Eugene F. Kranz (1989) has stated that the BOOSTER expert system paid for its
own development cost by speeding resolution of one problem which delayed the launch of
STS 26. An expert system has been implemented for planning radar trackingfor Space
Shuttle missions which saves one to two man-weeks per mission. Knowledge-based
systems arc alsoemployed inplanning Space Shuttlepayload bay cablingand verifyingon-
board software (Morris,1988).
Early knowledge based systems were very expensive to develop; such systems as
MYCIN, DENDRAL, ACE and XCON were theresultof many man-years of researchand
development, As the technology has become betterunderstood,the costsof developing such
systems has decreased, along with increasesin the probable payback. Many users now
attributelargecost savings to expertsystems; Mahler (Computer World 1987) claimed an
overallcost savings to I.E.DuPont de Nemours of $10 millionin 1987--a 1500 percent
return on investment--from a variety of expert system projects. Digital Equipment
Corporation ('DEC) isestimatedtosave over_ millionannually using expertsystems for
computer system configuration,order processing and other functions. The reasons for
system implementation, where reported,oftenemphasize decisionqualityand consistency
more than cost, While such systems generallyappear toresultincostsavings,the specifics
arcoftennot available;thetablebelow givesa summary of theinformationwhich isavailable
for fielded systems. This information comes from Friedland et al. (1988) and other sources.
The remainder of thissectionconsistsof fullerdescriptionsof severalrepresentative
knowledge based system applications.Particularemphasis has been given to the actual
experiencewith thefieldedsystem, although prototypeand experimental systems have been
included todemonstrate the range ofpossibleexpertsystem applications.The intentof this
sectionisobviously not to listallfieldedsystems,but ratherto give an idea of the range of
recentsuccessfulapplications,with particularemphasis on those withinNASA (otherthan
XCON).
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Knowledge-Based Systems in NASA
Thermal Expert System ('FEXSYS)
Automated Power Expert (APEX)
FaultReeovery and Manage_t
Expert System (FRAMES)
ARC
LeRC
MSFC
Model and rule-based reasot_g under
uncertainty, monitoring and FDIR of
Thermal Control System testbed
Fault detection/diagnosis of Electric Power
System, load planner and scheduler
Power Manage_nent & Distribution system
(PMAD) testbed monitoring/control/FDIR
Loads Priority List Manage_t
System (LPLMS) and Loads
Enable Scheduler (LES)
MSFC I_eveJop_t Of']oadshe-dd_ lists and
seheduling/rescheduling for PMAD testbed
Nickel-CadmiumBattery
Expert System(NICBES)
_al Controller Fault Manager
Expert System
Central Processor Resource
Manager Expert System
INCO Expert System Project (IESP)
BOOSTER
MSFC
Jsc
JSC
/SO
JSC
Fault diagnosis, System monitoring, system
stams/advk:e, decision support graphics for
Hubble Space Telescope power test bed
Communications and Tracking (C&T)
control and monitoring testbed
C&T control and monitoring testbed
Responds to firS communications mal-
functions and configura_on problems
Expert system for analyzing firs
propulsion system problems
EMPRESS
Spac_ H_th Automa_
Reasoning Prototype (SHARP)
Resource Allocation and Planning
(RALPH)
KSC
JPL
JPL
Expert system for planning/scheduling the
loading of horizontal payloads to orbiter
Automatic fault dead-and diagnosis
of Voyager's Command Data System
Planning for radio an_ complexes & Helper
associated computer facilities in support of deep
space satellites
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XCON
XCON (Barker and O'Connor, 1989) was the first knowledge based system to achieve
routine use in industry; it is a production (rule based) system written in OPS5, the
development of which was fh'st fielded in 1981. Its function is to verify the technical
correctness of system configuration orders. Prior to XCON, Digital Equipment Corp. was
seriously impacted by the difficulty of generating correct system configurations because of
the large number of discrete parts with complex interdependencies. A family of knowledge-
based systems has grown around XCON including the fielded systems XSEL (which assists
sales representatives in generating correct orders), XFL (which is used to generate computer
room floor plans), and XCLUSTER (which assists in generating cluster configurations).
XNET, a tool for planning local area networks, and SIZER, a tool to assist in computer
installation sizing are in various stages of development. The XCON rule base consisted of
10,219 rules as of September 1988; XSEL, 3629; XFL, 1808; and XCLUSTER, 243. The
estimated annual cost savings based on the use of all four systems is approximately $40
million, compared to a probable development cost in the $3-4 million neighborhood,
although constant maintenance is required to handle new products, etc. Additional benefits in
the form of more accurate order generation, smoothing of new product introduction, and
reduction of customer complaints are more difficult to quantify.
Hubble Space Telescope Ground Support
Baseline ground support for the Hubble Space Telescope CHST), scheduled to be
launched in March 1990, includes a number of knowledge-based systems (Cox, 1989).
Telemetry Analysis Logic for Orbiting Spacecraft (TALOS) will provide automated
monitoring, context sensitive evaluation and interpretation of telemetry dam. TALOS will
also perform some FDIR functions by prediction/identification of telemetry problems and
recommendation of corrective action. The HST Operational Readiness Expert (HSTORE)
will help assess operational readiness of the HST after its deployment by the Space Shuttle.
The Nickel - Cadmium Battery Expert System (NICBES) monitors battery system state and
performs fault diagnosis for the HST electrical power system test bed (Kirkwood and
Weeks, 1985).
INCO Expert System Prototype (IESP)
The IESP (Muratore et al., 1988) was developed to assist Mission Control console
personnel in the diagnosis and management of the SpaceShuttle communications and data
management systems. IF_,SP is a rule based system implemented in CLIPS, a C-based expert
system shell. The utility of IESP was successfully demonstrated during STS-26, and it has
been in use since. The development cost was $880,000; and the projected savings,
$400,000/year due to the reduction of the staff requirements for full-time monitoring. IESP
is also expected to reduce the time required to train INCO console operators, and improve the
consistency of decision-making. The IESP led to other console expert systems including
BOOSTER and Mechanical Systems.
Resource Allocation and Planning Helper (RALPH)
..... x
RALPH is an intelligent assistant for allocating/scheduling the resources of the antenna
and computer resources of the Deep Space Network, using a combination of algorithmic and
knowledge-based approaches. RALPH allowed the saving of 3.5 man-years per annum in
E-7
Wthe development of plans and planning meetings. In addition, previously infeasible long
range planning is now being done, along with an increased emphasis on special studies.
An Intelligent Tutoring System for Satellite Operations (ITSSO)
The intelligent Tutoring System for Satellite Operators has been implemented as a
prototype intelfigent, adaptive, embedded Waining system for satellite operators in a complex
multifunctional ground control system at the Georgia Tech--Multi-SateUite Operations
Control Center (Truszkowski, 1988). It has proven to be effective in training personnel for
satellite operations.
Spacecraft Health Automated Reasoning Prototype (SHARP)
:
SHARP ('Lawson and James, 1989) performs automated analysis of health and status
analysis of the Voyager II probe and its ground data operations. SHARP utilizes both
.conventional and AI technologies to analyze telemetry data and identify and diagnose faults.
Graphical displays communicate status information to the operator. SHARP was heavily
used during the August 1989 Voyager II flyby of Neptune.
Nickel-Cadmium Battery Expert System (NICBES)
NICBES (Weeks, 1988) performs automated fault identification and diagnosis, system
status and advice, and decision support graphics. It is interfaced with the Hubble Space
Telescope electrical power system test bed, having Fn'st gone into operation in November
1986. NICBES was also found to be useful in providing quick snapshots of system
operation.
Experience with Advanced Human-Computer Interfaces
Human-computer interfacesusing graphics,icons,pull-down-menus, and a "mouse" or
otherpointingdevice are now readilyavailablecommercially. This technology isgenerally
believed to support userefficiencyby presentinginformationin a manner which is readily
understood by the user and by making user commands simple to learn and execute: The
extensiveuse of menus as a command mechanism isprobably most usefulfornovice users
foroperationswhich the userwillnot be performingfrequently.Frequentlyexecuted
commands are often given a "hot key" alternative,to improve user speed/convenience.
Speech synthesisystemsarcalsoinwidespreadusetodayinpresentingi_ormationoverthe
telephoneor as an additionalchannel forcriticalinformationininformationrichenvironments
such as jet cockpits. .... : - : : :
One hfi_ Capabfihy whlch_developers have emulated with some success is speech
recognition. One advantage offered by speech recognition is its potential for hands-free
operation; another potential advantage is speed, speech being twice as fast as the average
typist. Hardware is commercially available which will allow recognition of user speech, as
long as the speech is clear and distinct. Such systems have limited vocabularies and
generally deal with discrete words as opposed to continuous speech. The accuracy is highest
and the vocabulary broadest for those systems which operate in a relatively noise free
environment and are trained for each individual user; but accuracy may be affected by such
factors as physiological changes which cause the users' speech to change. Early
experimental systems (HEARSAY and HARPY) have demonstrated the ability to recognize
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continuous speech from individual users with 90 - 95 percent accuracy, although requiring
extensive computer resources. A recent published test of a speech recognition system was
conducted by Pcrdue and Rissanen (1986) at Fidelity Brokerage Services; in this experiment
telephone customers were allowed to respond to computerized prompts either verbally or by
pressing the appropriate buttons on a tone generating telephone. This system achieved 91
percent accuracy in nine-digit numeric responses given by non-specific users. Accuracy of
99 percent is attainable in user-specific systems if the vocabulary is small and reasonably
distinct, such as the ten digits (Chroehiere and Flanagan, 1986). NASA has supported a
"number of studies aimed at the evaluation of speech recognition technology for use in space
applications. Shepcrd (1989) conducted a study using speech recognition to control a
computer display, with significantly higher error rates than those cited above; however the
bulk of the errors were incorrect recognitions of commands in extraneous speech.
Bierschwale eta/. (1989) have compared speech recognition to manual controls for video
camera aiming/focussing; the speech recognition system was slower than the manual system
but generated fewer errors. Speech recognition was found to be inefficient for control of
continuous adjustments. Collectively these studies show that speech recognition can be
reasonably reliable, as long as the command set is small, and reasonably distinct and the
environment is free of extraneous speech; ambient or line noise (other then extraneous
speech) is generally not a problem although it might be in some applications.
KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW
Knowledge-based systemsconsistof a knowledge-baseand an inferencengine.The
followingparagraphsdescribethemajor categoriesofknowledge basedsystems.The first
fourparagraphsdescribethemain forms of knowledge representationpredicatecalculus,
productions,frames,and semanticnets. The next foursectionsdescribethe fourmain
inferencestrategies.Finallya number ofrelatedarchitecturesaredescribed.Not only are
differentcombinationsofknowledge representation,infcrencingstrategy,and architecture
possible(e.g.a productionsystem using forward chainingand communicating via a
blackboard),butdifferenthybridknowledge representationsand infcrencingstrategiesare
possible(e.g.productionswithina semanticnet).
Predicatecalculus:Predicatecalculusissystem of formal logicwhich predatesdigital
computersby severalhundredyears.Insuch systemsknowledge isrepresentedby formal
propositionalstatementscalledpredicates.A collectionf formalrules(modusponens and
modus tolens)existsforthederivationofnew predicatesfrom existingones. A predicate
calculusapproachisusedinsuchapplicationsa automatictheoremprovers.
Production systems: These systems are based upon the representation of knowledge as a
series of rules or productions of the form
if (premise)then(assertion).
Iftheconditionsinthepremiseam21i satisfiedthentheassertionon therighthand sideare
applicable.The inferencengineisresponsibleforsearchingtheknowledge baseforrules
which can be triggeredinthismanner.
Frame based systems: These systems storeknowledge about objectsin abstract
representationscalledframes. Groups offramesdescribingrelatedobjectsareaggregated
intoclassesina hierarchicaltree-likefashion.Objects(frames)may inheritknowledge from
E-9
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the classes of which they are members. Each piece of information in a frame is stored in a
separate slot; this information may include procedures for handling certain conditions or
implementing certain actions called methods.
Semantic nets: Semantic nets are similar to frame-based systems, except that more complex
inheritance relationships are possible. For example an object may be a member of more than
one distinct class. Thus the entire knowledge-base looks -frioi'elike a network than a tree.
Inferencing techniqudsi F6_V_d c hai_ng is _infereneing t_niqde whiCh, derives new
assertions from those which already exist, with the goal of ultimately arriving at some
particular desired assertion. In backward chaining, a solution is derived by working
backward from some desired assertion and planning a path for deriving this assertion from
the existing knowledge. The choice of forward chaining or backward chaining will depend
upon which approach is expected to lead most directly to the desired derivation. Generate
and test, is an approach in which a set of alternative solutions arc proposed via some
appropriate scheme and tested.
Three types of reasoning may be used, deduction, induc_n and abduction. Deduction
derives correct conclusions from given assertions via the rules of predicate calculus.
Induction is the process of generalizing from existing assertions to some new possibly
correct conclusions; formal mathematical induction guarantees the correctness of its
conclusions. Abduction is the process hypothesizing assertions when the conclusions are
known.
Model based systems: Knowledge-based systemsnormally mason about the behavior of
some idealor actualunderlyingobjects.As such theymay be based on two differenttypesof
knowledge--deep knowledge, which comprises a comprehensive model of the underlying
system, and shallow knowledge, which isa set of ad hoc observations or ruleswith no
comprehensive model. Systems may utilizeboth typesof knowledge simultaneously.
Blackboard systems: Blackboard architectures allow a number of large knowledge-based
systems to communicate internally using a blackboard, or shared communication area.
Fuzzy logic: Fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1988) and the related fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 1965) deal
with concepts that are inherently imprecise. Fuzzy logic deals with assertions which may
have a degree of truth (e.g. a very tall man); fuzzy set theory deals sets in which objects may
have a degree of member ship (e.g. the set of all tall men). The degree of truth or degree of
membership is usually expressed as a number between 0 and 1 inclusive, however this
weight should not be confused with a probability value. Fuzzy logic may also be used
outside of knowledge-based systems.
Neural networks: Neural networks are constructed from a large number of processors
interconnectedina layerednetwork, which mimics the interconnectionsof human neurons.
Neural networks transform input patternsto appropriateoutput patterns,and as such are
particularlysuitedfor patternrecognitiontasks. Often they are ableto correctlyrecognize
inputs which are similarbut not identicalto theirtargetpatterns. The trainingof neural
networks is accomplished by successively altering the weights of the processor
intcrconncctionsuntilthedesiredpatternsare correctlyrecognized. This trainingmay either
be supervised training,in which weight change at each step is based on the difference
between the currentand desiredoutputpatterns;or itmay be unsupervised training,in which
E-10
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the desired target pattern is not used in computing weights. Neural networks, like fuzzy
logic, may be employed with systems other than knowledge-based systems.
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APPENDIX F
OVERVIEW OF ROBOTICS TECHNOLOGY
AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY
Robotics systems consist of physical robot components such as manipulators (arm), end
effcctors (hand), and actuators (muscles). The controller subsystem (computer) tics together
all these components. In addition the conu'oUer controls the motion of the actuators, receives
and utilizes data from any sensor that the robot may use, and supports the programming
interface and input/output devices as necessary. At first glance, the problem of controlling
actuators to achieve a specific motion or at a higher level of abstraction to perform a particular
task may seem to be a simple exercise in trajectory planning. This simplified view, however
is not appropriate because:
* Translation of real-world requirements into the kind of motion that the robot can
perform involves complex coordinate transformations and is not always simple,
The kinematics,i.e,the pure motion of the manipulatoras a functionof time without
the considerationof forces,torques,frictionsand otherpossiblemechanical errorsis
distinctand differentfrom thedynamics, i.e.,the actualgeometry ofthe manipulator
motion. In general the differencebetween kinematics and dynamics grows larger
during the taskexecution and depends stronglyon complexity of the taskand the
taskenvironment -thedomain of operation.The differencebetween the kinematics
and dynamics behavior --i.e.where therobot thinksitisvs. where itactuallyis--
belongs toan importantcategoryofuncertaintythattherobotswillhave todealwith.
• Uncertaintiesof non-geometric origincan alsoariseduring operations.For example
in the executionof a non-trivialtaskthe selectionand sequencing of an appropriate
branch of a decisiontreeused ina deliberateplanningexercisemay have tobe based
on inaccuratesensordataand asa resultbe ambiguous orrequirecomputation times
which are too long to be of any practicaluse.
Based on what has been saidso farwe may conclude thatthe applicationof robotics
technology ispromising only under circumstances where the inherentuncertaintiescan be
isolatedand dealtwith effectively.Present day industrialroboticsisa good example. In
such applicationsimplicitprogramming and advanced planning arc used in a structured
environment where errorsin the operationsare small and well understood. The success of
such applicationsisguaranteed by increasedsensorand manipulatoraccuracy,by using high
tolerance and familiar objects,and by supplying parts at predetermined positionsand
orientations.In orderto go beyond thiscapability,the roboticsresearchinitiatedin theearly
tomid-80s concentratedon systems which use sensordatatoextractparticularfeaturesof an
environment, and match thesefeaturestoa database of objectstodetermine thelocationand
theorientationof the objects.These systems proved towork wellin structuredenvironments
or in somewhat uncertainenvironments populated by well known objects.Because of their
limitedcapabilityto acquireand use sensordata however, they are severelylimitedin their
abilitytoresolveambiguities,toidentifyspuriousinformation,and todetectfailures.
To address these limitations an extensive research effort is currently underway at
universities (e.g., University of Rochester, University of Michigan, Brown, Stanford/SRI,
CMU, M'IT), government (e.g., JPL, NIST, Oak Ridge, Sandia) and many industry
organizations. The current research is geared towards both advanced teleoperations and
autonomous operations through novel architectures which allow acquisition and use of muti-
msensor data streams. Development of higher level, and task level programming languages
which buffer low level operations such as sensor interactions and manipulators movements
from the users are also the subject of current research. At the highest level of abstraction
there is a resurgence of research interest in integrated robotics, AI, and perception research
towards the type of semi-autonomous or autonomous operations which may be desired for
future lunar and Mars missions. In such a system the execution of a given task may start
with a deliberate plan, but allow modifications based on real time decisions which may be
necessary to effectively deal with an unexpected situation faced during the task execution. To
perceive the environment at the level of detail necessary for resolving real-time ambiguities
the robot system should be capable of dealing with a variety of sensor data streams
intelligently and efficiently.
NASA EXPERIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STATUS
Early in the Space Station program NASA in response to a request by the U.S.
Congress performed an assessment of the applications of the automation and robotics
technology in Space Station operation. This assessment was based on NASA's past
experience with the technology -- e.g., Mars Viking Lander and RMS - as well as the results
of the following five studies:
I. Autonomous system assembly by _ Marietta
2. Subsystems and mission ground support by Hughes
3. Space manufacturing by General Electric
4. Satelliteservicing by TRW
5. Operator system interface by Boeing.
A report entitled "An Independent Study of Automation and Robotics for the National
Space Program" (Automation and Robotics Panel, 1985) summarized the i-_suits of thescfive
studies and noted considerable potential for robotics technology in the areas of assembly,
inspection, satellite servicing, and manufacturing. New advances needed to perform the
projected activities were defined. Recommendations presented in this report for the IOC
phase are the basis for early capabilities and functionality planned for the-S_,_tems _r_fly
being developed by the U.S. ( Flight Telerobotic Servicer, the FTS), and as part of the
international Space Station program, the Canadians (Mobile Remote Manipulator System, the
MRMS) and the Japanese programs. Other studies which have been assisting in projecting
required functionalities, likely capabilities, and technology requirements are Smith et al.,
"The Space Station Assembly Phase: FTS Feasibility", (1987), and Drews, "Telerobotic and
EVA Joint Analysis System, TEJAS", (1989). The Smith study provides an unique man-
machine automation tradeoff methodology which reduces EVA tasks down to equivalent
robotic tasks, derives required technologies and conceptual designs, and then assesses the net
benefits of replacing/augmenting EVA tasks with a tcleoperated or supervised autonomous
robotic counterpart. The technique also assesses the risks associated with incowrorating_w
technology. A related component of the overqall trade.off scheme, TEJAS, allows one to
rapidly prototype EVA assembly/servicing tasks, reduce them to robotic primitives, and
perform productivity savings projections/trades through the use of a relational database.
(1987)NASA's robot technology program is based on two parallel paths, dcvelopment, _paee
qualification and operational integration of teleoperated manipulators (FTS, RMS, and
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MRMS), and an extensive research program focussed on developing progressively more
autonomy into the operational capabilities of manipulators.
The FTS, and to a lesser extent the MRMS and the RMS, have or are being developed
with features designed to facilitate the future incorporation of automatic and autonomous
capabilities as they are developed and demonstrated in the research programs, i.e.,, all three
arms areprogrammable and theITS utilizesa flexiblehierarchicalcontrolarchitecture.
A reportdescribingFTS evolution requirements iscurrentlyavailablein draftform
(GSFC, 1989). The study showed thatimprovement inthe performance of threefunctions,
(pathplanning,non-contactalignment,and contactplanningand control)would maximize the
performance of the FTS for itsmost frequentlyrequiredtasks.The reportprovides trade-off
maps for each of the three functions which suggest the task elements for which the
substitutionof automated programs inplaceof human controlwould bc technicallypractical
and possibleintherelativelynearterm. The reportalsoincludesan appendix which provides
an overview of the long-termpath tothenearlyfullyautonomous FTS of thefuture.
A current overview of the research path is presented in ADVANCES IN SPACE
ROBOTICS (Varsi,1989) a JPL studypresentedattheXXXXth congress of theIAF Oct 7-
13, 1989. The reportplaces the roboticresearch at JPL, other NASA laboratoriesand at
universitiesinfourcategories:
• Stateof practice teleoperation(SPT)
• Anthropomorphic exoskeleton(EXO)
* Computer aided teleoperation (CAT)
• Sul_rvised telerobotics(STR)
The figurebelow (Varsi,1989) organizes thesetechnicalapproaches to robot control
intooperationalregimes definedby thecommunication delayrequiredby themission,and the
relativecomplexity and uncertainty of the task structure.The chart indicatesthatpure
tcleoperationislimitedto situationswhich have essentiallyno communication time delay
operatingin a highly structuredenvironment with littletaskuncei'taintyand complexity. It
also shows thatboth the CAT and the EXO controlstrategiesarc severely limitedby the
communication delay factor,leavingthe futureof missions with over one second time delay
tothe development of supervisedtcleroboticontrolsystems which issueoperatorcommands
at an abstracttask level These operator commands would be implemented by automatic
controlfunctions,monitored and modified by localsensorinformation.
For thereasonillustratedby theperformance chart,thecurrentrobotresearchprogram is
focused on developing the elements of a practicalSTR system, which Varsi (1989) notes
requirestwo principalfunctionstobe added tothehierarchicalcontrolstructureof a telcrobot:
• Machine visionsubsystem torecalibrateorupdate thework-siteinformation
* Task planning subsystem forsequencing macro-instructionsand reasoning
about thegeometry of thework-site.
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HIGH MEDIUM LOW ,q-----TASK STRUCTURE
LOW MEDIUM HI G H,_------C OM P LE XITY/
UNCERTAINTY
COMMUNICATION .......... ............
DELAY (x2)
-1 SEC
-0.1 SEC
SPT = STATE OF PRACTICE
TELEOPERATION
CAT = COMPUTER AIDED
TELEOPERATION
EXO = ANTHROPOMORPHIC
EXOSKELETON
STR = SUPERVISED
TELEROBOTICS
Figure F-1. Control Technology for Space Robots
m
m
mE
i
J
b
El
m
i
b
D
l
F-4
mm
m
F_
_2
!
E :
b
w
F
APPENDIX G
NASA A&R CONTACT POINTS
Ted Ackerson
Telesciencc Workstation
MailStop: 522.2
Goddard Space Flight Center
FTS: 888-3208 [(301) 286-3208]
NASAMail: [TAckerson/GSFCMail]
Allan E. Brandli
OMS Integration WG Manager
MailStop: EH3
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
(713) 483-8238, FTS: 525-8238
NASAMail: ABrandli
Alan Adams
Space Station Projects Office
MailStop: KA41
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
(205) 544-3607, FTS: 824-3607
NASAMail: AMAdams
Allen Brewer
TFCR AI prototypes
MailStop: FS72
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
(713) 483-7042, FTS: 525-7042
NASAMail: A.Brewer
David W. Allen
MailStop: EB44
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
(205) 544-3821, FTS: 824-3821
David Atkinson, Manager
Computer Science & Applications Section
MailStop: 301-490
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(818) 354-2555, FTS: 792-2555
NASAMaiI: DAtldnson
Darrell G. Bailey
MailStop: Ell4
George C. Marshall Space Hight Center
(205) 544-2072, FTS: 824-2072
NASAMail: DABailey
Ben Barker
Automation and Robotics Focal Point
MailStop: SSS
Space Station Freedom Program Office
(703) 487-7580
NASAMail: BBarker
Dave Barker
Transition Flight ControlRoom (TFCR)
MailStop: FACC/B2B
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
(713) 335-6530, FTS: 525-6530
Curtis S. Barrett
Software Support Environment (SSE)
Space Station Freedom Program Office
(202) 453-8933
NASAMail: CBarrctt
Edward S. Chevers, Chief
Spacecraft Software Division
MailStop: FR
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
(713) 483-8225, FTS: 525-8225
NASAMail: EChevers
Barbara J. Cobb
MallStop: EL12
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
(205) 544-2190, FTS: 824-2190
NASAMail: BCobb
L. Stephen Colts, Technical Manager
Power Systems Engineering Group
MailStop: 303-300
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(818) 354-9734, FTS: 792-9734
NASAMail: SColes
Patricia M Cooney
MailStop: EL12
George C. Marshall Space Hight Center
(205) 544-2029, FTS: 824-2029
NASAMail: PCooney
Kenneth J. (=rouse
Design Knowledge Capture
MailStop: EF5
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
(713) 483-2040, FTS: 525-2040
NASAMail: KCrouse
Christopher J. Culbert
CLIPS
MailStop: FR5
G-1
bLyndon B. Johnson Space Center
(713) 483-8080, FTS: 525-8080
NASAMaiI: CCulbert
Tom E. Davis
KSC AI activities
John F. Kennedy Space Center
(305) 867-3494, FTS: 823-3494
NASAMail: TDavis
Brandon S. Dewberry
ECI_S Test Bed
MailStop: EB42
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
FTS: 824-4247 [(205)544-4247]
NASAMail: BDewberry
James Dolce
LcRC EPS Test Bed
MailStop: 8840
Lewis Research Center
(216) 433-8052, FTS: 297-8052
NASAMail: JDolce
Tom Dollman
Hubble Space Telescope, DKC
MailStop: EB44
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
(205) 544-3823, FTS 824-3823
NASAMail: TDoUman
Jeffrey S. Dominick
Thermal Control System Test Bed,
TEXSYS
MailStop: EC2
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
(713) 483-9132, FTS: 525-9132
NASAMaiI: /I_minick
Robert Dominy
Local Area Network Expert System
(LANES)
MailStop: 522.3
Goddard Space Flight Center
Katherine Douglas
DMS Advanced Development Tasks
MailStop: EH431
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
(713) 483-8369, FTS: 525-8369
NASA.Mail: K.Douglas
Richard J Doyle, Group Leader
AI Research & Applications
MailStop: 366
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
(818) 354-6476, FTS: 792-6476
NASAMail: Rl_ylc
Richard E. Eckelkamp
OMS Ground & Onboard Planning
prototype
MailStop: FM4
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
FTS: 525-817i [(713) 483-8171]
NASAMail: REckelkamp
Robcrto W. Egusquiza
GEPDC Test Bed
MailStop: EH431
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
(713) 483-8284, FTS: 525-8284
NASAMail: RE,gusquiza
Jon Erickson
Assistant to Division Chief for A&R; DKC
FAM
MailStop:" EEl 11
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
(713) 483-8119, FTS: 525-8119
NASAMail: J.Erickson
Alan Fernquist, Chief
Advanced Missions Technology Office
MailStop: 244-7
Ames Research Center
(415) 694-5699, FTS: 464-5699
NASAMail: AFemquist
Barry Fox
Planning & Scheduling
MailStop:
McDonnell Douglas, Houston, "IX
(713) 283-4194, FTS: 525-4194
Michael S. Freeman
Design Knowledge Capture
MailStop: SSE
Space Station Freedom Program Office
(703) 487-7520
NASAMaiI: MFreeman
Ernest M. Fridge Irl
Advanced Software Development WS
MailStop: FR5
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center :_
(713) 483-8109, FTS: 525-8i09
NASAMail: EEridge
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Peter Friedland, Chief
AI Research Branch
MailStop: 244-17
Ames Research Center
FTS: 464-4277 [(415) 694-4277]
NASAMail: PFriedland
Dennis L. Gallagher
Space Science Laboratory
MailStop: ES01
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
(205) 544-7587, FTS: 824-7587
NASAMail: DGallagher
Brian J. Glass
Thermal Expert System (TEXSYS)
MailStop: R244-7
Ames Research Center
(415) 694-3379, FTS: 464-3379
NASAMafl: BJGlass
Andre Goforth
AI and Ada
MailStop: ,244-4
Ames Research Center
(415) 694-4242, FTS: 464-4242
NASAMaiI: AGoforth
Terry L. Grant
Advanced Architectures Test Bed
MailStop: 24,6-4
Ames Research Center
(415) 694-4200, FTS: 464-4200
NASAMail: TGrant
Elaine Hansen
OASIS
Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space
PhySics
University of Colorado
Boulder, CO 80309
Matthew A. Hanson
OMS Global FDIR prototype
MailStop: FACC
Ford Aerospace Corporation, Houston, TX
(713) 335-6230, FTS: 525-6230
NASAMail: MHamon
Jonathan (Pepper) Hartley
PMS Test Bed, PMS Evolution
MaJlStop: 512.1
Goddard Space Flight Center
(301) 286-8540, FTS: 888-8540
NASAMail: [JI-Iartley/GSFCMail] GSFC
Robert A. Hasbrouck
IBM DMS Test Bed
MailStop: IBM/WP-2, MC3606
IBM, Houston, TX
(713) 282-7801
Gerry R. Higgins
KEE/Ada
MailStop: EL26
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
FTS: 824-5462 [(205) 544-5462]
NASAMail: GHiggins
Bill S. Ho
Multi-System Integration Facility (MSIF)
MailStop: FR4
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
(713) 483-4936, FTS: 525-4936
NASAMail: BHo
Wendy Holladay
Payload Simulator
MailStop: HA41
John L. Stennis Space Center
FTS: 494-1927 [(601) 688-1927]
NASAMaiI: WHolladay
Todd A. Holloway
MailStop: EL14
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
(205) 544-2073, FTS: 824-2073
NASAMafl: THolloway
Peter Hughes
Comm Ifnk Expert Assistant Resource
MailStop: 522.3
Goddard Space Flight Center
FTS: 888-3120 [(301) 286-3120]
NASAMaiI: [PHughes/GSFClviail] GSFC
Larry G. Hull
SCAN Test Bed, PMS Scheduler
MailStop: 522.2
Goddard Space Flight Center
FTS: 888-3009 [(301) 286-3009]
NASAMail: [I./-Iull/GSFCMail] GSFC
William R. Humphries, Chief
Environmental Control and Life Support
Branch
MailStop: EL22
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
G-3
(205) 544-7228, FTS: 824-7228
NASAMail: WHumphries
John P. Japp
ESP scheduler
MailStop: EL22
George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
(205) 544-2226, FTS: 824-2226
NASAMaiI: JJaap
Sally C.Johnson
KBS Verification and Validation
MailStop: 130
Langley Research Center
(804) 865-6504, FTS: 928-6504
NASAMaiI: SCJohnson
Henry Kaup
WP-2 Automation and Robotics Focal Point
MailStop: KC5
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
FTS: 525-0022 [(713)483-0022]
NASAMail: HKaup
Michael J. Kearney
OMS Global FDIR prototype
MailStop: FS54
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
FTS: 525-7060 [(713) 483-7060]
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NASA Headquarters
(202) 453-2864, FTS: 453-2864
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MailStop: 522.1
Goddard Space Flight Center
(301) 286-8609, FTS: 888-8609
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AI Research
MailStop: 522.3
Goddard Space Flight Center
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George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
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George C. Marshall Space Flight Center
(205) 544-3887, FTS: 824-3887
NASAMaiI: CWANG
Del W. Weathers
DMS Working Group
MailStop: SS$ ....
Space S_ationF'rer.domProgram Office
(703) 487-7248
NASAMail: DWeathers
Dennis J.Webb
OMA PI and ISA Prototypes
MailStop: DS3
Lyndon B. _Io-linson Space Center
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Ames Research Center
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AAI_S
AI
APEX
APS
A&R
ARAMIS
ARC
ART
ATM
CA1T
CAP
CAT
CMU
C&T
DEC
DKC
DMS
EVA
tK)CO
EPS
ES
EXO
FCR
FDF
APPENDIX K
GLOSSARY
Automated Air Load Planning System
Artificial Intelligence
Automated Power Expert
Astronaut Positioning System
Automation and Robotics
Automation, Robotics, and Machine Intelligence Systems
Ames Research Center
Automated Reasoning Tool
Apollo Telescope Mount
Computer-Aided Instructional Trainer
Crew Activity Plan
Computer Aided Teleopcration
Camegic-Mdlon University
Communications and Tracking
Digital .Eq_iptmnt Corporation
Design Knowledge Captur_
Data Management System
Extravehicular Activity
Extended Duration Crew Operations
Electrical Power System
Expert System
Anthropomorphic Exoskeleton
Flight Control Room
Hight Data File
K-1
gFD1R
FRAMES
FTS
FY
GATES
GSFC
HQ
HDTV
HST
HSTORE
ICAT
ICE
IESP
INCO
ITSSO
IVA
;£M
/PL
JSC
KBS
KEE
KSC
LaRC
LeRC
LES
LPLMS
MALs
Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery used here to include Fault
Diagnosis
Fault Recovery And Management Expert System
Flight Telerobotic Servicer
Fiscal Year
Gate Assignment and Tracking System
Goddard Space Flight Center
Headquarters
High De_ition Television
Hubble Space Telescope
HST Operational Readiness Expert
Intelligent Computer-Aided Training
Isolated and Confined Environments
INCO Expert System Project
Integrated Communications Officer
Intelligent Tutoring System for Satel_teOperators
Intravehicular Activity
Japanese Ex_ment Module
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Johnson Space Center
Knowledge-Based System
Knowledge Engineering Environment
Kennedy Space Center
Langley Research Center
Lewis Research Center
Loads Enable Scheduler
Loads Priority List Management System
Malfunction Procedures
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MCC
M1T
MCD
MPSR
MRMS
MSD
MSFC
NASA
NASREM
NICBES
NIST
NRL
OAST
OMS
ORU
OSF
OSS
PAM/D
PC
PI
PMAD
PMS
POCC
POIC
RALPH
RMS
RTDS
Mission Control Center
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Mission Operations Dir_torate
MullL_hn'pose Support Rooms
Mobile Remote Manipulator System
Mission Support Directorate
Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NASA/NBS Standard Reference Model
Nice,el-Cadmium Battery Expert System
National Instimm Standards Technology
Naval Research Laboratory
Office of Aeronatics and Space Technology
Operations Management System
On-orbit Replacen_. nt Unit
Office of Space Flight
Offu:e of Space Station
Payload Assist Module/Deploys
Personal Computer
Principal Investigator.
Power Managern_nt and Distribution
Platform Management System
Payload Operations Control Center
Payload Operations Integration Center
Resource Allocation and Planning Helper
Remote Manipulator System
Re,al-T'tme Data Systems
K-3
DSHARP
SIN[
SL
SLS
SMS
SOC
SPDM
SPT
SRI
SSC
SSCC
SSE
SSFP
SSHPS
SSM/PMAD
STR
STS
TALOS
TCS
TEXSYS
THURIS
TMIS
U.S.
VLSI
Spacecraft Health Automated Reasoing Prototype
Simulation
Spac,clab
Spacelab Simulator
Shuttle Mission Simulator
Space Operations Center
Special Purpose Dexterous Manipulator
State of Practice Teleoperation
Stanford Research Institute
Stennis Space Center
Space Station Conuv1 Center
Software Support Environment
Space Station Freedom Program
Space Station Human Productivity Study
Space Station Module (bah/lab)PMAD
Supervised Telerobotics
SpaceTransportationSystem
Telemcu-yAnalysisLogicforOrbitingSpacecraft
Thermal ControlSystem
Thermal Expert System
The Human Role in Space Study
T_chnical Management Information System
United States
Very Large Scale Integration
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